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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the value of housing which is a specific group of investment assets and a 
major component of household wealth for the UK, in particular the primary valuation drivers of 
the UK housing prices, by using quantitative modelling. Understanding the primary valuation 
drivers of housing prices will make market participants aware of the size of their risk exposure 
and can help them to detect early signals of the possibility of investment opportunities. Policy-
makers can use information about the underlying valuation drivers of the house prices to stabilize 
the market. This thesis contributes to literature both methodologically and empirically. This 
thesis proposes a three-step theoretical framework for studying the drivers of housing prices. The 
rationale is that people make investment decisions by studying the underlying costs and benefits. 
Additionally, people respond to expectations under the given behaviour rules, which refer to the 
institutions in place. There are a series of empirical findings. Firstly, the classical fixed 
parameter models are poor in terms of robustness, especially the regression coefficient changes 
in both magnitude and sign over samples. The time varying coefficients indicate the possibility 
of institutional changes and the changes in expectations. Secondly, the thesis supports the 
bounded rationality expectation hypothesis implying that the UK housing bubbles reflect 
people’s biased expectations. The UK house prices were undervalued from 1996Q1 to 2002Q4; 
and thereafter overvalued. As a proportion, the bubble ranges from -52% to 27.4% in log scale. 
Thirdly, the thesis empirically supports that the UK housing market experiences both fast-
moving and slow-moving institutional changes over previous decades. Fourthly, the thesis does 
not support the feedback theory. Overall, the three-step theoretical framework is empirically 
supported. Through a series of institutional changes, people’s biased expectations are playing a 
far more important role in driving the UK house prices than the fundamentals. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 The Need for the Housing Valuation 
This thesis investigates the value of housing which is a specific group of investment assets, in 
particular the primary valuation drivers of the UK housing prices, by using quantitative 
modelling. In practice, there are direct housing investments such as ownership of residences; and 
indirect housing investments such as investment in companies that develop and manage housing, 
and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT). Throughout this thesis, the term of housing primarily 
means private residential and is interchangeable with real estate and property. 
Housing prices are important at three levels. Firstly, at the macroeconomic level, housing 
appears to lead the business cycle (Leamer, 2007). This is because increasing house prices can 
make homeowners feel more secure, motivating willingness to consume, while providing them 
collateral against which they can borrow. Higher purchasing power, and greater readiness to use 
it, can thus raise demand in the economy and increase economy activity and vice versa. 
Secondly, at the corporate level, financial firms’ risks/returns are built up when house prices are 
increasing. The high yield on housing incentive financial firms, particularly banks, to indulge in 
lending to house developers and homebuyers. The financial risks materialized in the aftermath of 
house price declines. The impacts are asymmetrical, being more significant in the recession 
period than in the boom period. 
Thirdly, at the household level, housing is a major asset in the household portfolio. Changes in 
house prices have significant influence on the wealth holdings of households, and the distribution 
of wealth within the economy. 
1.2 General Introduction to the Thesis 
1.2.1 Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Chapter 2 proposes a three-step theoretical framework for studying the primary drivers of 
housing prices. Firstly, what common factors may drive the housing risk-return? Secondly, how 
the desirability of outcome or expectation drives people to behave on the house prices (Lucas 
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critique)? Thirdly, how the changes in institutions will affect the housing market? The rationale 
is that people make investment decisions by studying the underlying costs and benefits. 
Additionally, people respond to expectations under the given behaviour rules, which refer to the 
institutions in place. Following the three-step framework, Chapter 2 reviews literature from three 
interrelated aspects: 
 Firstly, the value of investments, especially the common factors that are specific to the 
UK housing price in a closed economy and an open economy, respectively. 
 Secondly, the ‘value’ of housing and the implications of four typical expectation 
hypotheses, namely, Irrational Expectation Hypothesis, Adaptive Expectation Hypothesis, 
Rational Expectation Hypothesis, and Bounded Rationality Expectation Hypothesis. 
 Thirdly, the institutions and the effect of institutional changes on UK house pricing. 
Throughout Chapter 2, there are considerable controversies among the literature. Therefore, 
Chapters 3 through to 7 run a battery of quantitative models for two purposes: 
 Firstly, whether the three-step analytical framework is empirically supported? 
 Secondly, what drives UK housing prices by quantifying the effect of these common 
factors, expectations and institutional changes? 
1.2.2 Chapter 3: Updating the Econometric Modelling of House Prices in the United Kingdom 
Chapter 3 replicates the principal equations of Hendry (1984) to four recent datasets. This 
chapter aims to demonstrate the limitations of Hendry (1984), which set the scene for the 
development of models in Chapters 4 through to 7. Chapter 3 addresses two issues: 
 Firstly, Hendry (1984) is the last major work on the UK housing market using classical 
demand and supply equations, in which house prices are determined by the demand for 
housing. It is an interesting study to see if the result of Hendry (1984) is replicable by the 
similar datasets, in particular more recent datasets? 
 Secondly, Brown et al. (1997) suggest the early studies, including Hendry (1984), are 
poor in terms of robustness. The chapter considers whether simple modifications can 
improve the model fit and robustness? 
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The findings are mixed. In the data descriptive section, the findings are roughly consistent with 
Hendry (1984) in the same time period. However, the regression coefficients change in both 
magnitude and sign over samples indicate the poor robustness of Hendry (1984). Chapter 3 finds 
that some naïve modifications will improve the fit of the underlying equation. However, it is 
unclear why people should make such a modification. Brown et al. (1997) suggest that time 
varying coefficients indicate the possibility of institutional changes and the changes in the 
unobservable components of economic variables, such as expectations. Chapters 4 through to 7 
will address the effect of institutional changes and expectations on the UK housing prices step by 
step. 
1.2.3 Chapter 4: Econometric Modelling of UK House Prices in an Open Economy 
Chapter 4 incorporates the Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) into the equations of Chapter 3, 
ceteris paribus. FPI reflects one institutional changes in the UK since the 1970s that Hendry 
(1984) does not consider. Chapter 4 considers two issues: 
 Firstly, whether an open economy framework is empirically superior to its closed 
economy counterpart, in terms of model robustness? 
 Secondly, whether FPI drives the UK’s house prices to a statistically significant extent? 
The findings in Chapter 4 are generally consistent with Chapter 3, which demonstrate that an 
open economy framework is not empirically superior to its closed economy counterpart in the 
absence of suitable modelling techniques. Both of Chapters 3 and 4 suggest the classical fixed 
parameter demand and supply equations are inappropriate in studying house prices in the UK. 
Furthermore, changes in FPI do not statistically significantly drive the UK house prices, under 
the given models. 
1.2.4 Chapter 5: Identification of House Price Bubbles using User Cost in a State Space 
Model 
The time varying coefficients in Chapters 3 and 4 prompt Chapter 5 to investigate the effect of 
expectations on housing prices. Chapter 5 considers two issues: 
 Firstly, how much variation in house price results from bubbles? 
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 Secondly, whether the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis will best fit into the 
UK housing market? 
This thesis suggests that persistent and substantial divergence between market price and its 
equilibrium value is evidence of a bubble. The bounded rationality hypothesis argues that people 
make expectations and decisions to help them satisfice, rather than make theoretically optimal 
decisions. The chapter contributes to the literature both methodologically and empirically. Firstly, 
this chapter proposes a user cost framework within a state space model. The user cost framework 
suggests that people should be indifferent between renting and purchasing, given the same cost 
and housing attributes. The user cost of holding a house is the sum of six components, namely, 
foregone interest, property tax, maintenance cost, the risk premium for the larger uncertainty of 
purchasing relative to renting, and the marginal tax for the house buyer. A state space model 
consists of two equations: a measurement equation (or signal equation) and a state equation (or 
transition equation). The measurement equation illustrates the relationship between observed 
variables and unobserved state variables. The state equation illustrates the dynamics of the 
unobserved state variables, normally in the form of an AR(p) in the state vector. 
Using a user cost framework within a state space model has clear methodological advantages. In 
the first step, the fundamental house price-rent ratio is calculated using the enhanced user cost 
framework, which has the benefit when compared to many prior papers incorporating all relevant 
variables. In the second step, the method can advantageously estimate the level of any bubble by 
incorporating the fundamental price-rent ratio into a state space model by taking advantage of a 
Kalman filter. Secondly, the empirical results indicate that UK house prices were undervalued 
from 1996Q1 to 2002Q4; and thereafter overvalued. As a proportion, the bubble ranges from -52% 
to 27.4% in log scale, which is indeed quite a substantial range. The chapter supports the 
bounded rationality expectation hypothesis implying the UK housing bubbles reflect people’s 
biased expectations. 
1.2.5 Chapter 6: Investigation of Institutional Changes in the UK Housing Market by 
Structural Break Tests and Time Varying Parameter Models 
Distinct from Chapter 5, Chapter 6 expands Chapters 3 and 4 by empirically studying the time 
varying coefficients from two aspects: 
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 Firstly, whether the institutional changes in the UK housing market are empirically 
supported by using the Bai and Perron (1998) structural break tests and the Time Varying 
Parameter (TVP) models in which the parameters vary with time? 
 Secondly, whether the institutional changes in the UK have short (less than 1 year) or 
long term (more than 1 year) effects? 
This chapter contributes to the literature from two aspects. Firstly, the dates of structural breaks 
or fast-moving institutional changes appear to match market shocks rather than political events. 
It seems the unexpected shock, in particular the financial crisis, caused people to coordinate their 
future anticipations around the rules of the economy and thereby led to a structural break. 
Secondly, this chapter expands on the literature by using three novel Kalman filtering based 
Time Varying Parameter (TVP) models to quantify the slow-moving institutional changes in the 
UK housing market. The three TVP models are; the Time Varying Parameter with Principal 
Component Analysis (TVP-PCA), Time Varying Parameter with Principal Component Analysis 
and Bubbles (TVP-PCA-Bubble), and Time Varying Parameter with Error Correction Model 
(TVP-ECM). The TVP models empirically suggest that people’s biased expectations or housing 
price bubbles are playing much more important role in driving the UK house prices than ever. 
However, the effects of fundamental variables on housing prices are decaying over time. Overall, 
the TVP models suggest there are long term institutional changes in the UK over previous 
decades. 
1.2.6 Chapter 7: Understanding the Causal Relationship between Changes in House Prices 
and Bubbles: Evidence from the UK Regional Panel Data 
To check whether the time series analyses in Chapters 3 through to 6 are robust over time, 
Chapter 7 applies the panel data analysis to four recent UK datasets and considers two issues: 
 Firstly, whether the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis best fit into the UK 
housing market in the context of panel data analysis? 
 Secondly, whether the feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) is supported in the UK 
housing market? 
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The bounded rationality expectation captures the idea that asset prices overreact to relevant 
information on fundamentals. However, people learn from their mistakes and attempt to satisfice 
by acting as rationally as possible. The feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) suggests that when 
house prices as a whole appreciate significantly, this generates many investor success stories, 
and these stories entice potential investors, who naively extrapolate that they will achieve the 
same success if they invest too, and vice versa. The repetition of this process drives prices higher 
and higher and vice versa, for a while. The feedback theory implies that there is a positive 
feedback causal relationship between people’s expectations and the subsequent house prices and 
vice versa. The feedback theory appears as a type of adaptive expectation hypothesis which 
means that people usually form their expectations of an economic variable by taking a weighted 
mean of past values and an ‘error adjustment’ term. 
This chapter contributes to the literature from two aspects. Firstly, the chapter empirically 
indicates that the changes in people’ expectations best fit the bounded rationality hypothesis in 
the context of the panel data analysis. Relative to Shiller (2007), the chapter estimates the 
regional fundamental value takes account of mortgage rates, people’s risk aversions, taxes and 
the most recent UK datasets. Relative to Mayer (2007) and Hubbard and Mayer (2009), the study 
incorporates the people’s unbiased expected capital gain and the quarterly adjusted risk premium 
into the estimation of the fundamental house price. Secondly, the chapter provides the first 
empirical evidence to justify the statistically significant feedback causality, between the changes 
in bubble and the contemporaneous changes in house prices by using the Fixed Effects Model 
(FEM). The feedback causality is robust even when taking the mortgage rate and the more recent 
datasets into account. This chapter supports the bounded rationality hypothesis best fit into the 
UK housing market. However, the chapter does not support the feedback theory (Shiller, 
1990,2007) because an increase in bubble could cause a subsequent decrease in house price, 
ceteris paribus. The positive feedback causal relationship between the changes in house price 
and the contemporaneous changes in bubble are asymmetrical. One unit changes in bubble could 
approximately drive one unit changes in house price, after controlling for the fundamental 
variables. By contrast, one unit changes in house price only causes about 60% unit changes in 
bubble. Furthermore, the regression coefficients changes modestly over time indicate that there 
are institutional changes. 
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Overall, the findings in Chapters 3 through to 7 are consistent and support the three-step 
analytical framework in Chapter 2. Simply put, housing prices are not only determined by 
fundamental economic variables but also people’s expectations, under the given institutions in 
place. Through a series of institutional changes, people’s biased expectations are playing a far 
more important role in driving the UK house prices than the fundamentals. 
8 
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review 
This chapter reviews the value of housing, in particular which factors are specific to housing 
investment. Understanding the primary valuation drivers of housing prices will make market 
participants aware of the size of their risk exposure and can help them to detect early signals of 
the possibility of investment opportunities. Furthermore, policy-makers can use information 
about the underlying valuation drivers of the house prices to stabilize the market. 
Reilly and Brown (2011) regard an investment as the current commitment of funds for a period 
of time with the aim of deriving future payments that will compensate the investor for three 
things. Firstly, the time the money is committed that is the pure rate of interest. Secondly, the 
expected rate of inflation during this time period and thirdly, the uncertainty of payments from 
the investment. In financial markets, the typical investor will range from individuals and 
governments, to a diverse selection of institutions. The investment instruments include not only 
stocks and bonds, but also housing and so on. 
Generally, investments are valued using Markowitz’s emphasis on ‘nothing ventured, nothing 
gained, but do not put all eggs into one basket’ and Tobin’s insights into the risk-return trade-off 
(Fabozzi and Markowitz, 2002). Furthermore, one can capture the influences of macroeconomic 
events on individual assets through microeconomic characteristics (Rosenberg and Marathe, 
1976), essentially common factors. 
This chapter proposes a three-step theoretical framework for studying the primary drivers of 
housing prices. Firstly, what common factors may drive the housing risk-return? Secondly, how 
the desirability of outcome or expectation drives people to behave on the house prices (Lucas 
critique)? Thirdly, how the changes in institutions will affect the housing market? The rationale 
is that people make investment decisions by studying the underlying costs and benefits. 
Additionally, people respond to expectations under the given behaviour rules, which refer to the 
institutions in place. 
Housing often provides excellent risk-return trade-off and good diversification potential to stocks 
and bonds portfolios. Relative to the stocks and bonds investment, direct housing investment 
provides many advantages. For example, 
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 Direct control of the property which rewards the owner from two aspects, rental income 
and capital gain;  
 Highly likely to have residual value no matter what kind of shock it may experience in 
the space and capital markets; 
 Ability to use more leverage by using mortgage; 
 Ability to diversify geographically; 
 Often an inflation hedge in the long run; 
 Many expenses are tax deductible in specific countries. 
However, direct housing investment also has some typical disadvantages. For instance, 
 Poor liquidity and difficult to evaluate; 
 Lack of divisibility indicates a single investment can be a huge part of the investor’s 
portfolio; 
 High information and transaction costs; 
 High operating and maintenance costs. 
Although altogether, these features make direct housing investment interesting, they are specific 
to each market participant. However, housing investment is not necessarily different to other 
types of investment (Parker, 2012). Following the three-step framework, Section 2.1 reviews the 
common factors in the housing market. Section 2.2 reviews the formation and effect of people’s 
expectation of the housing market. Section 2.3 reviews the institutions and institutional changes 
in the UK since 1970s. 
2.1 The Common Factors in the Housing Market 
A factor model provides a good framework for valuing investments (Zivot and Wang, 2006; 
Alexander, 2008; Tsay, 2010). With multi variable regressions, people can quantify the impact of 
one or more factors on asset risks and returns. According to the characteristics of the factors, 
there are three typical multifactor models. The macroeconomic factor model, in which, the 
factors are observable economic and financial time series like interest rates, as measures of 
pervasive or common factors in asset returns. In the fundamental factor model, people use 
observable asset specific attributes like dividend yield, to determine factors in asset returns. The 
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statistical factor model refers to the extraction of unobservable factors from asset returns, such as 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) for stock 
pricing. However, there are some conditions that underpin the use of CAPM, including high 
liquidity and minimum transactions costs which are not met in the case of direct housing 
investment. All three types of factor models share the general specification: 
                                                                                                             2. 1  
     is the return on asset   in time period  ,      is the  -   common factor in time period  ,      
is the factor beta or coefficient for asset   on the  -   factor which allows people to study the 
individual effects of each factor on asset return, ceteris paribus.      is the asset specific error 
term which is the unexplainable components of return on asset  . Common factor models can 
take the time series and/or cross section data. In general, the common factors are stationary with 
unconditional moments; error terms are uncorrelated with each of the common factors; and error 
terms are serially uncorrelated. 
Obviously, before applying the factor models, one has to theoretically identify which common 
factors may attribute to the asset returns. The theoretical housing literature can date back to the 
1920s or even earlier. Most of the earlier literature focuses on the US. 
Vanderblue (1927) and Simpson (1933) are pioneers of the study of the housing speculation and 
depression between 1916 and 1927 in the US, particularly in Florida. Hoyt (1933) studies the 
cyclical fluctuations of land values for rational real estate investment policy using one hundred 
years of land values in Chicago, US. Thereafter, literature studies the long cycles in residential 
construction from three perspectives. Investigations of a primarily descriptive character, for 
example, Newman (1935) provides the necessary facts and suggestions for empirical study of the 
problem. Investigations containing statistical analysis, for example, Wenzlick (1933) suggests 
there is a very weak link between the general business cycle and mortgage foreclosure, 
particularly in Greater St. Louis, US. Wenzlick (1933) suggests construction is not a good 
measure of supply, either in terms of money or of permits. Investigations containing multiple 
correlation analysis, for instance, Derksen (1940) suggests the construction cycle is an example 
of a cycle independent of the variations in a general business cycle. Building on Tinbergen’s 
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Closed System of Equations, Derksen (1940) suggests that it is possible to predict the housing 
construction a couple of years in advance. 
Since the 1950s, rising literature studies the demand for and supply of housing, using a number 
of common factors, such as capital formation, cost of renting, taxation, migration, monetary 
policies, inflation, mortgages, nominal and real interest rate, housing services, inflation 
expectation, capital gain, capital market constraints, income, and so on. 
For instance, Grebler et al. (1956) suggest net capital formation in the housing sector shows a 
downward trend from 1890 to 1950; and there is no evidence of upward trend in per capita 
residential wealth. Grebler et al. (1956) infer that people’s preference for housing changed 
between 1890 and 1950. Reid (1958) challenges Grebler et al. (1956) by applying simple 
multivariate regression analysis. However, Grebler et al. (1959) clarify their arguments and 
defends Reid (1958)’s criticism. 
Shelton (1968) develops a theoretical model for evaluating whether it is economically better for 
people to own or rent their houses. The break-even point for people to buying a home is when 
the rent equals the total economic cost. The model can be shown as: 
    
            
 
                   
            
 
                                           
            
                  2. 2 
In equation (2.2),          is property tax,       is maintenance cost,      is obsolescence 
cost,      is mortgage rate. Shelton (1968) argues that the potential investment return and 
duration of tenancy play a critical role for deciding whether to rent or buy. Weiss (1978) 
criticizes Shelton (1968) does not consider the taxes on capital gain. Due to the existence of 
discriminatory taxes in some countries, capital gains impact people differently (Weiss, 1978). 
Relative to Shelton (1968), the user cost framework (Hendershott and Hu, 1983; Poterba, 
1985,1992) has the advantage of quantifying the level of housing price deviation from its 
fundamental value. Given its importance in empirical analysis, this thesis will explicitly review 
the user cost framework in Chapter 5. 
Mishkin (1976) argues that housing would be a less desirable portfolio asset if people’s debt 
holdings and income volatility are high; or anticipated income and gross financial holdings are 
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low. The illiquidity of the durable asset would increase the effective opportunity cost of holding 
the asset that is the liquidity risk premium. Similarly, McCulley (2008) argues that liquidity is 
not measured properly by the traditional monetary aggregate, but by people’s state of mind, in 
particular their ‘appetite for risk’. Generally, a higher appetite for risk would lead to higher 
liquidity and vice versa. 
There is a great deal of confusion about the link between expected inflation, mortgage payments 
and capital gain on housing investment (Schwab, 1982,1983). The first view argues that the 
nominal interest rate, which is the sum of inflation and the real interest rate, is a primary 
determinant of housing prices. For instance, Feldstein (1976) proposes a theoretical monetary 
growth model in which one can study the long-run impact of inflation, income tax, and the rate 
of interest on the cost of capital and the process of capital accumulation. Feldstein (1976) argues 
that the tax rates and saving behaviour determine the effect of inflation on capital intensity. 
Poterba (1985) suggests higher overall inflation normally drives up the nominal mortgage 
interest rate and generates higher nominal capital gains for homeowners. When the tax rate on 
housing gains is inconsequential, homeowners bear only partial higher interest costs but receive 
full housing gains. Expected inflation consequently reduces the effective expense of 
homeownership. The increase in expected inflation may have contributed to approximately 30% 
of increases in real house prices in the 1970s. Conversely, Kearl (1979) supports the hypothesis 
that fixed rate mortgages lead to deviations in the housing market in the face of expected 
inflation. The anticipation of inflation does not deteriorate the household’s real financial position, 
yet it has increased the real cost of debt service. Consequently, the anticipation of inflation drives 
an inter-temporal reallocation of people toward more saving and less consumption at the current 
term. These effects lead to a higher real cost of housing capital, lower demand for housing, and a 
lower equilibrium of housing prices and return, ceteris paribus. Fama and Gibbons (1982) 
demonstrate the hypothesis of Mundell (1963) and Tobin (1965) that the expected real return 
component of the interest rate is inversely related to the expected inflation. In the Mundell-Tobin 
framework, the variation in expected inflation leads to variation in the expected real return. 
However, Fama and Gibbons (1982) suggest the variation in expected real return is more 
fundamentally a result of the capital expenditures process. The second view proposes that 
demand for housing is independent of inflation expectation. Arcelus and Meltzer (1973) suggest 
that only real variables such as real interest rate are important. The third view suggests that the 
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truth lies somewhere between the first two views (Schwab, 1982,1983). Housing demand is a 
function of both the real interest rate and inflation expectation. Expected inflation has a greater 
effect on those that are prone to be constrained by capital market imperfections. Hendershott and 
Hu (1983) illustrate that a low income elasticity and capital market imperfections could offset the 
impact of the inflation-induced relative decline in the real user cost of housing on the 
accumulation of housing capital. 
The earlier empirical literature uses cross section and/or time series regressions. For instance, 
builds on Muth (1960) and Lee (1968), Leeuw (1971) studies the demand for housing by using 
cross section regression in log linear specification. For renter families, with deflated expenditure 
as the dependent variable, the equation is  
                                                                                                          2. 3 
With price as dependent, the equation is 
                                                                                                          2. 4 
  is median rental expenditure,   is an index of rental price,   is median income, and   is an 
index of the general price level. 
There are two typical microeconomic approaches in modelling housing prices. First, the 
monocentric approach is based on the urban general equilibrium theory (Muth, 1969). Second, 
the hedonic price approach, which is based on the microeconomic consumer theories (Rosen, 
1974). The monocentric approach assumes the housing price is a function of homogeneous units, 
‘housing services’, which are priced according to the distance-transport cost trade-offs. The 
hedonic price approach appears more suitable than the monocentric approach as housing 
investment is characteristic for its durability, heterogeneity, and spatial fixity. 
Rosen (1974) suggests the hedonic price approach treats goods as a package of inherent 
attributes. The relative price of one good is the sum of its marginal or implicit prices fitted 
through the regression analysis. Freeman (1979) proposes the theoretical framework for the 
application of the hedonic price approach to housing. The house price hedonic regression can be 
estimated by regressing the housing price against its key attributes, by using cross sectional 
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and/or time series data. Freeman (1979) suggests there are three key attributes in the housing 
market, namely, Structural attribute (S) such as the size of a building, Accessibility or Locational 
attribute (A) such as the distance to central business districts; and Neighbourhood (N) attribute 
such as the quality of surroundings. Thus, the housing price (P) is a function of S, A and N, as 
equation (2.5). 
                                                                                                                                                      2. 5 
The hedonic model has two steps (Rosen, 1974). The first step aims to fit the marginal price for 
the attribute of interest by running the housing price against its attributes. The second step is to 
identify the inverse demand curve function, based on the implicit price function in first step. 
However, Bartik (1987) disagrees with Rosen’s estimation procedures. Bartik (1987) and Chin 
and Chau (2003) suggest that the problems of hedonic estimation result from the endogeneity of 
both price and quantities of attributes in the context of a non-linear budget constraint, rather than 
the interaction between demand and supply. 
The hedonic price approach shares the main characteristics of the general time series and/or cross 
sectional data approaches. For instance, people only need to collect certain data such as housing 
price and the composition of housing attributes. The hedonic price approach allows people to 
study the individual effect of each housing attribute on housing price, ceteris paribus. However, 
this has a couple of specific limitations when compared to the general time series and/or cross 
sectional data approaches. For example, the hedonic price approach works only on the 
assumption of market equilibrium, whereas a large amount of literature disagrees with this 
assumption in the housing market. Moreover, hedonic regression is quite data consuming and 
some of the attributes are hard to measure. With hedonics, one must be aware of endogeneity, 
especially if one wants to construct a price curve. Finally, it does not explicitly consider the 
external factors such as taxes and interest rates (Chin and Chau, 2003). 
The rest of the thesis focuses on the UK housing market for two reasons. Firstly, it is interesting 
to study the housing market in other countries, given that the bulk of earlier literature focuses on 
the US. Secondly, the quality of datasets and market characteristics are comparable to the US. 
However, the analysis methodology can also apply to other countries. 
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Early UK housing literature (Whitehead, 1974; Mayes, 1979; Hendry, 1984) is built on the 
framework of demand and supply equations in which house prices are determined by the demand 
for housing. Through reviewing Hendry (1984), people can get a brief idea about how to apply 
factor models, especially the macroeconomic factor model and fundamental factor model into the 
UK housing market. Section 2.1.1 reviews Hendry (1984) which is a closed economy framework. 
Section 2.1.2 extends the housing literature into an open economy framework. 
2.1.1 Factor Models in a Closed Economy Framework 
In order to address the equilibrium housing price, Hendry (1984) firstly considers a static state 
where the completion of new houses   is exactly offset by the depreciation of the physical 
housing stock  . 
                                                                                                                                           2. 6 
Where   is the depreciation rate. The equilibrium meant the market is ‘cleared’ and has ‘no 
inherent tendency to change’. Equilibrium house price is where demand equals supply. Therefore, 
it generates a ‘normal profit’ to the construction industry when   is provided. The demand curve 
is a downward sloping curve, which indicates people want to buy more at lower prices. The 
supply curve is an upward sloping curve meaning that sellers are likely to supply more at higher 
prices. Sometimes, under certain circumstances, supply is a vertical line indicating that supply is 
constant. 
On the demand side, there are three sets of underlying factors: (1) demographic (e.g. the changes 
of household formation and working age population, changes in birth rates, employment and 
unemployment rate); (2) service flow (the utility derived from the size, quality, type); (3) asset 
demand (the relative yield obtained from home ownership as against ownership of alternatives). 
(1) The population size and composition significantly affect the number of shelter units and may 
in turn influence the size of average unit. Theoretically, there are N/F households given the 
population size of N with an average family size of F. This situation presents if, and only if, there 
is no homelessness and no one occupies additional dwelling units. Realistically however, a lot of 
people buy additional dwelling units for investment purposes. Thus, even though conditional on 
population size and family size, the number of owner occupied houses varies with underlying 
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factors such as credit availability, incomes, wealth holdings. Econometric modelling of 
demographic factors needs further improvement, despite rising attention over the past decades 
(Buckley and Ermisch, 1982; Mankiw and Weil, 1989). 
(2) The service flows provided by housing is a comprehensive bundle of attributes. Buckley and 
Ermisch (1982) suggest such a flow is frequently proportional to the housing stock reflected as a 
number of units in time series analyses. This assumption seems extremely inappropriate, being 
conditional on an assumption of constant composition within the physical housing stock H. 
Hendry (1984) suggests a constant price weighted average of the value of all existing units 
would be a more rational measuring of housing stock, denoted by  . This is analogous to the 
measure for ‘capital stock’. Hence,   is the accumulated depreciation of past constant price 
investment in housing. If the relative prices of the components comprising of a house are 
variable, then   and   deviate over time. The relative price of the two inputs changes for a cost-
minimizing builder who builds homogeneous units. It appears that   and   do not differ 
substantially even though one of the relative figures changes dramatically. Given there is no 
measure of private sector  , people have to tolerate crude proxy of   by  . 
(3) Incomes and the relative prices determine the corresponding assets demand. In theory, the 
selection of shelter (rented or owned) is separable from the level of demand. However, the taxes 
on housing inevitably influence asset and service demands. For instance, both net rental incomes 
and nominal capital gains generated from changes in house prices are taxed on a landlord in the 
UK. Neither the implicit rental revenues (the rent saved by living in the owned house) nor capital 
appreciations are taxed on an owner-occupier of a single unit. Hendry (1984) suggests rent 
controls on landlords are popular and tenure regulations are favourable to tenants, pushing 
further discouragement to let houses. However, Britain has probably the most liberalised private 
renting market in the European Union (EU) since 1989. The less security of tenure and long-term 
taxation imbalance between the rental and owned making it more attractive to rent than own than 
it was in before. The typical landlord has treated the buy-to-let as the mainstream of personal 
investments, and the tenants are now composited by far more immigrations and younger people. 
Without presenting a formal life-cycle model, equation (2.7) illustrates the anticipated sign of 
partial derivatives: 
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)                                                                                 2. 7 
Where, ρ is the real rental rate, R is the representative market interest rate,    is the mortgage 
rate, M is the gross mortgage advances, and T is the tax rate. And then, a log-linear specification 
is selected as consistent with the positivity of physical housing stock H, and this provides a 
flexible framework for a range of transformations on the endogenous variable including all of 
those exhibited in data description. 
In a dynamic condition, the real housing stock evolves as equation (2.8): 
                                                                                                                          2. 8 
Where    denotes private new completions plus net supply from other sectors such as the rental 
markets. Depreciation rate    likely changes with economic conditions but is treated as constant. 
When         and       , the equilibrium of (2.8) reproduces equation (2.6). At any given 
time,    is tiny compared to      and it is relatively dependant on the volume of construction in 
progress. Thus,      is a fixed supply of dwelling in the short term. Consequently, in the short 
run the demand for the existing housing will determine the house price. However, in the long run, 
demand determines the quantity of housing. 
Hendry (1984) suggests there are three factors which operate to induce dynamic feedbacks which 
likely alter the stock of available housing. Initially, capital gains are made by developers on land 
but these are taxed, unlike those made by owner-occupiers on their dwellings, distorting their 
relative incentives. Secondly, excess profits accruing on the stock of construction in progress is 
likely to alter the time profile of new construction. Thirdly, the relative price of land to 
construction cost changes and this induces substitution and the kind of dwelling desired. Static 
models are useless in studying the feedback mechanisms. However, the adjustment must 
continue until markets, stock and flow, are again in joint equilibrium, with new construction 
yielding normal profits. 
Alhashimi and Dwyer (2004) argue that neoclassical analysis of the housing market with its 
concentration on aggregated competitive markets is inadequate to study the housing market. The 
bulk of literature (Miller, 1982; Liu et al., 1990) suggests that the housing market may be 
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imperfect, or at least inefficient (Linneman, 1986; Gau, 1987). The neoclassical competitive 
model suggests that buyers want to buy more housing services at minimum prices. Sellers want 
to sell more housing services at maximum prices. One implicit assumption is buyers and sellers 
are independent. However, it is hard to measure how buyers and sellers can maximise returns if 
they do not hold perfect knowledge and analysis ability. Sometimes, people will buy one house 
while simultaneously selling another which indicates the market transactions are interdependent 
in a chain. 
Out of equilibrium, Hendry (1984) studies the effects of expectations regarding inflation and 
variations in asset prices on current housing prices by studying the cubic excess demand models 
and the cubic difference equations. However, Hendry (1984) concludes that these cubic models 
do not provide superior modelling ability. 
2.1.2 Factor Models in an Open Economy Framework 
The earlier housing literature, including Hendry (1984), assumes a closed economy, an economy 
that does not interact with the rest of world. Given the dramatic developments of globalization 
over the past half century, there is no real closed economy in today’s world. So, it appears 
somewhat problematic to model house prices without the consideration of international factors. 
Since the 1990s, rising literature studies house prices in an open economy. An open economy is 
one in which there are economic activities between the domestic and international community. 
In the 1990s, the literature primarily focuses on the relationship between the few explicit open 
economy variables and house prices. For example, Benson et al. (1997) argue the appreciation of 
the Canadian dollar will stimulate the Canadian demand for Washington properties in the US 
which, in turn, drive higher home prices. Jiang et al. (1998) suggest that the Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) make the housing sector perform well in Shanghai, China, despite the 
government’s tight monetary policy and the recession of the housing sector in the rest of China 
over the same period. Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) propose the unintended impact of the 
exchange rate is one of the dilemmas in determining house prices. The dilemma being if short-
term interest rates are increased for the purpose of cooling excessive house price appreciation, 
the real exchange rate might be raised. If the exchange rate overshoots, this may also hit a 
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country’s real economy via the volatility of interest rates and credit availability, then, influencing 
house prices. 
Post the Subprime Crisis, growing attention is paid to the effects of global macroeconomic 
imbalances on the asset pricing and financial crisis. The global macroeconomic imbalance refers 
to the imbalances between investment and savings in the major world economies (The Turner 
Review, 2009). For example, the substantial capital flows from current account surplus countries 
like Asian emerging economies to the deficit countries like the US and the UK. Given some of 
the surplus economies are committee to managing the exchange rates regime, the rising surplus 
claims are typically taken in the form of central bank reserves. These reserves are generally 
investing not in a wide array of equity, property or fixed income assets, but almost exclusively in 
apparently risk-free or close to risk-free government bonds or government guaranteed bonds. 
The key controversy among the literature is whether there is a causal relationship between the 
capital inflows and excessive liquidity (Whelan, 2010). If a causal relationship exists, then the 
global macroeconomic imbalance affects house pricing via credit mechanism. Bini-Smaghi 
(2009) proposes the US house boom would have been more modest and its burst less significant 
if US households had improved net savings. Global macroeconomic imbalances play a key role 
in the recent house prices boom-bust cycle (Astley et al., 2009; Bernanke, 2009; Guha, 2009; 
Portes, 2009). Adam et al. (2011) suggest that home prices are positively related to the 
deterioration of the current account. Some literature (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2006; Aoki 
et al., 2009) is not limited to the context of global macroeconomic imbalance. However, they 
argue that capital inflows are likely to appreciate asset prices. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2009) and Whelan (2010) argue that the global imbalances and house price 
movements are correlated though there is no causal effect. The real culprits behind the recent 
house prices boom-bust cycle are financial regulatory failures and policy errors. Inadequate 
financial supervision allowing lower credit standards for mortgage borrowing is certainly a 
reason for the boom in home prices in the US and some other markets. Even if the huge foreign 
demand for US Treasury bonds depresses long term real interest rates and then fuel house prices, 
the US regulators such as the Federal Reserve, can counteract such impacts via its control over 
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short term rates. It is the easy credit conditions resulting from the loose monetary policy causing 
the housing boom. 
Some recent research uses the applied general equilibrium theory. For instance, Berrak and 
Olena (2010) investigate the housing markets through the monetary open-economy Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model. Their findings reveal that international shocks 
account for approximately 50% of residential investment and close to 10% of home prices swing. 
The following paragraphs review an open economy framework in general. 
When compared to a closed economy, a self-sufficient community, the key element of an open 
economy is the cross border economic activities. Mankiw (2011) suggests an open economy 
interacts with others through two channels. First, it imports and exports goods/services in global 
goods markets. Second, it purchases and sells capital assets, such as equities and debts, in global 
financial markets. Each channel represents a type of imbalance. The first one measures a cross 
border goods/services flow. The second would measure a cross border capital flow. These two 
flows are two sides of the same coin. For an economy as a whole, net capital inflows must 
always equal net imports. This is because at an equilibrium foreign exchange market, the value 
of goods/services and capital assets received must equal the value of goods/services and capital 
assets delivered. Expressed by identity, Imports + Capital Outflow = Exports + Capital Inflow. 
Rearranging this equation, Capital Inflow – Capital Outflow = Imports –Exports. Put simply, Net 
Capital Inflow = Net Imports, or Net Capital Inflow = Trade Deficit. In order to finance its trade 
deficit, a country must sell its capital assets in global financial markets. Consequently, capital is 
flowing into the economy when an economy is running a trade deficit by exactly the same 
amount, Capital Account Surplus = Current Account Deficit, and vice versa. The Balance of 
Payment (BOP) identity assumes: Current Account + broadly defined Capital Account + 
Balancing Item = 0. The Balancing Item is simply a statistical error, which assures that the sum 
of the capital account and current account is zero. In macroeconomics, the broadly defined 
Capital Account = Foreign Direct Investment + Foreign Portfolio Investment + Other Investment 
+ Reserve Account. The reserve account is the ‘Change in Central Bank Reserves’ only. 
Therefore, the global macroeconomic imbalance just mirrors the trade imbalance. 
Mankiw (2011) argues the market for loanable funds and the market for foreign exchange are the 
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two pillars of an open economy. Net capital inflow is the variable that connects these two 
markets. This is because net capital inflow is the proportion of the supply of loanable funds as it 
provides the demand for dollars for foreign exchanges. In the loanable funds market, real interest 
rate determines the quantity of loanable funds supplied (National Saving) and the quantity of 
loanable funds demanded (Domestic Investment). A higher real interest rate will discourage 
domestic investment but incentive national saving. As a higher real interest rate means higher 
real investment return, the real interest rate is positively related to capital inflow. In the foreign 
exchange market, real exchange rate determines the demand (Net Export) and supply (Net 
Capital Outflow). An appreciation of the real domestic exchange rate reduces the quantity of 
domestic currency demanded in the foreign exchange market. Hence, the real domestic exchange 
rate is also positively related to capital inflow. 
According to Mankiw (2011), capital flow into major trade deficit countries has increased 
dramatically over the past decades. For example, the capital inflow increases from 0.5% to 5.7% 
of GDP between 1980 and 2006 in the US. There is no simple and appropriate answer to the 
influence of trade deficit, or capital inflow, on the US economy. If an individual can go into debt, 
so can an economy (Mankiw, 2011). 
Overall, a closed economy framework can be explored to an open economy framework by 
incorporating international economic activities, either by net capital inflows or by net imports. In 
practice, it appears capital flow outperforms the rest of the open economy variables for three 
reasons. Initially, it is possible to investigate the primary sources of capital inflow, which makes 
the study of asset prices in an open economy more precise. Secondly, the effects of real exchange 
rates and the real interest rate on an economy will ultimately reflect on the changes in capital 
inflows. Thirdly, the use of a component of capital inflow helps to reduce the risk of 
multicollinearity when applying the multivariate linear regressions. In particular, the real 
exchange rate, the real interest rate and the mortgage rate may be highly correlated with each 
other. 
The following paragraphs present the theoretical links between house prices and capital flow. 
The purpose is to illustrate that people can extend a closed economy model to an open economy 
model by incorporating Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). 
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The massive capital inflow is a double edged sword (Makin, 1999; Hattari and Rajan, 2011). On 
one hand, larger capital inflows finance economic growth by supplementing liquidity and 
facilitating new technology. During the boom period, the high yield in an economy will attract 
capital inflows which, in turn, built up an economy’s risks/returns by expanding credit and 
investment. On the other hand, the volatility of capital inflows is the approximate driver of many 
of the financial disasters, e.g., the East Asian Financial Crisis from 1997 to 1998. The previous 
boom continues until the reversal of capital inflow where asset prices reversed sharply and 
forced a structural regime on the fundamental economy. The impacts are asymmetrical being 
more significant in the recession period than in the boom period. 
The pattern of capital flows has two apparent characteristics. Firstly, private flows are the 
primary sources of capital, dominated by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio 
Investment (FPI). Secondly, the capital flows are subject to the boom-bust swings (Secretariat, 
1999). Conventional wisdom suggests FDI and FPI are two quite different issues. FDI refers to 
the investment to acquire a lasting management interest in an operating enterprise. FDI flows are 
relatively stable, driven by foreign investors’ long term considerations, such as the underlying 
economy and the degree of openness. Conversely, FPI is a passive investment in the securities of 
another country. FPI flows are unstable and subject to pressure from increased/decreased 
demand for new investment, which are generated by foreign investors’ short term considerations, 
such as interest rate differentials, exchange rate movements and speculations. Conventional 
wisdom suggests regulators should selectively deregulate FDI transactions but maintain and even 
strengthen monitors of FPI. 
Friedman (1987) argues foreign investors’ preferences will change the equilibrium asset prices 
and yield relationships determined in domestic markets, given the rapid increase of capital 
inflows. Relative to domestic investors, foreign investors tend to hold much more of their 
portfolios in short term assets rather than long term assets. Hence, rising capital inflows tend to 
increase the risk premium on long term asset. Furthermore, rising capital inflows decrease the 
cost of capital on short term assets because foreign investors bear some of the risks associated 
with the domestic economic activities. 
Olaberría (2012) suggests net FPI inflows are more likely to appreciate real asset prices than 
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other types of capital inflows, even when controlling for other variables such as growths of GDP 
and inflation. Furthermore, capital inflows have much larger influence on asset pricing in 
emerging markets than in industrialized markets. By contrast, Xu and Chen (2012) argue that 
domestic monetary policy plays a far more important role in driving China’s house prices than 
FPI flows. From this viewpoint, both of Whelan (2010) and Xu and Chen (2012) suggest the 
impacts of capital flow on asset prices can be effectively regulated by domestic macroeconomic 
regulations. 
To sum up, a couple of findings emerge. Initially, the impact of current account surplus and 
capital account deficit on house prices should be the same, and vice versa. Secondly, although 
the capital inflow is likely to appreciate asset prices, it is not necessarily a problem in itself. The 
key thing is the appropriate domestic macroeconomic regulations, such as monetary policy and 
regulations on capital flows. 
2.2 The Expectation Hypotheses 
Conventional wisdom defines ‘value’ as relating purely to monetary value such as price. 
However, Reddy (1991) defines value as a combination of ‘using value’ and ‘value in use’, both 
of which correlate to substitutability and functionality. The value defined by Reddy (1991) 
appears very sensible in the housing market. Alhashimi and Dwyer (2004) suggest the classical 
monetary price is simply one component of a perceived value. Perceived value includes both 
exchange price and ancillary costs that attend any sale which is more individualistic and personal 
than price. The threefold of ancillary costs cover price related costs such as agent’s fees and 
mortgage costs; time related costs such as search costs; and psychology related costs such as 
anxiety, satisfaction and expectation. Some ancillary costs will vary during purchase and 
consumption, in particular those related to psychology and expectations. 
To reveal how people’s psychology and expectations will affect housing prices, this chapter 
looks into four typical expectation hypotheses. Sections 2.2.1 through 2.2.4 review irrational 
expectation hypothesis, adaptive expectation hypothesis, rational expectation hypothesis, and 
quasi-rational or bounded rationality hypothesis, respectively. 
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2.2.1 Irrational Expectation Hypothesis 
Keynes (1936) distinguishes between short-run and long-run expectations (Harcourt and Riach, 
1997; Hoover, 1997). Entrepreneurs’ short-run expectations determine the scale of their current 
output which, in turn, determines the macroeconomic equilibrium and the effective demand. 
Entrepreneurs’ long-run expectations determine the amount of their investment in plant and 
machinery, followed by the aggregate demand. It is other’s long-run expectations that govern 
which demands entrepreneurs could anticipate in the short-run. Expectations are not single-
valued. In the short-run, entrepreneurs may consider a range of possibilities, each with an 
attached numerical probability. It is unclear whether Keynes (1936) believes that the long-run 
expectations can be dealt with using the same approach. It is the diversity of people’s 
expectations about the expected values of financial assets which prevents the asset prices from 
experiencing massive volatility. 
A general criticism to Keynes (1936) is that it does not have a clear hypothesis or a single 
mechanical algorithm for the formation of expectations. Keynes’s arguments lead either to 
adaptive expectations which subsume the formation of short-run expectations, or to a ‘mob 
psychology’ dealt with expectations, see (Rutherford, 1984; Harcourt and Riach, 1997; Hoover, 
1997). Furthermore, Rutherford (1984) disagrees with the distinction that Keynes (1936) makes 
between short-run and long-run expectations. 
Building on Keynes (1936), Akerlof and Shiller (2010) suggest that animal spirits, people’s 
irrational expectation and non-economic motivation, are the force that drives the economy and 
asset returns. Akerlof and Shiller (2010) expand Keynes (1936) by suggesting that the changes in 
people’s expectations can attribute to the five different aspects of animal spirits, namely, 
confidence, fairness, corruption and antisocial behavioural, money illusion, and stories. 
 Confidence and the feedback mechanisms between it and the economy that amplify 
disturbances is the cornerstone of Akerlof and Shiller (2010). 
 The setting of prices depends significantly on the feeling of fairness. 
 When studying the functioning of the economy, one must also be aware of the economy’s 
sinister side. For instance, the tendencies toward corruption and the failures that disrupt it 
at long intervals or in invisible places. 
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 Money illusion refers to people that are confused by inflation and/or deflation and fails to 
reason through its impacts. 
 The sense of reality is correlated with the story of one’s life and of the lives of others. 
The aggregate of these stories is a national or global story, which itself plays a significant 
role in the economy. 
These five aspects are closely linked with each other. It is the changes in any one or more of 
these aspects that are driving the economy. 
Friedman (1953) argues that irrational people who use biased beliefs will consistently lose 
money and will not survive in the financial market. So, irrational people cannot influence asset 
prices in the long-run. Using a parsimonious model with no intermediate consumption, Kogan et 
al. (2006) demonstrate that long-run survival and asset price impact are two independent 
concepts. Irrational people can survive and even dominate rational people. Even when irrational 
people cannot survive, their non-economic behaviour can still have a substantial impact on asset 
prices. By taking the intermediate consumption into account, Berrada (2006) suggests irrational 
people with low consumption share have a far smaller impact than Kogan et al. (2006) suggest. 
Berrada (2006) shows that people’s influence on asset prices is increasing in their consumption 
share and argues that biased people can considerably impact equilibrium quantities. 
Given house prices are largely set by negotiation between buyers and sellers through a system 
that centres on agents, it is a bargaining process rather than the arm’s length. Many sellers may 
fail to put their houses on the market if they believe the prices are too low and are more likely to 
wait for better times. Alhashimi and Dwyer (2004) suggest that people buy homes infrequently, 
with a tiny proportion of households active at any one time. Little changes in the aggregate 
behaviour of a few people could, regionally at least, have substantial influences on house prices. 
Therefore, house prices are likely to be set through people’s irrational expectations, see (Clayton, 
1996; Alhashimi and Dwyer, 2004; Akerlof and Shiller, 2010). 
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2.2.2 Adaptive Expectation Hypothesis 
Adaptive Expectation Hypothesis (AEH) is a plausible and empirically sensible approach in 
studying expectations (Cagan, 1956; Friedman, 1957). One simple version of adaptive 
expectations is 
       
             
                                                                                                     2. 9 
   is the expected value at current term,     
 is the current value that was predicted last term, and 
  is this term’s actual value,   ranges between 0 and 1. 
AEH is a backward looking expectation which means that people usually form their expectations 
of an economic variable by taking a weighted mean of past values and an ‘error adjustment’ term. 
In a more general case, 
        ∑       
 
                                                                                                            2. 10 
   is actual value at  -   period in the past. 
AEH can sometimes be a helpful hypothesis in econometric practice (Chow, 1989,2011). Some 
literature quantifies the level of a housing price bubble by using the user cost framework based 
on the backward looking expectation, or AEH (Poterba, 1992; Quigley and Raphael, 2004; 
Girouard et al., 2006). 
A general criticism to the AEH is that the adaptive expectations boil down to a hypothesis of 
how historical data affect current and/or future data. When people make a forecasting error, 
resulting from a stochastic shock, it will be fairly hard for people to accurately forecast the 
economic variable again, even if the variable experiences no additional shocks. This is because 
the AEH only ever incorporate part of their errors. Since the introduction by Muth (1961), the 
Rational Expectation Hypothesis (REH) has replaces the AEH in mainstream economics. Evans 
and Ramey (2006) suggest REH is superior to AEH in providing optimal expectations. However, 
adaptive expectations may coincide with rational expectations, given a constant policy regime 
(Harcourt and Riach, 1997; Hoover, 1997). 
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2.2.3 Rational Expectation Hypothesis 
Gertchev (2007) suggests that there are three prevalent definitions of rational expectation. The 
first one corresponds to Muth (1961) which suggests all people need not hold the same 
expectations of the objective distribution. However, the weighted average of expectations is 
equal to the forecasting of the relevant economic model, see (Redman, 1992). The second, 
narrowest, definition suggests that all people possess the same subjective probability 
distributions, which coincide with the objective distribution. The third, weakest definition, solely 
asserts that people make economically rational expectations in the sense only to the point where 
the marginal gain becomes just equal to the marginal cost, see (Feige and Pearce, 1976). The 
three distinct definitions of rational expectations are not necessarily exclusive and can be 
identified. 
Harcourt and Riach (1997) suggest the rational expectations are usually formulated as: 
  
            |                                                                                                                2. 11  
Equation (2.11) suggests that the expectation of    developed at time  -  is the mathematical 
expectation of    conditional on all the information available at time  - . The information set 
     in any theoretical account covers the model hypothesized by the theory. In empirical 
analysis, the rational expectation formula is regarded as a regression of    on the variables in 
    . The error terms from this regression are independent of   , and has an expected value of 
zero. The estimated values are the expected values. 
In asset pricing theory, expectations govern asset valuation. Rational expectations equilibrium 
implies that the current price of an asset has incorporated all the relevant information and that it 
is equal to the sum of discounted future cash flows. 
   
  
    
 
  
       
   
  
       
                                                                                            2. 12 
   is the fundamental market price of an asset at time  ,    is the expected cash flow payment at 
time    ,   is the number of payments,    is the market interest rate at time    . 
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REH suggests the release of new information determines the change in people’s expectation 
which, in turn, determines the changes in asset prices. Given the information which enters the 
economy are random, changes in prices must also be random, making abnormal returns 
impossible to predict consistently (Radner, 1979; Gertchev, 2007). 
Under the rational expectation hypothesis, there are several theoretical arguments that an asset 
price could exceed its fundamental value, which refers to the rational asset price bubble. Based 
on symmetric information in which all people share the same information, the expectational 
difference equation allows a stock price to involve a rational bubble element apart from the 
market fundamentals component, see (Diba and Grossman, 1988a,b). The rational bubbles 
component of a stock price follows an explosive process, under symmetric information. Based 
on asymmetric information in which people have different information but still share a common 
prior distribution, the presence of a rational bubble need not be widely known, see 
(Brunnermeier, 2003). Therefore a rational investor only holds bubble assets when he/she 
believes he/she can resell the bubble assets to a less informed investor in the future. Allen et al. 
(1993) argue that the necessary conditions for an expected rational bubble to occur is that each 
person must be short sale constrained at some period in the future. Unfortunately, literature does 
not explicitly discuss the distribution of a rational bubble under the circumstances of asymmetric 
information. 
There are three prevalent reasons to justify the popularity of the REH. Initially, REH describes a 
coherent, and even unavoidable, extension of rationality to the form of people’s expectation. 
People’s purposeful action, by virtue of its own nature, is expected to be void of systematic 
expectation mistakes. People are not purely rational when the same expectation mistakes repeat 
from time to time. Secondly, the REH targets to transform it from a pure hypothesis into a 
necessary principal. The rejection of REH would make some economic theories impracticable. 
Thirdly, people regard REH as an appropriate tool for undertaking research, particularly in a 
dynamic perspective, which is consistent with the contemporary positivist methodology. 
Lucas defends the REH not on grounds of realism, but as a consistency criterion for economic 
models. On the contrary, Keynes’s framework concerns the substance of the economy instead of 
the form of models. From an economic policy perspective, the biggest difference between 
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Lucas’s REH and Keynes’s expectations is in Lucas’s willingness to permit our ignorance of the 
future to a set of limited government policies. Whereas Keynes (1936) is more optimistic and 
possesses a spontaneous urge for action (Harcourt and Riach, 1997; Hoover, 1997). 
Like the AEH, REH also asserts that people adapt to learn and change from experience. AEH 
suggests people gradually adapt after a certain situation. However, REH suggests people have 
the ability to rapidly adapt and simultaneously learn from their economic environment as it takes 
place. Furthermore, REH is a forward looking expectation. According to Lucas (1976), the REH 
implies that existing econometric models of the time could not apply to evaluate the effects of 
government policy, given the parameters of these econometric models would change when the 
economic policy changes. 
In regard to the criticisms about REH, there are several misunderstandings. Here, the chapter 
makes it clarification. Firstly, REH does not apply to everyone. Instead, it argues that some 
people may be over-optimistic or over-pessimistic though on average the market is rational. 
Secondly, REH does not require every individual to collect and form the expectations for them. 
More often some people will depend on others’ expectations, such as well-known economists. 
When these economists’ expectations are rational, then the economy as a whole might be rational. 
Thirdly, when people’s expectations turn out to be mistakes, it does not necessarily mean that a 
better course of choice was available or would have been preferable, under the revealed reality. 
These expectation mistakes are shocks in the economy which are random with a mean of zero 
and have a variance less than that associated with any other model of prediction. Fourthly, REH 
does not argue that people can automatically know which information is more important in 
formulating expectations. However, people are adaptive and can learn. Thus, REH is best 
regarded as a long-run argument. Finally, Attfield et al. (1986) claim that people can make 
rational expectations even when variables are formulated by unique and unusual processes. This 
is because people will have enough information to generate a sensible estimation of the process. 
Beyond these misunderstandings, there are additional criticisms about REH. For instance, 
although people make rational expectations, the representative people describing these actions 
may not satisfy rationality assumptions, see (Janssen, 1993). Furthermore, market anomalies 
such as the asset price bubble-burst cycle indicates the market as a whole may be occasionally 
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irrational. Akerlof and Shiller (2010) suggest so many economists have gone so far in the 
direction of REH that they ignore the vital dynamics underlying financial crises. Failing to 
incorporate people’s irrational expectation and noneconomic action into the model can mislead 
us to the real sources of trouble. In housing literature, Xiao and Randolph Tan (2007) quantify 
the changes in the housing bubble using the rational expectation hypothesis. 
2.2.4 Quasi-rational or Bounded Rationality Hypothesis 
Unlike the REH, behavioural finance acknowledges that people’s expectations, individually and 
collectively, are affected by inadequate information and the inability to process the information 
they have in an unbiased fashion. Consequently, people display bounded rationality. Assuming 
bounded rationality, people make expectations and decisions to help them satisfice rather than 
make theoretically optimal decisions. People collect what they think to be a sufficient amount of 
information and apply heuristics to achieve an acceptable decision. People take steps to achieve 
short-run targets, as long as they assist people toward their ultimate desired target. 
Conlisk (1996) suggests there are four reasons for incorporating bounded rationality into 
economic study. Firstly, there is a bulk of empirical evidence that bounded rationality is 
important, see (Froot and Obstfeld, 1991; Black et al., 2006). Secondly, models of bounded 
rationality have documented themselves in a wide range of impressive work. Thirdly, the popular 
justifications for assuming full rationality are unconvincing. Finally, deliberation about an 
economic decision is an expensive activity, and sensible hypotheses require that people 
incorporate all expenses. 
The behavioural financial models in particular the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH), suggest 
that given people must adapt to survive (satisfice), asset prices can be temporarily mispriced and 
no one investment strategy can continually outperform. Success in the market is an evolutionary 
process. 
Langlois (1990) suggests people’s limitations may take the form of an inability to process a 
complex optimization problem. However, such a limitation makes people not bounded rational 
but bounded skilful. Rationality is a matter of doing the best one can with the given knowledge 
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and abilities. The philosophy of acting reasonably already implies limited abilities and has 
boundedness built in. 
Hendry (1984) argues that ‘sensible’ expectations, which are not systematically biased, yet are 
not fully efficient seems to provide a more reasonable and realistic compromise in the UK’s 
housing market. Bounded rationality helps to interpret the anomalies of financial markets 
(Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Scanlon and Whitehead, 2010; Schiliro, 2011). 
2.3 The Institutions and Institutional Changes in the UK Since 1970s 
2.3.1 The Institutions and Institutional Changes 
There is controversy on the relationship between market participants and institutions. Rational 
choice approach regards institutions as a strategic choice and/or a result of an economics game. 
Therefore, market participants are rule makers and their practices generate norms, making rapid 
deviations costly and thus institutionalizing the practices. Others view market participants as rule 
takers (North, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 2003; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). North (1990) 
explicitly excludes organizations as institutions. For instance, North (1990) regards banks as 
organizations instead of institutions. Yet the banking system itself is essentially shaped by the 
institutional system (Roland, 2004). However, the recent literature (Morgan et al., 2010) 
suggests market participants and institutions are mutually constitutive of each other. 
Without denying the importance of formal institutions, recent literature (Hall and Soskice, 2003; 
Helmke and Levitsky, 2004) emphasises ‘the importance of informal rules and understandings to 
securing equilibria in the many strategic interactions of the political economy’. The shared 
beliefs among interdependent people are foundational to their expectations of how others will 
behave. Laws are not the sole determinant of these shared beliefs. The primary determinant of 
the stability of a system is the extent to which beliefs about its functioning and benefits are 
popularly shared among people. 
Hall and Soskice (2003) conceptualize two typical types of political economies according to how 
firms coordinate their endeavours. The Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) are 
characterized for the non-market relations, collaboration, credible commitments and deliberative 
calculation on the part of firms. On the contrary, the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are 
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characterized for the arms-length, competitive relations, competition and formal contracting, and 
the operation of supply and demand in line with price signalling. The typical LMEs include the 
US and the UK while most of continental European countries are CMEs. However, the 
framework of Hall and Soskice (2003) is overly static, with institutional changes only seen as 
rapidly exogenous shocks, see (Kang, 2006; Hancké, 2009). 
Roland (2004) distinguishes between sets of institutions based on whether they change slowly 
and continuously or rapidly and irregularly. The slow-moving institution is also named ‘culture’, 
including values, beliefs and social norms. The evolution of culture is significantly linked to the 
development of technology and scientific knowledge. Like culture, technology and knowledge 
evolve slowly and continuously. However, the pace may vary. The development of technology 
and culture are fairly hard to predict because they are subject to the laws of the evolution of 
knowledge. On the contrary, fast-moving institutions such as political institutions and/or legal 
systems do not necessarily change frequently, but can changes more rapidly even almost 
overnight. Slow-moving institutions are good candidates to impact fast-moving institutions. 
Slow-moving institutions must change continuously so that they produce inconsistencies with 
fast-moving institutions which, in turn, create pressure for change. 
Roland (2004) suggests that it is the interaction between slow-moving institutions and fast-
moving institutions that drives the institutional changes which, in turn, compounded with 
technology advances that which drives economic growth. Institutional changes are driven by 
social forces that favour it and are resisted by those that would experience a loss from it. The 
balance of power between those social forces determines the dynamics of change. Nonetheless, 
the changes in the relative strengths of those social forces also depend on the existing institutions. 
Therefore, reforms (fast-moving institutions) in a given economy must in part build on its local 
conditions (slow-moving institutions). From another perspective, the characteristics of a given 
institutional change are likely to differ between economies, either in terms of directionality or 
degree. 
Similarly, Culpepper (2005) suggests the sufficient condition for institutional change is the 
change in ideas, with the process by which people apply triggering events to coordinate their 
future anticipations around the new rules of the economy. The formal institutional framework 
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argues that legal change will precede and cause behavioural change in the practice of an 
economy. Culpepper (2005) argues that legal reform is often a necessary but insufficient 
condition for institutional change in Coordinated Market Economies, given people’s shared 
beliefs can persist even after changing the formal laws. Where coordinated financial systems 
depend mainly on the strategic interaction of dominant market participants. Institutions do not 
automatically change their response to regulatory reform. The institutions change only when the 
dominant market participants within the system are willing to devise their new cognitive maps. 
In literature, people study institutions in two different ways, either as exogenously given 
constraints (North, 1990); or as endogenously-appearing self-enforcing rules (Aoki, 2001). If the 
constraints they impose are not enforced, the institutions will be meaningless. For the purpose of 
investigating specific institutions, it suffices to treat institutions as exogenous and study their 
impacts on human behaviour and interaction (Roland, 2004). 
2.3.2 Institutional Changes in the UK Since 1970s 
Following Roland (2004) and Culpepper (2005), this section reviews the institutional changes in 
the UK since the 1970s from two perspectives, political and legal changes; and norms and 
technological change. 
At the political and legal level, British government concentrates on Keynesian economic policies 
and transforms Britain into a welfare state from 1945 to 1979. Through the Thatcher revolution 
since 1979, Britain transitioned to a more free market economy or a neoliberal model thereafter. 
Generally speaking, the economic liberalization process in the UK is sudden and decisive, for 
example, the ‘Big Bang’ in 1986. One of the key characteristics of the UK economic 
liberalization is minimal state intervention. This means the state ‘steer’ and regulate economic 
activity but do not ‘row’ and intervene as an economic player. According to Hall and Soskice 
(2003), what defines a liberal market economy is not the character of state intervention but how 
firms coordinate their endeavours. Therefore, the institutional in the UK does not change as 
much as many may think. Obviously, there is room for disagreement about such matters. 
Konzelmann et al. (2010) suggest the political and economic climates of the 1970s and early 
1980s significantly influenced the US and the UK returns to neoliberal model. With the failure of 
34 
 
the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, international capital movement restrictions and fixed 
currency regimes are no longer in place among major Western economies. Therefore, the 
economic liberalization begins with capital flow deregulation. In the UK, the Heath government 
attempts to liberalize the money markets and stimulate competition among banks by introducing 
a policy of ‘Competition and Credit Control’ in 1971. Consequently, quantitative restrictions on 
bank lending are removed and interest rates tend to play a key role in the allocation of credit. 
Meanwhile, in response to increasing unemployment, the Heath government introduces a ‘dash 
for growth’. Therefore, increasing bank lending stimulates monetary expansion and economic 
growth. However, with the fight for a backdrop of worldwide inflationary situations during the 
1970s, the housing market speculation inflates a housing bubble which eventually leads to the 
Secondary Banking Crisis between 1973 and 1975. From 1976 to 1979, the Callahan government 
strongly convinces the value of many of Friedman’s monetarism ideas. However, they do not get 
the chance to put these ideas into practice. 
Baddeley (2005) suggests significant institutional changes, especially those implemented by the 
Thatcher government from 1979 onwards, exacerbates the instability of the housing market.  
Thatcher’s reform can be broadly divided into three categories. Firstly, the financial changes 
with deregulation, for instance, the removal of constraints on mortgage rationing. Secondly, the 
fiscal changes, including changes in incentive to purchase. Thirdly, changes impacting the 
supply of alternatives to owner occupation. 
Deregulation influences the housing markets via financial markets (Muellbauer and Murphy, 
1997; Baddeley, 2005). The deregulation of the Building Societies in 1981 allows a substantial 
increase in mortgage liquidity and market instability. Financial deregulation reduces the vital 
role of Building Societies in offering mortgage lending backed by household savings. A wide 
range of other financial institutions enter into the mortgage lending market and this mortgage 
lending could be backed by a range of instruments such as the short-term money market funds. 
The removal of mortgage constraints increases the average leverage rates and the UK housing 
market volatility, due to the terms of mortgages becoming more flexible. 
Shiwakoti et al. (2008) suggest that about 80% of the total assets of Building Societies 
eventually transfer to the banking sector, since the enactment of the UK Building Societies Act 
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1986. According to O’Connor (2010), the proportion of total mortgages outstanding provided by 
Building Societies dramatically declines from more than 60% in the mid-1980s to 14% by 2010. 
Therefore, any analysis based on the data of Building Societies alone should take these 
institutional changes into account. Building Societies are non-profit cooperatives with low legal 
minimum reserve ratios, which ensure that they run on small margins of lending over borrowing 
interest rates. 
Baddeley (2005) argues that financial uncertainty starts to creep into the mortgage market as 
interest rates rise in response to the inflationary consequences of the Lawson boom from 1986 to 
1988 in the UK. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, lot of borrowers hold variable rate 
mortgages which depend on high multipliers of their incomes and have an inadequate financial 
ability to adapt to interest rate increases. Increases in unemployment accompanied with rises in 
mortgage rates meant that more people have to default on their mortgages which, in turn, 
translate into pressure for declining house prices. Consequently, mortgage lenders are facing 
uncertain cash-flow and they have to increase financial stringency. Because the mortgages are no 
longer backed up with retail deposits, the Building Societies are unlikely to reduce costs during 
downturns by cutting their interest payments to depositors. 
Other fiscal reforms impact the substitutes for owner-occupation such as council house sales and 
the declining investment in public housing; generate additional pressures in the owner-occupied 
market. 
Apart from the rapid political and legal changes, there are also slow but continuous institutional 
changes at the norms and technological level. For example, the proportion of UK households 
who owned their own homes increases from 56% to above 68% from 1981 to 2007. On the 
contrary, the private rental sector in the UK declines from 33% in the 1960s to 10% in the 1980s 
and the figure has not yet significantly recovered. The right to buy council houses in the 1980s 
and the consequent reluctance of local authorities to build have placed additional pressure on 
private rents; and could be a possible source of breaks in the relationship between rental and 
ownership. 
Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) suggest that the stimulation of owner occupation increases 
housing demand by providing more and cheaper mortgages and privatizing state-owned housing 
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exacerbates market volatility. Furthermore, prior to the ‘Big Bang’ liberalization, the City is 
populated by small, specialist companies which are largely immune from takeover. The 
liberalization process gives rise to the ‘Wimbledon Effect’, where a successful London financial 
market is increasingly composed of foreign actors, see (Konzelmann et al., 2010). Information 
Technology makes it possible for affiliates of overseas firms to operate internationally and more 
rapidly to engage in supervisory arbitrage. 
The wave of ‘short-termism’ in the UK since the 1960s accompany with financial innovation and 
deregulation drive people to become increasingly impatient for a quick return on their 
investments. Traditionally, banks used deposits to fund loans that they then leave on their 
balance sheets until maturity which refers to the originate-to-hold model. Banks and Building 
Societies transit to the more aggressive originate-to-distribute model, especially from 2001 to 
2006. Financial assets turn into people’s gambling chips. In the UK, the extraction of equity from 
houses to finance additional investment is a notably form to enhance household leverage over the 
past decades. In particular, the financial innovation and deregulation make the US and the UK 
financial industries more dependent than ever on the housing market in terms of mortgage 
securitization since the 1990s. Mortgage securitization refers to the financial practice of pooling 
various types of mortgages as pass-through securities, or collateralized mortgage obligations to 
various investors. Take the massively used originate-to-distribute model for example, the 
mortgage lenders borrow short-term cheap funding from the capital markets, and then lend long-
term expensive mortgages to mortgage borrowers. Through the selling of mortgage backed 
securities to other investors, mortgage lenders not only raise capital to meet their short-term 
liabilities but also improve their asset liquidity and profitability. Because more than one class of 
pass-through securities may be backed by a single mortgage pool, mortgage securitization and 
the originate-to-distribute mode will dramatically amplify the volume of mortgage related 
derivatives and financial risks. Schwarcz (2007) argues that the securitization and the originate-
to-distribute model create moral hazards, given these lenders do not have to live with the credit 
consequences of their loans. Consequently, the mortgage underwriting standards decrease. 
2.3.3 Evaluation of the Liberalization Since 1970s 
With the economic liberalisation since the 1970s, the industrialized economies make the 
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transition from a manufacturing to a service-based economy. Financial services sector transition 
from a pure financial intermediary into an industry in its own right; and significantly increase 
competition among financial corporations, see (Toporowski, 2002). Gamble (2009) suggests 
financial services become the engine of growth in many countries, particularly in the US and the 
UK. According to the OECD Factbook 2009, the percentage of value added by financial services 
to the total value added, increases from 15% in 1975 to 33% in 2007, in the UK. 
However, the global financial crisis in 2008 not only presents a ‘shock event’, but also 
incentivizes rising people to critique and re-evaluate the liberalization and institutional changes 
over the past decades. For instance, people criticize the US and UK institution’s lack of 
transparency and communication and the inability to exercise macro-prudential regulation within 
the market as a whole. However, through investigating the differing performance of four major 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), the US, the UK, Canada and Australia, Konzelmann et al. 
(2010) deny the failure of the LME variety of capitalism. Instead the Subprime Crisis results 
from the failure of the neoclassical variety of liberal capitalism. 
Palley (2009) argues that the liberalization or neoliberal model since the 1980s inaugurates an 
era of wage stagnation. The essential argument is that the neoliberal model depends on rising 
borrowing and asset price inflation, to cover the inadequate aggregate demand resulting from 
wage stagnation and increasing wealth inequality. The new institutions are always unsustainable. 
However, financial innovation and liberalization helps the neoliberal’s model going far longer 
than expected. Financial instability hypothesis (Minsky, 1992) is a good candidate to interpret 
these delay mechanisms. 
Minsky (1992) suggests that a free market economy is inherently unstable. In times of stability, 
people will extrapolate the current stability forward into the future, which stimulates higher risk 
bearing, especially in levered investments. Minsky’s framework is evolutionary instability. 
Simply put, it argues ‘success breeds excess breeds failure’. The basic Minsky instability cycle 
begins with ‘hedge finance’ when people expect incomes which are sufficient to cover interest 
and outstanding loans. It then enters into ‘speculative finance’ when incomes are only sufficient 
to repay interest. The basic Minsky cycle ends with ‘ponzi finance’ when incomes are 
insufficient to repay interest payments and people are primarily relying on capital gains to cover 
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their obligations. By contrast, the super Minsky cycle takes several basic cycles, allowing rising 
supply of and demand for financial risk. Minsky’s framework incorporates institutions, 
evolutionary dynamics and human psychology. Empirically, it is roughly consistent with the 
developments over the past decades. Since the 1980s, there are three business cycles, namely, 
1981-1990, 1991-2001, and 2002-2009. Each of these business cycles is consistent with a basic 
Minsky cycle in which people take on increasingly more financial risk. The period as a whole is 
consistent with the super Minsky cycle involving financial deregulation, innovation and changes 
in people’s appetite for risk. Minsky (1992) regards a capitalist crisis as a purely financial 
phenomenon where financial instability results from the progressive removal of market 
disciplines. 
According to Palley (2009), the structural Keynesianism and the generic Marxist beyond the 
Minsky’s framework by suggesting that there is an underlying real economic problem regarding 
wage stagnation and deterioration of wealth distribution. Financial excess is always a patch of 
the fundamental economic contradiction. Therefore, their institutional design would have a 
significantly larger public sector and more government intervention, in particular regarding the 
financial sector. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews what factors are specific to the UK housing market from three aspects. 
Firstly, what common factors may drive the housing risk-return? Secondly, how the desirability 
of outcome or expectation drives people to behave based on house prices (Lucas critique)? 
Thirdly, how the changes in institutions will affect the housing market? 
Among the three factor models, this chapter reviews the application of the macroeconomic factor 
model and the fundamental factor model in the housing market in terms of a closed economy and 
open economy framework. This thesis discusses the statistical factor model such as the principal 
component analysis in Chapter 6. Unsurprisingly, people are likely to ask two questions about 
the factor model literature. Firstly, is the methodology of Hendry (1984) still suitable to the UK 
housing market using more recent datasets? Secondly, is an open economy framework superior 
to a closed economy framework? 
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Given the four expectation hypotheses have quite different implications on housing price and 
investment practice, it is interesting to study which one is more suitable to the UK housing 
market. 
Given Britain experienced a battery of formal and informal political and social changes since the 
1970s, it is interesting to investigate how the effect of common factors and expectations behave 
on the UK housing market over time. 
Through care and due diligence, investigation of the above issues on a timely basis, academic 
researchers can evaluate and develop economics theories with more sound evidence, 
economically rational investors can develop more sensible investment strategy; and 
policymakers can regulate the market more effectively. 
In the remainder of the thesis, Chapter 3 re-estimates the principal equations of Hendry (1984) to 
four recent British housing datasets. Chapter 4 expands the equations of Hendry (1984) to an 
open economy framework by incorporating Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI). Chapter 5 
accesses the expectation hypotheses by proposing the user cost framework in a state space model. 
Chapter 6 investigates the institutional changes in the UK housing market, by using the structural 
break tests and time varying parameter models. Chapter 7 studies the causal relationships 
between people’s expectations and house price changes using the UK regional panel data. 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 3. Updating the Econometric Modelling of House Prices in the United 
Kingdom 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the Literature Review, this chapter replicates the principal equations of Hendry (1984) 
to four recent datasets. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the limitations of Hendry 
(1984), which sets the scene for the development of models in Chapters 4 through to 7. 
Specifically, this chapter addresses two issues. 
 Firstly, Hendry (1984) is the last major work on the UK housing market using classical 
demand and supply equations in which house prices are determined by the demand for 
housing. It is interesting to study whether his result is replicable by similar datasets, in 
particular more recent datasets. 
 Secondly, Brown et al. (1997) suggest that early studies, including Hendry (1984), are 
poor in terms of robustness, and find that the regression coefficients vary in both sign and 
magnitude over samples. The chapter considers whether simple modifications can 
improve the model fit and robustness. 
This chapter excludes the subsections of ‘A Dynamic Model of the Market for Owner occupied 
Housing’ and the closely related ‘The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Representation’, ‘Cubic 
Excess Demand Model’ and the ‘Cubic Difference Equation’ in Hendry (1984) for two reasons. 
Initially, Hendry (1984) concludes that the ‘Restricted Parameterisation’ model is superior to the 
‘Cubic Excess Demand Model’ and the ‘Cubic Difference Equation’ models. Secondly, the 
‘dynamic models’ in Hendry (1984) assume that the underlying data generating process is stable 
and apply fixed parameter models, which is technically the same as the ‘Restricted 
Parameterisation’ model. 
The chapter is structured in the following way. Section 3.2 describes the datasets. Section 3.3.1 
refers to the descriptive statistics. Section 3.3.2 presents a possible expectations model. Section 
3.3.3 illustrates a restricted parameterisation model. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 Data Description 
The data included in this study are Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
House Price Index (HPI), the Retail Price Index (RPI), the mortgage rates of Building Societies, 
the composite mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks, aggregate mortgage outstanding of 
Building Societies and Banks, real aggregate household disposable income and the house 
completions series from the United Kingdom. All the quarterly time series data were collected 
from DataStream and cover the period from 1968Q2 to 2007Q4. The starting dates are chosen by 
the availability of data for the HPI and the ending dates are chosen by the availability of data for 
the house completions. The chapter sets the House Price Index (HPI) and the Retail Price Index 
(RPI) equal to 100 at 2002Q1. Except where specifically mentioned, all the variables are in 
nominal terms. Throughout this chapter, lower case letters for time-dependent variables represent 
the natural logarithm of their capital counterparts. 
This chapter investigates four datasets, namely, 1968Q2-1982Q4; 1983Q1-2007Q4, 1968Q2-
2007Q4 and 1995Q1-2007Q4. The dataset 1968Q2-1982Q4 is used to examine whether the 
results of Hendry (1984) are replicable by using a similar dataset. The dataset of Hendry (1984) 
ranges from 1959Q1 to 1982Q2. The other three datasets investigate whether the findings of 
1968Q2-1982Q4 are robust over samples. The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite 
mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks, while all the remaining three datasets use the 
mortgage rate of Building Societies. The date for 1995Q1 is chosen by the availability of data for 
the composite mortgage rate. 
There are different datasets available on house prices for the UK. The chapter uses the 
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) House Price Index (HPI) 
primarily because it has one of the longest time span which is comparable to Hendry (1984). 
DCLG HPI uses the mix-adjusted method, which is based on weighted averages. DCLG HPI 
uses mortgage completion data supplied by a few large lenders. By contrast, Hendry (1984) uses 
the second hand HPI which is simple average till 1968Q2 and then weighted average. 
Additionally, Hendry (1984) uses the data of gross mortgage outstanding and nominal mortgage 
rate from Building Societies. However, Building Societies have contributed to a declining 
proportion of the UK’s aggregate mortgage outstanding since the financial deregulation and 
42 
 
innovations of the 1980s. Therefore, this chapter uses net secured lending to individual house 
purchase from Building Societies and Banks to proxy the aggregate mortgage outstanding, which 
accounts for more than 75% of the UK’s total mortgage outstanding by 2007Q4 according to the 
Bank of England. The chapter uses both the mortgage rates of Building Societies and composite 
mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks for illustration purposes. In Appendices, Table A 
and Table B display the variable sources and definitions; Table C illustrates a basic variable 
summary. 
Figure 3.1 plots nominal house prices index in log scale. House prices appreciate by six fold 
from 1968Q2 to 1982Q2 which is roughly consistent with Hendry (1984), although Hendry uses 
a different HPI. The price boom continues until 1988Q4 and increased by 254% relative to 
1982Q2. From 1989Q1 to 1995Q4, the UK house prices remain stable, and then house prices 
increase by three fold between 1996Q1 and 2007Q4. 
Figure 3.1 House Price Index (   ) 
 
Given the dominant trend in Figure 3.1 masks the short-run price fluctuations, Figure 3.2 
displays the quarter to quarter proportional variations,      , which is the first natural log 
difference of house price index. The quarterly changes in house prices peak at 1972 and bottom 
out at 1992. The change in house price is positive for most of the time and shows ‘cyclical’ 
behaviour. The findings in Figure 3.2 are consistent with Hendry (1984) between 1968Q2 and 
1982Q2; the quarterly changes in house price remain stable from 1983 to 1986; climb in 1988; 
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the price declines most of the time from 1989Q4 to 1996Q1; and remains modestly volatile 
thereafter. 
Figure 3.2 Quarterly Changes in HPI (     ) 
 
Figure 3.3 plots the annual changes in house prices index       against the annual changes in 
retail price index     , for the purpose of displaying the ‘cyclical’ behaviour of house prices. 
Where,                 and             . Figure 3.3 shows several interesting 
findings. Initially, the annual variations in house prices are far more volatile than those of the 
retail price index. Secondly, these two time series are impressively asynchronous, seemingly 
illustrating changes in house prices not only causing general inflation by several years but also 
on average exceeding the changes in retail prices. Consequently, real house price         
           ⁄ , which are nominal house prices deflated by inflation, should have increased. 
Figure 3.4 suggests that real house prices         remain constant from 1968 to 1971; 
mushroom from 1972Q1 to 1973Q4; and then decrease by 60% from 1974Q1 to 1977Q3; 
experience remarkably growth between 1978 and 1989, despite reporting modest recession in 
1980; real house prices experience a significant reduction from 1989 to 1995; and then increase 
dramatically and peak at 2007Q4. 
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Figure 3.3 Annual Rates of Change in House Prices (     ) and Retail Price Index (    ) 
 
Figure 3.4 Real House Prices         
 
Based on the hypothesis that home prices and incomes share some common trends in the long-
term, aggregate demand for a home should be a stable function of the average income. So, a 
higher price-income ratio means housing prices are too high. From Figure 3.5, which exhibits the 
price-income ratio, the UK house price-income ratio reports dramatic fluctuation and the ratio 
constantly converge to a ‘base level’. 
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Figure 3.5 Price-income Ratio           
 
The real disposable income is an average evaluation that covers the aggregate population, but the 
specific groups of sellers and buyers that determine the house prices may have income that is 
significantly different from the population mean. Furthermore, the price-income ratio measures 
the local purchasing ability relative to the local housing prices (Himmelberg et al., 2005); it does 
not consider the purchasing power from outside of the local statistical area. 
The average value of housing per unit income                                ⁄ , 
is the next closely related data variable. It is fairly hard to measure this variable accurately 
because HPI    is related to owner occupied housing, while     is aggregate disposable income. 
On the one hand, it is inappropriate to use HPI    if   is represented by the total housing stock, 
unless in the extremely rare case that homes owned by landlords and authorities have the same 
average price as privately owned homes. On the other hand, if the owner occupied stock is 
selected to proxy  ,     is not the most relevant income variable for the reasons exhibited above. 
Following Hendry (1984), this chapter selects the owner occupied stock of housing, using data 
on completion of private sector, to proxy physical housing stock  . 
Figure 3.6 plots the average value of housing per unit income             against the real 
value of the mortgage stock         . Figure 3.6 shows there is a much larger gap between 
these two time series than that in Hendry (1984). And the correlation between these two 
variables changes over time. According to the author’s calculation, the correlations between the 
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two variables are -0.7979, 0.0023, -0.0551 and 0.5577 for 1968Q2-1982Q4, 1983Q1-2007Q4, 
1968Q2-2007Q4 and 1995Q1-2007Q4, respectively. 
Figure 3.6 Average Value of Housing per unit Income             and Real Value of 
Mortgage Stock          
 
Figure 3.7 displays the borrowed to own equity ratio          . Although it experiences 
several short time reductions, the borrowed to own equity ratio remains an upward trend from 
1968 to 1986; peaks at 1995Q2; and then enters into the long-time downward movement without 
a significant rebound by 2007Q4. Figure 3.7 reveals mortgage leverage plays a rising role in 
home transactions prior to 1996. Thereafter, the ratio declines primarily because of the 
significant increase in house prices since 1996. The increase in home prices improves the 
proportion of equity, and then reduces the level of leverage. Overall, the findings in Figures 3.1 
through to 3.7 are roughly consistent with Hendry (1984) over the period from 1968Q2 to 
1982Q2. 
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Figure 3.7 Ratio of Borrowed to Own Equity           
 
3.3 Empirical Estimates of the UK House Prices 
Section 3.3.1 displays the descriptive statistics. Section 3.3.2 investigates a possible expectations 
model and a restricted parameterisation in Section 3.3.3. Throughout the chapter, EVIEWS 7.2 
executes the ADF unit root tests; STATA 12 conducts all the reminder of estimations. All the 
empirical equations apply to the four datasets simultaneously for the purpose of comparison. 
3.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Following Hendry (1984), the chapter firstly investigates equation (3.1) for each variable to 
assess the autoregressive characteristics over time. Equation (3.1) is a typical Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test specification with constant and three lagged first differenced 
dependent variable. Given equation (3.1) does not necessarily is the optimal ADF test 
specification, Table 3.2 displays the ADF test according to the Enders (2010) testing procedure 
in which the ADF test specification explicitly considers the optimal lag length of the first 
differenced dependent variable; and the selection of constant and/or trend terms. 
               ∑     
 
                                                                                      3. 1 
            .    denotes the economic variable.    is constant.    is the constant coefficient 
for the  -   lagged variable.    is error term or residual. Table 3.1 shows the results for the four 
48 
 
datasets. Except for a few exceptions, such as the changes in mortgage outstanding      for 
1995Q1-2007Q4, the majority of regressions report residual non-normality, heteroskedasticity 
and/or autocorrelation. Apart from the changes in house completion      for the sample 
1968Q2-2007Q4, at least one of the coefficients is statistically insignificant for the rest of the 
regressions at the 5% significance level. 
From an econometrics perspective, when the error terms present the heteroskedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation, the ‘normal’ standard errors will be too small to find the properly coefficient 
significant effect. Usually, one could use the White standard errors and/or Newey-West standard 
errors (White, 1980; Newey and West, 1987) to correct for the heteroskedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation. However, this chapter does not attempt these ‘robust’ standard errors primarily 
because the sample size of this chapter is fairly small. There are 159 observations for the full 
dataset 1968Q2-2007Q4 and 59 observations for the sample 1968Q2-1982Q4. In small samples, 
White (1980) ‘robust’ standard errors can be more biased than conventional ones (MacKinnon 
and White, 1985; MacKinnon, 2013). 
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Table 3.1 Time Series Descriptions 
               ∑     
 
              
                                      ̂          
1968Q2-1982Q4 
      -.007 
(.0056) 
.4448*** 
(.1398) 
.3016** 
(.147) 
-.0272 
(.1384) 
.0253* 
(.0134) 
0.4216 .0236 .0876* .4650 .5765 
     -.0418 
(.0294) 
-.1604 
(.1375) 
.0169 
(.1397) 
-.1244 
(.1369) 
.1679 
(.1131) 
0.0122 .0211 .0754* .6405 .3886 
     .0018 
(.0014) 
.8273*** 
(.1408) 
.0312 
(.1810) 
-.1247 
(.1422) 
-.0070 
(.0124) 
0.6463 .0057 .0583* .1023 .8458 
     -.0005 
(.0043) 
.4300*** 
(.1421) 
.0726 
(.1574) 
.0684 
(.1466) 
.0136 
(.0124) 
0.1762 .0153 .0000*** .002*** .007*** 
    
  -.1222* 
(.0677) 
.1500 
(.1369) 
.1003 
(.1410) 
-.1172 
(.1418) 
1.1486* 
(.6364) 
0.0308 1.1225 .0000*** .5989 .1090 
     -.1159 
(.0858) 
-.3836*** 
(.1328) 
-.2128 
(.1388) 
-.383*** 
(.1256) 
.4077 
(.3141) 
0.2771 .1067 .0684* .6540 .0136** 
1983Q1-2007Q4 
      -.0025 
(.00396) 
.4525*** 
(.0999) 
-.0975 
(.1103) 
.2542*** 
(.09965) 
.0187 
(.0167) 
0.2369 .0220 .0827* .6030 .0016*** 
     -.0107** 
(.0051) 
-.458*** 
(.1006) 
-.0588 
(.1093) 
.0157 
(.0996) 
.0578** 
(.0228) 
0.1790 .0110 .0122** .3504 .2599 
     -.0043** 
(.0020) 
.4502*** 
(.0944) 
-.1074 
(.1051) 
.3665*** 
(.0938) 
.0603** 
(.0270) 
0.7509 .0071 .0431** .0001*** .0002*** 
     -.009*** 
(.0031) 
.0148 
(.0990) 
.2742*** 
(.0951) 
-.1832* 
(.0965) 
.0472*** 
(.0142) 
0.1665 .0073 .0000*** .0015*** .0000*** 
    
  -.039* 
(.0234) 
.1500 
(.0999) 
.0420 
(.0980) 
.1904* 
(.0972) 
.2710 
(.1807) 
0.5480 .0463 .0000*** .0002*** .5150 
     -.1282* 
(.0756) 
-.6848*** 
(.0946) 
-.4576*** 
(.1025) 
-.538*** 
(.083) 
.4802* 
(.277) 
0.5947 .0725 .0032*** .8314 .0000*** 
1968Q2-2007Q4 
      -.0029* 
(.0017) 
.4446*** 
(.0807) 
.0569 
(.0885) 
.1531* 
(.0801) 
.0187*** 
(.0069) 
0.3367 .0227 .0731* 
 
.0404** .0258** 
     -.0019 
(.004) 
-.2518*** 
(.0814) 
.0121 
(.0838) 
-.0600 
(.0806) 
.0164 
(.0168) 
0.0488 .0155 .0113** .0000*** .8325*** 
     -.001*** 
(.0005) 
.6035*** 
(.0778) 
-.0533 
(.0920) 
.2945*** 
(.0770) 
.0198*** 
(.0069) 
0.7774 .0069 .0020*** .0050*** .0030*** 
     -.005*** 
(.0015) 
.3101*** 
(.0813) 
.2666*** 
(.0822) 
.0042 
(.0798) 
.0257*** 
(.0067) 
0.4590 .0110 .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
    
  -.0561** .1404* .0746 -.0330 .4366** 0.0237 .8022 .0000*** .0002*** .4660 
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(.0262) (.0808) (.0816) (.0816) (.2195) 
     -.1173** 
(.0555) 
-.5248*** 
(.0771) 
-.2906*** 
(.0823) 
-.444*** 
(.0707) 
.4282** 
(.2033) 
0.4507 .0873 .0189** .4414 .0000*** 
1995Q1-2007Q4 
      .0016 
(.0078) 
.2959** 
(.1460) 
-.2363 
(.1486) 
.1452 
(.1463) 
.0112 
(.0344) 
0.0322 .0211 .0002*** .6303 .0410** 
     -.0249* 
(.0137) 
-.4115*** 
(.1406) 
-.0952 
(.1525) 
.1163 
(.1392) 
.1223* 
(.0632) 
0.1453 .0099 .0017*** .6933 .3933 
     .0010 
(.0041) 
.2311 
(.1446) 
-.0270 
(.1481) 
.1997 
(.1498) 
-.0038 
(.0532) 
0.0242 .0075 
 
.1525 .0013*** .0034*** 
     .00602 
(.0074) 
-.2248 
(.1379) 
.0145 
(.1415) 
-.3423** 
(.1345) 
-.0168 
(.0339) 
0.1335 .0051 .0000*** .4181 .0000*** 
    
  -.1077** 
(.0514) 
.5545*** 
(.1424) 
-.0064 
(.1653) 
-.0042 
(.1494) 
.5574** 
(.2687) 
0.2870 .2222 .0529* .0570* .5314 
     .0685 
(.1289) 
-1.019*** 
(.1423) 
-.7832*** 
(.1518) 
-.733*** 
(.1101) 
-.2373 
(.4705) 
0.7690 .0630 .0005*** .4329 .2248 
Notes: Adj.    is the adjusted    of the regression.  ̂ is the standard deviation of the regression.    denotes for the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality Test with the 
null hypothesis of the data is normally distributed.    denotes for the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity with the null hypothesis of the data is 
homoscedasticity.    denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation with the null hypothesis of there is no autocorrelation of any order up to  . The 
figures for   ,    and    are p-values.    means first difference.     is the house price index,    represents the real household disposable income,    is the 
mortgage outstanding,    is the general index of retail price.    is the physical housing stock.   
  is the after tax mortgage rate. The figures for the diagnostic tests 
are  -      . Subsample 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks. All the rest of the samples use the mortgage rate 
from Building Societies. Coefficient standard errors in parentheses (·). In Appendices, Table A and Table B display the variable definitions and sources. ***, ** 
and * denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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According to the testing procedure of Enders (2010), Table 3.2 displays the results of 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for each variable where the appropriate number 
of lagged differences is identified by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). Except for 
aggregate mortgage outstanding  , all the rest of the variables are stationary at first log 
difference in all the four datasets. The findings from Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 are generally 
consistent with Hendry (1984). 
Table 3.2 ADF Unit Root Tests 
ADF Unit Root Test 
                   
         
          
1968Q2-1982Q4 
Level  0.7968 0.7037 0.9988 0.9711 0.4012 0.3625 / 
1st Difference 0.0150** 0.0000*** 0.3040 0.0009*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** / 
1983Q1-2007Q4 
Level  0.8650 0.2484 0.5091 0.3440 0.5819 0.6151 / 
1st Difference 0.0556* 0.0001*** 0.5665 0.0398** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** / 
1968Q2- 2007Q4 
Level  0.3521 0.9080 0.0507* 0.0143** 0.0645* 0.4371 / 
1st Difference 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.4746 0.1016* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** / 
1995Q1- 2007Q4 
Level  0.9705 0.2876 0.9923 0.9977 0.9890 0.1873 0.1443 
1st Difference 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0447** 0.0000*** 0.0055*** 0.0028*** 
 
Notes:     is the house price index,    represents the real household disposable income,   is the mortgage 
outstanding,    is the general index of retail price.    is the physical housing stock.   
       is the after-tax 
mortgage rate from Building Societies.             is the after-tax composite mortgage rate from Building 
Societies and Bank. The figures shown in the table are  -      . ***, ** and * denote for statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. The appropriate number of lagged difference for the ADF unit 
root test is identified by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). The ADF test specifications for the after-tax 
mortgage rates          and   
          include constant only. For the rest of variables, the ADF test 
specifications include both of constant and trend. 
The results of unit root tests do not ensure that the differenced time series alone merits analysis 
for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the findings of the ADF test will be biased, in particular when the 
underlying time series are highly volatile and over a long time horizon. Secondly, even though 
some variables are individually non-stationary, the linear combination of them might be 
stationary. The second reason refers to cointegration. The extent of autocorrelation in the 
residuals from the linear combination of the variables can indicate the presence of cointegration. 
When the residual of the linear equation itself is not significantly autocorrelated, then the 
cointegration is credible and vice versa (Hendry, 1984). Equation (3.2) examines such a chance 
and Table 3.3 shows the results. To make the results comparable to Hendry (1984), the chapter 
examines the residuals of equation (3.2) by using the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics instead of 
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the ADF tests. Throughout the thesis, the figures for ‘Hendry’s Eq.()’ are drawn from Hendry 
(1984) for comparison purposes; the ‘wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. ‘Wrongly signed’ 
coefficient means the implied economic relationship violates the classical economic theory and 
therefore biased. This chapter assumes a coefficient is ‘properly signed’ when it is consistent 
with Hendry (1984). In reality, the linkage between two variables might be suppressed by the 
other variables, especially in a complex dynamic economy. Consequently, it is fairly hard to 
judge whether a coefficient is ‘properly signed’, without the control of the other omitted 
variables such as people’s expectations. It does not make a lot of sense to talk about ‘wrongly 
signed’ coefficients when they are statistically no different from zero. 
   ̂                          
                                                                  3. 2 
Table 3.3 Investigates the Cointegration 
   ̂                          
         
Hendry’s Eq.(14) 
                  
0.30 1.78 0.48 -1.16 0.23 -3.7 
      ̂                  
94 0.9959 5.4% 0.82 1.56 1.78 
1968Q2 – 1982Q4 
                  
.0694 
(.1387) 
1.7612*** 
(.3114) 
.5240*** 
(.1389) 
-.0511 
(.0600) 
.0181*** 
(.0049) 
-9.9291*** 
(.6265) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
59 0.9929 .0516 .7554*** 1.41 1.77 
1983Q1 – 2007Q4 
                  
-2.153*** 
(.4392) 
3.668*** 
(.3041) 
.5734*** 
(.155) 
.4009*** 
(.0968) 
.0373*** 
(.0063) 
-11.4297*** 
(.4105) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
100 0.9754 .0877 .6193*** 1.57 1.78 
1968Q2 – 2007Q4 
                  
.7726*** 
(.1121) 
2.0597*** 
(.1543) 
-.0565 
(.0797) 
.4039*** 
(.0766) 
.0391*** 
(.0047) 
-9.2915*** 
(.3761) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
159 0.9909 .1064 .4658*** 1.67 1.81 
1995Q1 – 2007Q4 
                  
-.0655 
(.4050) 
.7537*** 
(.2628) 
1.225*** 
(.1357) 
-.0227 
(.0533) 
.002 
(.0109) 
-14.599*** 
(.3036) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
52 0.9949 .0287 .6237*** 1.35 1.77 
Notes:     is the house price index,    is the general index of retail price.    represents the real household 
disposable income,   is the mortgage outstanding,    is the house completion proxies for the physical housing 
stock.   
  is the after-tax mortgage rate.   through    are coefficients.    is constant,    is residual. The        
and        are the lower and upper bound of Durbin-Watson statistic critical values at the 5% significance level, 
respectively. Source: http://www.stanford.edu/~clint/bench/dwcrit.htm Throughout the chapter, the ‘wrongly 
signed’ coefficients are in bold. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * means statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Given the observed    statistics are smaller than their corresponding lower critical    values 
(                    ), one can rejects the null hypothesis of no positive autocorrelation 
and conclude that the equation (3.2) has positive autocorrelation among the residuals (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009). Thereby, this chapter fails to find any cointegration, and there is no evidence 
to believe that the linear combination of the variables in equation (3.2) may be stationary. It 
appears the results of equation (3.2) are in contrast to Hendry (1984). Given T=94 and 5 
independent variables in Hendry (1984), the lower critical    value (  ) should be 
approximately 1.56 at the 5% significance level. In Hendry (1984), the    statistic value 0.82 is 
below its lower critical    value 1.56 (                    ). Therefore, Hendry (1984) 
is wrong to conclude that the linear combination of the level variables is stationary in his 
equation (14). 
3.3.2 A Possible Expectation Model 
To capture how people form their expectations about house prices, Hendry (1984) illustrates a 
possible expectation model as equation (3.3). Equations (3.3) through (3.5) are estimated by the 
classical Ordinary Least Square (OLS) which is typical fixed parameter estimation. 
          
                   
                                  
                                                                                                         3. 3 
Where,       is changes in house price,   
                is the changes in inflation rate. 
     is changes in aggregate mortgage outstanding.   
    
     .   
  is the mortgage rate after 
marginal tax.              is the annual changes in Retail Price Index (RPI).         
       is the average value of housing per unit of income.              is the ratio of 
borrowed to own equity.    and    denote the corresponding historical means of the feedback 
effects, respectively.        is the real income per household.    is constant,    is residual.    
through    are regression coefficients. 
This chapter sets the historical means of feedback effects        . Given the historical 
means of feedback effects (   and   ) are constants, whatever the values they are, the 
coefficients for equation (3.3) are unaffected by    and    or a specific dataset, ceteris paribus. 
This is because incorporating a constant into a time series is equivalent to parallel shift a time 
54 
 
series by the same amount for the whole data period. This has nothing to do with the changes in 
the shape of the time series. 
Table 3.4 exhibits the results of equation (3.3). In Table 3.4, none of the four datasets fits into the 
possible expectations model as Hendry (1984). The majority of coefficients are insignificant 
and/or ‘wrongly signed’. Table 3.4 further indicates the regression coefficients change in both 
sign and magnitude over datasets, which supports Brown et al. (1997). From an econometric 
perspective, the changes in coefficients over time refer to the parameter instability which implies 
the models are probably mis-specified. From an economics perspective, the changes in 
coefficients might mirror the institutional changes in the housing market (Lucas, 1976; Brown et 
al., 1997). Brown et al. (1997) suggest the institutional changes are said to occur if an economic 
relationship changes over time, which is identified by the change in one or more of the 
coefficients in the regression. 
Table 3.4 The Outputs for Equation (3.3) 
          
                   
                                       
                         
                      
Hendry’s Eq(16) 0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
-0.22*** 
(0.05) 
1968Q2-1982Q4 .4839** 
(.2199) 
1.8062*** 
(.4714) 
.0450 
(.0974) 
-.0279 
(.0893) 
-.0608 
(.10355) 
-.0107 
(.0337) 
.1842 
(.3249) 
1983Q1-2007Q4 .7450*** 
(.213) 
.7194** 
(.3480) 
.0892 
(.2986) 
-.0035 
(.0218) 
-.0148 
(.0331) 
.0386* 
(.0218) 
.0405 
(.1358) 
1968Q2-2007Q4 .5096*** 
(.1552) 
.6455*** 
(.2061) 
-.0062 
(.0795) 
.0101 
(.0112) 
-.0066 
(.0153) 
.0077 
(.0145) 
.0413 
(.0591) 
1995Q1-2007Q4 1.2919*** 
(.3113) 
.0034 
(.3565) 
.5496 
(.5409) 
.0704 
(.0882) 
.1008 
(.1135) 
.0952*** 
(.0262) 
-.5064 
(.4776) 
Notes:                .   
                 .             .     is the house price index,   is the 
mortgage outstanding.   
    
     .   
  is the after-tax mortgage rate.    is the general index of retail price.    is 
the physical housing stock.   represents the real household disposable income.   and   denotes the 
corresponding historical means of the feedback effects. Throughout the chapter, the ‘wrongly signed’ 
coefficients are in bold. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote for statistically significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
To investigate whether simple modifications improve the model fitting and robustness, this 
chapter investigates hundreds of alternative equations to equation (3.3) by changing the numbers 
of lags and/or the orders of differences to the independent variables. The ‘better’ alternative 
model satisfies the following three criteria. Firstly, the coefficients are signed consistently with 
Hendry (1984). Secondly, the coefficients are statistically significant in as many cases as 
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possible. Thirdly, the model reports the smallest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic 
among the alternative models. Such a modification strategy also applies to equations (3.4) and 
(3.5). 
Table 3.5 reports the alternative equations to equation (3.3) with the diagnostic tests for residual 
normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, model specification and multicollinearity. 
Unfortunately, few of the alternative equations are as good as Hendry (1984). 
From Table 3.5, except for the lagged second log difference of RPI   
     , none of the rest 
independent variables are statistically significant at the 5% significance level, for the sample 
1995Q1-2007Q4. The lagged changes in mortgage outstanding        have a negligible 
influence on the changes in house prices for the time period 1968Q2-1982Q4 and 1995Q1-
2007Q4, as the coefficients are statistically insignificant. The coefficients for             are 
insignificant for the datasets 1983Q1-2007Q4 and 1995Q1-2007Q4. For the sample 1968Q2-
2007Q4, all the coefficients are statistically significant. The adjusted    are 0.46, 0.457, 0.455 
and 0.211 for the four datasets, respectively. The adjusted    means the four alternative 
equations can interpret no more than 50% of the total variation in house prices which are lower 
than the   , 0.67, reported in Hendry (1984). Although a low adjusted    is not evidence for a 
poor model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009), the general violation of diagnostic tests would indicate a 
poor model. 
In Table 3.5, all the alternative equations exhibit multicollinearity which suggests some of the 
independent variables are highly correlated. Apart from the alternative equation for 1968Q2-
1982Q4, all the other three alternative equations also report residual autocorrelations. Thus, the 
coefficients in Table 3.5 are biased more or less (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
Hendry (1984) suggests that it is hard to understand precisely what properties to ascribe to 
equation (3.3). On one hand, all of the independent variables are lagged so equation (3.3) can be 
used for ex ante predictions. On the other hand, it is unknown why people should form 
anticipations in the way illustrated by equation (3.3), and the alternative equations in Table 3.5. 
So, even if people can find some much better fitted alternative equations for equation (3.3), it is 
unclear why it should be this. 
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Table 3.5 The Alternative Equations for Equation (3.3) 
Hendry’s Eq.(16)           
                   
                             
                                   
                     
0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
-0.22*** 
(0.05) 
The alternative equations for equation (3.3) 
1968Q2-1982Q4           
                     
                                
    
                                 
                     
.4367** 
(.2097) 
.6729 
(.4516) 
-.2912* 
(.1703) 
.5366*** 
(.1066) 
.0374** 
(.0160) 
.5674*** 
(.1084) 
.0044 
(.0182) 
Adj.    AIC          
0.4600 -243.0497 .2037 .2220 .2270 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.0591* 2 VIF Values > 10 This model reports multicollinearity. 
1983Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                
    
                            
                      
.9792*** 
(.2154) 
.3192** 
(.1580) 
-.13299 
(.1782) 
.5423*** 
(.0807) 
.02698** 
(.0124) 
.6325*** 
(.0861) 
.0109* 
(.0059) 
Adj.   AIC          
0.4566 -506.5692 .1236 .5877 .0201** 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.1267 2 VIF Values > 10 This model reports multicollinearity and residual 
autocorrelation. 
1968Q2-2007Q4           
                   
                                   
                             
                     
.8405*** 
(.1352) 
.3641*** 
(.1226) 
-.1706*** 
(.0462) 
.5729*** 
(.0615) 
.0403** 
(.0167) 
.6352*** 
(.0669) 
.0110** 
(.0042) 
Adj.   AIC          
0.4550 -745.9825 .1619 .2576 .0301** 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.2277 2 VIF Values > 10 This model reports multicollinearity and residual 
autocorrelation. 
1995Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                   
                             
                     
1.5282*** 
(.397) 
.1133 
(.4847) 
-.6735 
(.7599) 
.2755 
(.2789) 
.0538 
(.2422) 
.2919* 
(.1527) 
.0175** 
(.0077) 
Adj.   AIC          
0.2106 -253.8633 .2001 .7588 .0270** 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.2579 3 VIF Values > 10 This model reports multicollinearity and residual 
autocorrelation. 
Notes:    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticit. 
   denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification.  
The figures for the    tests are  -      . As a rule of thumb, a figure of centred VIF>10 indicates the corresponding 
variable report the multicollinearity, see (O’Brien, 2007). Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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3.3.3 A Restricted Parameterisation 
Hendry (1984) suggests that the tactic of directly removing insignificant variables is unlikely to 
yield a reasonable regression. Initially, regressions with near orthogonal variables yet 
explainable parameters are likely to offer ‘robust’ traits of time series. Secondly, a regression 
with relatively few independent variables not only helps to avoid the trap that an excessive 
number of variables cause over fitting, but also makes the regression easier to understand. 
However, excessively simplified regressions would also lose invariance to potential disturbances. 
Thirdly, it appears reasonable to employ lagged instead of contemporaneous variables both to 
eliminate the reliance on problematic exogeneity assumptions and to enhance the implement of 
the chosen equation for practical predicting. 
To study the resulting choice of a model which accounts for the available evidence clearly 
necessitates new evidence. Hendry (1984) tests a restricted parameterisation equation as (3.4). 
                           
                                     
                                                                      3. 4 
Where,       is a restricted Almon polynomial.        
 
      
∑          
 
    . 
The restricted Almon polynomial       provides a weighted average of     , with linearly 
decreasing weights. Throughout the thesis,           is the ratio of house price to income, 
   is the natural log of mortgage rate. The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage 
rate of Building Societies and Banks, while all the remaining three datasets use the mortgage rate 
of Building Societies. All the remaining model specifications are the same as the earlier 
equations. Table 3.6 shows the results for equation (3.4). From Table 3.6, the results for equation 
(3.4) do not make any economic sense, even if without the diagnostic tests, given the majority of 
coefficients are insignificant and/or ‘wrongly signed’. In particular, eight out of ten regression 
coefficients are statically insignificant for the sample 1983Q1-2007Q4 at the 5% significance 
level. Consistent with the results for equation (3.3), the parameters of equation (3.4) change both 
in sign and magnitude over datasets. 
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Table 3.6 The Outputs for Equation (3.4) 
                           
                                               
                                              
Hendry’s  Eq.(17)                      
0.24*** 
(0.11) 
11.4*** 
(4.8) 
0.57*** 
(0.22) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.15) 
             / / / 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-3.0 
(2.3) 
-1.01*** 
(0.37) 
/ / / 
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4573*** 
(.1496) 
12.896 
(10.418) 
.7201** 
(.3203) 
-.0950 
(.0966) 
.1210 
(.11995) 
-.0445 
(.04903) 
.1853 
(.1331) 
             / / / 
-.0368 
(.0324) 
.0114 
(.0226) 
-.0093 
(.03217) 
.1699 
(.4678) 
/ / / 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
.0416 
(.1100) 
24.447** 
(12.273) 
.1637 
(.4066) 
.0191 
(.0269) 
-.0240 
(.0400) 
-.0239 
(.0196) 
.5741*** 
(.1716) 
             / / / 
-.0298* 
(.0153) 
.0181 
(.0123) 
.0257 
(.0228) 
-.1234 
(.1847) 
/ / / 
1968Q2-2007Q4 
 
                     
.2086** 
(.0850) 
18.856** 
(7.559) 
.5254** 
(.240) 
-.025*** 
(.0091) 
.0294 
(.0189) 
-.0079 
(.0145) 
.2322*** 
(.0710) 
             / / / 
-.0248*** 
(.0079) 
.0089 
(.0093) 
.0201 
(.0178) 
.1086 
(.0821) 
/ / / 
1995Q1-2007Q4 
 
                     
-.2235 
(.1467) 
54.5707 
(35.149) 
-.6537 
(.5283) 
.4107** 
(.1929) 
-.2273 
(.1521) 
-.1789** 
(.0840) 
.7442*** 
(.2558) 
             / / / 
.0903** 
(.04116) 
-.0387 
(.0293) 
-.0790** 
(.0363) 
-2.755** 
(1.200) 
/ / / 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
‘Wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Following the strategy of Table 3.5, Table 3.7 illustrates the better alternative equation for 
equation (3.4) with a range of diagnostic tests. Unfortunately, none of the alternative equations in 
Table 3.7 provides us with reasonable fit as in Hendry (1984). According to Table 3.7, more than 
half of the coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 5% significance level for the sample 
1968Q2-1982Q4. The alternative equation for 1983Q1-2007Q4 violates the assumption of 
residual normality, and only two of the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% 
significance level. There are more coefficients which are statistically significant for the sample 
1968Q2-2007Q4. However, this equation violates four out of five diagnostic tests. The 
alternative equation for the sample 1995Q1-2007Q4 satisfies the five diagnostic tests, none of 
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the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Overall, the alternative 
equations for equation (3.4) are far from economically sensible. 
Table 3.7 The Alternative Equations for Equation (3.4) 
Hendry’s  Eq.(17)                            
                                     
                                                        
                     
0.24*** 
(0.11) 
11.4*** 
(4.8) 
0.57*** 
(0.22) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.15) 
             / / / 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-3.0 
(2.3) 
-1.01*** 
(0.37) 
/ / / 
The alternative equations for equation (3.4) 
1968Q2-1982Q4                               
                                   
                                                                  
                     
.9611*** 
(.1968) 
24.039*** 
(8.9272) 
.555* 
(.2953) 
.0579* 
(.0316) 
.0269 
(.0283) 
-.5435*** 
(.1650) 
.1321 
(.1042) 
             / / / 
-.0318 
(.0275) 
-.0145 
(.0112) 
-.0295 
(.0296) 
-.0103 
(.0076) 
/ / / 
Adj.   AIC    (p-value)    (p-value)    (p-value) 
0.5902 -248.5856 .4320 .2791 .3555 
   (p-value) Centred VIF Value Remark 
.3873 All VIF values < 10 Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1983Q1-2007Q4           
                     
                  
                   
                                                                
                     
.1850* 
(.0946) 
17.1300 
(11.2332) 
.1050 
(.2874) 
.0092 
(.0116) 
.0860*** 
(.0265) 
-.0138 
(.0127) 
.6755*** 
(.103) 
             / / / 
-.0051 
(.0357) 
-.0353 
(.0363) 
-.0448 
(.0219) 
.013 
(.0588) 
/ / / 
Adj.   AIC    (p-value)    (p-value)    (p-value) 
0.3651 -487.396 .0024*** .8132 .0221** 
   (p-value) Centred VIF Value Remark 
.1505 2 VIF Values > 10 This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are 
insignificant. 
1968Q2-2007Q4                             
                    
                
    
          
                                                           
                     
.3243*** 
(.0954) 
27.002*** 
(7.3220) 
.5338** 
(.2374) 
.0178 
(.0832) 
.0201 
(.0832) 
-.0921 
(.0678) 
.1087 
(.0681) 
             / / / 
-.0106* 
(.0064) 
-.0159* 
(.009) 
-.0517*** 
(.0185) 
.0293** 
(.0133) 
/ / / 
Adj.   AIC    (p-value)    (p-value)    (p-value) 
0.3609 -707.1701 .7131 .0301** .0001*** 
   (p-value)    (p-value) Remark 
.0233** 2 VIF Values > 10 This model violates four basic assumptions. 
1995Q1-2007Q4            
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.1847 
(.1551) 
61.358 
(51.157) 
.0029 
(.3107) 
.0208 
(.0399) 
.0536 
(.0367) 
-.2277 
(.2423) 
.4005* 
(.2303) 
             / / / 
-.0150 
(.0646) 
-.0294 
(.0212) 
-.0368* 
(.0188) 
.0157 
(.0056) 
/ / / 
Adj.   AIC    (p-value)    (p-value)    (p-value) 
0.3499 -217.1956 .4782 .9651 .2774 
   (p-value) Centred VIF Value Remark 
.6555 All VIF Values < 10 This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are 
insignificant. 
Notes:    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticit. 
   denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification.  
The figures for the    tests are  -      . As a rule of thumb, a figure of centred VIF>10 indicates the corresponding 
variable report the multicollinearity, see (O’Brien, 2007). Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
As a comparison to equation (3.4), Hendry (1984) examines equation (3.5). Table 3.9 presents 
the findings for equation (3.5). 
                           
                                      
                       ̅   
          
       
       
                           3. 5 
Where,                      and  ̅             . 
Relative to equation (3.4), equation (3.5) removes changes in physical housing stock     ; 
replaces real value of the mortgage stock          and ratio of house price to income 
            by ratio of borrowed to own equity            ; uses the original interest 
rates  ̅ 
  instead of natural logarithmic and takes two dummy variables into account. Hendry 
(1984) defines the two dummy variables as: 
      in 1967Q3 and zero otherwise; 
      in 1981Q3 and 1982Q1, -2 in 1982Q2 and zero otherwise. 
As the full dataset used in this chapter ranges from 1968Q2 to 2007Q4, this chapter sets dummy 
variables as Table 3.8. 
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Table 3.8 Dummy Variables for Equation (3.5) 
Dataset                 
Hendry (1984) 1967Q3; 0 otherwise 1981Q3 & 1982Q1 1982Q2; 0 otherwise 
1968Q2-1982Q4 1979Q2; 0 otherwise 1981Q4 & 1982Q1; 1982Q2; 0 otherwise 
1983Q1-2007Q4 1997Q2; 0 otherwise 2006Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
1968Q2-2007Q4 1979Q1; 0 otherwise 1997Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
1995Q1-2007Q4 1997Q2; 0 otherwise 2006Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
Table 3.9 The Outputs for Equation (3.5) 
                           
                                               
              ̅   
          
       
       
         
Hendry’s Eq.(18)                      
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
14.0*** 
(4.9) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.178*** 
(0.027) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
                 / / 
-0.22*** 
(0.09) 
-0.50*** 
(0.20) 
-3.5*** 
(0.4) 
-2.1*** 
(0.3) 
-3.0*** 
(0.05) 
/ / 
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4282*** 
(.1381) 
8.8207 
(10.1835) 
.5451** 
(.2104) 
.0297 
(.0375) 
-.0089 
(.0405) 
.4181 
(.2842) 
.2547 
(.2534) 
                 / / 
-.4946* 
(.2662) 
-.0943 
(.3060) 
-.6837 
(2.198) 
-2.5211*** 
(.8780) 
-.0879 
(.1510) 
/ / 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
-.0009 
(.1161) 
21.543* 
(12.709) 
.3110 
(.3353) 
.0248 
(.0169) 
.0128 
(.0191) 
.8547*** 
(.3099) 
.7501*** 
(.1847) 
                 / / 
-.52370*** 
(.1739) 
.1395 
(.4575) 
-.6022 
(2.366) 
.6086 
(1.7200) 
-.1119 
(.0881) 
/ / 
1968Q2-2007Q4                      
.0971 
(.0822) 
16.814** 
(7.492) 
.5289*** 
(.1792) 
.0042 
(.0111) 
.0040 
(.0120) 
.6952*** 
(.1731) 
.5090*** 
(.1141) 
                 / / 
-.5147*** 
(.1118) 
-.1546 
(.2414) 
.3020 
(2.2888) 
-.0188 
(1.619) 
.0008 
(.0477) 
/ / 
1995Q1-2007Q4                      
-.2797* 
(.1464) 
53.453 
(35.452) 
-.1241 
(.4899) 
.0466* 
(.0236) 
.0479 
(.0377) 
.7814 
(.5006) 
.4604 
(.3697) 
                 / / 
-.4452 
(.8288) 
.8234 
(1.4104) 
-1.0671 
(2.3095) 
.8642 
(1.595) 
-.2392** 
(.1039) 
/ / 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
‘Wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
The findings in Table 3.9 show a large number of coefficients that are statistically insignificant 
and/or ‘wrongly signed’, and present time varying parameters. Because the sets of dummy 
variables in this chapter are differ from Hendry (1984), and there is no prior theoretical 
assumption on the relationship between dummy variables and house prices, the signs of dummy 
variables in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 are not necessarily consistent with Hendry (1984). 
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Hendry (1984) suggests that the equation shown as equation (3.5) satisfies most of the model’s 
selection criteria. Unfortunately, it does not fit into the chapter’s datasets. Table 3.10 shows the 
better alternative models. In Table 3.10, the AIC value ranges from -737.7 to -229.5. The 
alternative model for 1968Q2-1982Q4 satisfies all the basic assumptions; the alternative model 
for 1982Q4-2007Q4 rejects the Ramsey RESET test at the 5% significance level which implies 
there is a specification error; the alternative model for 1968Q2-2007Q4 might report residual 
autocorrelation; and the alternative model for 1995Q1-2007Q4 rejects the null of residual 
normality at the 10% level. However, more than half of coefficients are again statistically 
insignificant across the four datasets. The adjusted    for the four datasets are 0.5956, 0.3935, 
0.4009 and 0.3636, respectively. Overall, the alternative equations for equation (3.5) are poor. 
Table 3.10 The Alternative Equations for Equation (3.5) 
Hendry’s Eq.(18)                            
                                      
                       ̅   
          
       
       
         
                     
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
14.0*** 
(4.9) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.178*** 
(0.027) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
                 / / 
-0.22*** 
(0.09) 
-0.50*** 
(0.20) 
-3.5*** 
(0.4) 
-2.1*** 
(0.3) 
-0.30*** 
(0.05) 
/ / 
The alternative equations for equation (3.5) 
1968Q2-1982Q4                            
                                        
                       ̅   
          
       
       
          
                     
.4631*** 
(.1262) 
6.2378 
(9.435) 
.4731** 
(.2043) 
.0288 
(.0204) 
.0465* 
(.0233) 
.4807* 
(.2734) 
.2928 
(.2426) 
                 / / 
-.6195*** 
(.2024) 
-.1878 
(.2772) 
-1.1966 
(2.1186) 
-2.6213*** 
(.8411) 
-.0800 
(.0657) 
/ / 
Adj.   AIC          
0.5956 -265.255 .6804 .3534 .4975 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.3812 All VIF Values <10 Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1983Q1-2007Q4                            
                                        
                             ̅   
          
       
       
          
                     
.4314*** 
(.1239) 
8.5742 
(13.1711) 
.1195 
(.3735) 
.0109 
(.0122) 
.0829*** 
(.0215) 
.5377** 
(.2308) 
.4501*** 
(.1178) 
                 / / 
-.4569*** 
(.1265) 
-.7438** 
(.3640) 
-.3807 
(2.0752) 
1.9497 
(1.5644) 
-.0343 
(.0649) 
/ / 
Adj.   AIC          
0.3935 -491.113 .1002 .4303 .4032 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.0318** All VIF Values <10 Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1968Q2-2007Q4                            
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                       ̅   
          
       
       
          
                     
.1790** 
(.0830) 
13.26* 
(7.317) 
.6153** 
(.2402) 
.0653*** 
(.0180) 
.0612*** 
(.019) 
.5834*** 
(.0917) 
.4577*** 
(.0917) 
                 / / 
-.5364*** 
(.1027) 
-.2827 
(.2376) 
.1564 
(2.2175) 
.4372 
(1.5833) 
.0255*** 
(.0067) 
/ / 
Adj.   AIC          
0.4009 -737.67 .3340 .1530 .0001 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.2333 All VIF Values <10 This model reports residual autocorrelation. 
1995Q1-2007Q4                          
                                             
                               ̅   
          
       
       
          
                     
.4731*** 
(.1174) 
34.587 
(36.73) 
.3085 
(.3734) 
.06496* 
(.0320) 
.0311 
(.0369) 
1.1738** 
(.5570) 
.5665** 
(.265) 
                 / / 
-.4387 
(.5891) 
-1.039 
(1.164) 
-1.1896 
(1.8302) 
-.7266 
(1.3183) 
-.0052 
(.0116) 
/ / 
Adj.   AIC          
0.3636 -229.51 .0724* .9145 .2810 
   Centred VIF Value Remark 
.5085 All VIF Values <10 This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are 
insignificant. 
Notes:    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticit. 
   denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification.  
The figures for the    tests are  -      . As a rule of thumb, a figure of centred VIF>10 indicates the corresponding 
variable report the multicollinearity, see (O’Brien, 2007). Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
3.4 Conclusion 
To set a scene for the development of analysis models in Chapters 4 through to 7, this chapter re-
estimates the principal equations of Hendry (1984) to four datasets for two research questions. 
Firstly, whether the empirical results of Hendry (1984) are replicable by using similar datasets. 
The findings are mixed. In the data description section, the findings are roughly consistent with 
Hendry (1984) in the same time period. However, his econometric models fall when fitted into 
the chapter’s four datasets. Throughout the chapter, the regression coefficients change in both 
magnitude and sign over samples which support Brown et al. (1997). Secondly, the chapter 
considers whether simple modifications improve model fitting. The chapter finds that some naïve 
modifications, such as changing the number of lag length for independent variables, will improve 
the fitting of the underlying equation. However, the alternative equations are far from 
economically sensible, as the alternative equation violates one or more assumptions of regression 
analysis. Some much better alternative equations might emerge if one keeps trying such a 
modification procedure. However, it is unclear why people should make such a modification, and 
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statistical significance does not entail a superior economic explanation. Even if one alternative 
equation properly captures the historical linkage between those variables, it may be inappropriate 
for predictions or analysis in another dataset which refers to the model’s stability and the 
model’s uncertainty. Model stability focuses on how long a predictive relationship stays in effect, 
while model uncertainty concentrates on how one selects amongst many competing quantitative 
models, see (Pesaran and Timmermann, 2002). 
From an econometrics perspective, the change in coefficients refers to the parameter instability, 
implying that the fixed parameter models are probably mis-specified. From an economics 
perspective, the parameter instability might result from the institutional changes in the UK 
housing market. Thereby, a more suitable and parsimonious approach to the representation of an 
unstable economic system is to develop a model using a methodology which takes account of the 
institutional changes. 
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Chapter 4. Econometric Modelling of UK House Prices in an Open Economy 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter incorporates the Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI) into the principal equations of 
Hendry (1984), ceteris paribus. Through comparison with Chapter 3, this chapter demonstrates 
that the classical fixed parameter demand and supply equations are poor in terms of robustness 
and unsuitable to studying the UK house prices, even taking account of FPI. FPI reflects one of 
the institutional changes since the 1970s that Hendry (1984) does not consider. This chapter 
addresses two issues. 
 Firstly, whether an open economy framework is empirically superior to its closed 
economy counterpart in terms of model robustness? 
 Secondly, whether FPI drives the UK’s house prices to a statistically significantly extent? 
4.2 Data Description 
The data included in this study are the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) House Price Index (HPI), the Retail Price Index (RPI), the mortgage rates of Building 
Societies, the composite mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks, the aggregate mortgage 
outstanding of Building Societies and Banks, the real aggregate household disposable income, 
the house completions series, foreign exchange reserves, net exports of good/services and net 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow from the United Kingdom. All the quarterly time series 
data were collected from DataStream and cover the period from 1968Q2 to 2007Q4. The starting 
dates are chosen by the availability of data for the HPI and the ending dates are chosen by the 
availability of data for the house completions. The chapter sets the House Price Index (HPI) and 
the Retail Price Index (RPI) equal to 100 at 2002Q1. Except where specifically mentioned, all 
the variables are in nominal terms. Throughout this chapter, lower case letters for time-
dependent variables represent the natural logarithm of their capital counterparts. Apart from the 
new variables, foreign exchange reserves, net exports of good/services and net FDI inflow, all 
the rest of the variables are the same as in Chapter 3. 
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To make the empirical results comparable to Chapter 3, this chapter also uses four datasets, 
namely, 1968Q2-1982Q4, 1983Q1-2007Q4, 1968Q2-2007Q4 and 1995Q1-2007Q4. The dataset 
1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and Banks, while all 
the other three datasets use the mortgage rate of the Building Societies. In the Appendices, Table 
A and Table B display the variable sources and definitions; Table C illustrates a basic variable 
summary. 
Following Martin and Morrison (2008), the chapter calculates the raw FPI data by identity: FPI 
Inflow = Change in Foreign Exchange Reserves – Net Exports – Net FDI Inflow. Figure 4.1 
plots the FDI against FPI in raw data. Figure 4.1 suggests the net FDI inflow to the UK remains 
incredibly stable and ignorable value from 1968Q2 to 1986Q2; decreases (increasing net FDI 
outflow) between 1986Q3 and 1998Q2; and is dramatically volatile thereafter. FPI inflow 
appears stable and insignificant between 1968Q2 and 1979Q2; impressively, it fluctuates from 
1979Q3 to 1996Q2; thereafter, it increases substantially. The net FDI inflow and FPI inflow 
range from -17,638 to 1,099 and -3,379 to 30,648 million Great Britain Pounds, respectively. 
The presence of negatives and positives indicate that the capital flows, either FDI or FPI, might 
be reversed under certain macroeconomic conditions. Although there is a massive FPI inflow 
most of time, the UK reports substantial net FDI outflow. For instance, there are 17 billion Great 
Britain Pounds net FDI outflow by 2007Q4. FPI is much more volatile than FDI, as their 
standard deviations are 6,780 million and 3,479 million, respectively. Such great volatility is 
primarily attributable to the last two decades. Considering that these two variables report 
incredibly high correlation, -0.94, any regression which incorporates these two variables 
simultaneously may report severe multicollinearity. From another perspective, these two 
variables may share some common driving forces, e.g. the underlying economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
67 
 
Figure 4.1 Net FDI inflow vs. FPI inflow 
 
Notes: The currency unit is Great Britain Pound Millions at raw data scale. A minus sign indicates net outflow. 
Following Hendry (1984), this chapter uses the log-linear specification to apply the multiple 
linear regressions. Log-linear specification reduces the skewness of response variables, which 
may improve the model fit (Barthel et al., 2010). 
A constant of 3,380 is added to the net FPI inflow series before applying the natural log 
transformation. Such a parallel upward shift does not change the pattern of the raw FPI series but 
ensures that the minimum value of the transformed series equals 1 which, in turn, ensures the log 
transformation is applicable. In the literature, Barthel et al. (2010) set the negative observations 
equal to 0.1 before taking the natural log transformation. Xu and Chen (2012) incorporate the 
non-logged FPI into a log-linear model. In fact, all the three aforementioned handling techniques 
to non-positive values are biased. Firstly, although the arbitrarily added constant does not 
influence the pattern of the raw time series, it does affect the pattern of the transformed series 
because the natural log is a nonlinear transformation. Secondly, set negatives which equal a 
small positive value also change the pattern of the time series variable. Even worse, it blinds us 
to the level and changes in negative values especially when there are a lot of negatives. In this 
chapter, 39 out of the 159 FPI observations are negatives, which is a great many. Thirdly, it is 
not unusual to combine the logged and non-logged variables in the right hand side of an equation, 
as Hendry (1984) did, and there should not be technical issues. However, the coefficients of non-
logged variable is not elasticity anymore (one unit increase in capital flow will cause 1% change 
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in logged dependent variable). More importantly, the model fitting would be poor. Overall, the 
method of adding a constant to negatives appears superior to the others for this chapter. 
4.3 Empirical Modelling of the UK House Prices in an Open Economy 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To investigate the autoregressive characteristics, the chapter firstly estimates equation (4.1) for 
foreign portfolio investment     . The description to the rest of the variables has been displayed 
in the last chapter. 
                   ∑     
 
                                                                              4. 1  
                   is the first natural log difference of FPI.    is constant.    is the 
constant coefficient for the  -   lagged variable.    is error term or residual. Table 4.1 displays 
the results of equation (4.1) for      in terms of four datasets, and reveals various fits.      
exhibits residual non-normality and heteroskedasticity in all of the four datasets at 1% 
significance level; and reports residual autocorrelation in 1983Q1-2007Q4, at the 5% 
significance level. 
Table 4.1 Time Series Descriptions to      
                   ∑     
 
                  
                                                    ̂          
1968Q2-1982Q4 
 -.2801 
(.2085) 
-.4536** 
(.2028) 
-.3486* 
(.1856) 
-.43*** 
(.1502) 
2.0993 
(1.655) 
0.3399 1.26 .000*** .000*** .483 
1983Q1-2007Q4 
 -.22*** 
(.0597) 
-.511*** 
(.0799) 
-.442*** 
(.0784) 
-.33*** 
(.0685) 
2.017*** 
(.5308) 
0.5463 .501 .000*** .000*** .041** 
1968Q2-2007Q4 
 -.129* 
(.0726) 
-.567*** 
(.0899) 
-.444*** 
(.0882) 
-.42*** 
(.0751) 
1.1295* 
(.6216) 
0.3920 .856 .000*** .000*** .692 
1995Q1-2007Q4 
 -.0851 
(.1041) 
-.469*** 
(.1546) 
-.581*** 
(.1355) 
-.357** 
(.1367) 
.8655 
(.9693) 
0.3487 .516 .000*** .000*** .176 
Notes: Adj.    is the adjusted    of the regression.  ̂ is the standard deviation of the regression.    denotes the 
Skewness-Kurtosis Normality Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticit.    denotes Breusch-
Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelation. The figures for   ,    and    are  -      . ***, ** and * represent statistically 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Coefficient standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 4.2 reports the ADF unit root test for     . From 1983Q1 to 2007Q4, FPI is stationary at 
the second log difference at the 5% significance level; while it is stationary at the first log 
difference for the rest of the three samples at the 1% significant level. 
Table 4.2 ADF Unit Root Tests for      
 1968Q2-1982Q4 1983Q1-2007Q4 1968Q2-2007Q4 1995Q1-2007Q4 
Level  0.8282 0.9998 0.6081 0.7928 
1
st
 Difference 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
Notes: The figure shows in the table is  -     . The appropriate number of lagged difference for the ADF unit root 
test is identified by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). The ADF test specification for FPI includes constant 
only. *** means statistically significant at the 1% significance level. 
As the findings of stationary do not entail that the differenced time series alone merit analysis, 
this chapter investigates equation (4.2) which is analogous to the investigation of cointegration. 
Relative to equation (3.2) in Chapter 3, equation (4.2) incorporates the     , ceteris paribus. 
Throughout the thesis, the figures for ‘Hendry’s Eq.()’ are drawn from Hendry (1984) for 
illustration purposes; the ‘wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. 
   ̂                          
                                                         4. 2 
Table 4.3 Investigates the Cointegration 
Panel A: Equation with      
   ̂                          
                
1968Q2-1982Q4                   
.0690 
(.1397) 
1.7464*** 
(.3147) 
.5306*** 
(.1404) 
-.0447 
(.0616) 
.0182*** 
(.0049) 
.0031 
(.0058) 
     Adj. 
    ̂   (statistic)        
-9.9839 
(.6393) 
59 0.9928 .05196 .7642*** 1.36 
1983Q1-2007Q4                   
-1.4343*** 
(.4343) 
3.0544*** 
(.3117) 
.4108*** 
(.1467) 
.4011*** 
(.0886) 
.0329*** 
(.0059) 
.0722*** 
(.0165) 
     Adj. 
    ̂   (statistic)        
-10.458*** 
(.4365) 
100 0.9794 .0802 .7231 1.55 
1968Q2-2007Q4                   
.8851*** 
(.1148) 
2.011*** 
(.1509) 
-.1161 
(.0799) 
.4022*** 
(.0745) 
.0387*** 
(.0046) 
.0299*** 
(.0096) 
     Adj. 
    ̂   (statistic)        
-9.0757*** 
(.3722) 
159 0.9914 .1034 .4984 1.66 
1995Q1-2007Q4                   
-.2234 
(.399) 
.6053** 
(.2642) 
1.2984*** 
(.1360) 
-.0217 
(.0515) 
.0034 
(.0105) 
.0173** 
(.0084) 
     Adj. 
    ̂   (statistic)        
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-14.329*** 
(.3215) 
52 0.9952 .0278 .6754 1.35 
Panel B: Equation without      
   ̂                          
          
Hendry’s Eq.(14)                   
0.30 1.78 0.48 -1.16 0.23 -3.7 
      ̂                  
94 0.9959 5.4% 0.82 1.56 1.78 
1968Q2-1982Q4                   
.0694 
(.1387) 
1.7612*** 
(.3114) 
.5240*** 
(.1389) 
-.0511 
(.0600) 
.0181*** 
(.0049) 
-9.9291*** 
(.6265) 
          ̂    (statistic)               
59 0.9929 .0516 .7554*** 1.41 1.77 
1983Q1-2007Q4                   
-2.153*** 
(.4392) 
3.668*** 
(.3041) 
.5734*** 
(.155) 
.4009*** 
(.0968) 
.0373*** 
(.0063) 
-11.4297*** 
(.4105) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
100 0.9754 .0877 .6193*** 1.57 1.78 
1968Q2-2007Q4                   
.7726*** 
(.1121) 
2.0597*** 
(.1543) 
-.0565 
(.0797) 
.4039*** 
(.0766) 
.0391*** 
(.0047) 
-9.2915*** 
(.3761) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
159 0.9909 .1064 .4658*** 1.67 1.81 
1995Q1-2007Q4                   
-.0655 
(.4050) 
.7537*** 
(.2628) 
1.225*** 
(.1357) 
-.0227 
(.0533) 
.002 
(.0109) 
-14.599*** 
(.3036) 
          ̂   (statistic)               
52 0.9949 .0287 .6237*** 1.35 1.77 
Notes:     is the house price index,    is the general index of retail price.    represents the real household 
disposable income,   is the mortgage outstanding,    is the house completion proxies for the physical housing 
stock.   
  is the after-tax mortgage rate.       is foreign portfolio investment.   through    are coefficients.    is 
constant,    is residual. The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and 
Banks, while all the other three datasets use the mortgage rate of the Building Societies. Throughout the chapter, the 
‘wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. The        and        are the lower and upper bound of Durbin-
Watson statistic critical values at the 5% significance level, respectively. Source: 
http://www.stanford.edu/~clint/bench/dwcrit.htm Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote for statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. Panel B is drawn 
from Table 3.3 in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.3 shows the findings for the cointegration tests. To make the results comparable to 
Hendry (1984) and Chapter 3, the chapter examines the residuals of equation (4.2) by using the 
Durbin-Watson (  ) statistics instead of the ADF tests. 
Panel A of Tables 4.3 through to 4.10 show the results for a given equation with FPI. Panel B of 
Tables 4.3 through to 4.10 is essentially drawn from Tables 3.3 through to 3.10 which show the 
results for an equation without FPI, ceteris paribus. The purpose is to address whether an open 
economy model is superior to its closed economy counterpart. 
Panel A in Table 4.3 rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals for equation (4.2) have no 
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positive autocorrelations, because the observed   statistics are smaller than their corresponding 
lower bound    critical values over the four datasets. So, the linear combination of the 
variables in equation (4.2) is nonstationary and there is no cointegration over the four datasets, 
which are consistent with the findings in panel B. Table 4.3 suggests that the incorporation of 
FPI does not enhance the presence of cointegration. 
4.3.2 A Possible Expectation Model 
Equation (4.3) incorporates the lagged first log differenced FPI          into the equation (16) 
of Hendry (1984) which is a possible expectation model. Following Hendry (1984), equations 
(4.3) through (4.5) are estimated by the classical Ordinary Least Square (OLS). 
          
                   
                                  
                                                                                            4. 3  
Where,       is changes in house price,   
                is the changes in inflation rate. 
     is changes in aggregate mortgage outstanding.   
    
     .   
  is the after-tax mortgage 
rate.              is the annual changes in Retail Price Index (RPI).           
     is the average value of housing per unit of income.              is the ratio of 
borrowed to own equity.    and    denote the corresponding historical means of the feedback 
effects, respectively.        is the real income per household.      is foreign portfolio 
investment.    is constant,    is residual.    through to    are regression coefficients. Like 
Chapter 3, the chapter sets        . Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the results for equation 
(4.3). 
Table 4.4 shows pretty poor fits, whether it incorporates      or not. More than half of the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant and/or ‘wrongly signed’ for all the four datasets. 
Moreover, the regression coefficients change in both sign and magnitude over samples. 
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Table 4.4 The Outputs for Equation (4.3) 
Panel A: Equation with      
          
                   
                                                   
                        
                         
1968Q2-1982Q4 .4801** 
(.2155) 
1.899*** 
(.4653) 
.0567 
(.0956) 
-.0455 
(.0881) 
-.0849 
(.1025) 
-.0057 
(.0332) 
.0044* 
(.0026) 
.2601 
(.3215) 
1983Q1-2007Q4 .7424*** 
(.2129) 
.7087** 
(.3480) 
.0476 
(.3010) 
-.0027 
(.0218) 
-.0133 
(.0331) 
.0353 
(.0220) 
.0028 
(.0027) 
.0381 
(.1357) 
1968Q2-2007Q4 .5037*** 
(.1540) 
.6447*** 
(.2045) 
-.0110 
(.079) 
.0114 
(.0111) 
-.0058 
(.0152) 
.0065 
(.0144) 
.0034* 
(.0019) 
.0393 
(.0586) 
1995Q1-2007Q4 1.2756*** 
(.3207) 
.0013 
(.3604) 
.5469 
(.5468) 
.0711 
(.0892) 
.1016 
(.1148) 
.0943*** 
(.0268) 
.0011 
(.0040) 
-.5088 
(.4828) 
Panel B: Equation without      
          
                   
                                                   
             
                         
Hendry’s Eq(16) 0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
/ -0.22*** 
(0.05) 
1968Q2-1982Q4 .4839** 
(.2199) 
1.8062*** 
(.4714) 
(.0450) 
(.0974) 
(-.0279) 
(.0893) 
(-.0608) 
(.10355) 
(-.0107) 
(.0337) 
/ .1842 
(.3249) 
1983Q1-2007Q4 .7450*** 
(.213) 
.7194** 
(.3480) 
(.0892) 
(.2986) 
(-.0035) 
(.0218) 
(-.0148) 
(.0331) 
.0386* 
(.0218) 
/ .0405 
(.1358) 
1968Q2-2007Q4 .5096*** 
(.1552) 
.6455*** 
(.2061) 
-.0062 
(.0795) 
.0101 
(.0112) 
(-.0066) 
(.0153) 
.0077 
(.0145) 
/ .0413 
(.0591) 
1995Q1-2007Q4 1.2919*** 
(.3113) 
.0034 
(.3565) 
(.5496) 
(.5409) 
.0704 
(.0882) 
.1008 
(.1135) 
.0952*** 
(.0262) 
/ -.5064 
(.4776) 
Notes:                .   
                 .             .     is the house price index,   is the 
mortgage outstanding.   
    
     .   
  is the after-tax mortgage rate.    is the general index of retail price.    is 
the physical housing stock.    represents the real household disposable income.    and    denotes the corresponding 
historical means of the feedback effects.      is foreign portfolio investment. The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the 
composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and Banks, while all the other three datasets use the mortgage rate 
of the Building Societies. Throughout the chapter, the ‘wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. Coefficient standard 
deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.4 in Chapter 3. 
To capture the well fitted possible expectation models, this chapter again investigates hundreds 
of alternative equations to equation (4.3) by changing the numbers of lags and/or the orders of 
differences to the independent variables. Following Chapter 3, the ‘better’ alternative model is 
selected by three criteria. Firstly, the coefficients are signed consistent with Hendry (1984) for a 
given model. Secondly, the coefficients are statistically significant in as many cases as possible. 
Thirdly, the model reports the smallest Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) statistic among the 
alternative models. 
Table 4.5 illustrates the alternative equations to equation (4.3) with the diagnostic tests for 
residual normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, model specification and multicollinearity. 
 
73 
 
Table 4.5 The Alternative Equations for Equation (4.3) 
Panel A: Equation with      
1968Q2-1982Q4           
                   
                                     
                                      
                        
.4522** 
(.2075) 
.6484 
(.4466) 
-.2855* 
(.1684) 
.5418*** 
(.1054) 
.0360** 
(.0158) 
.5617*** 
(.1072) 
.0033 
(.0023) 
.0055 
(.0180) 
Adj.    AIC              Centred VIF Value 
0.4726 -243.4601 .1633 .1835 .5132 .0769* 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports specification error and multicollinearity. 
1983Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                
       
                                   
                        
.9132*** 
(.2136) 
.2681* 
(.1570) 
-.0920 
(.1759) 
.5653*** 
(.0800) 
.0266** 
(.0122) 
.6549*** 
(.0852) 
.0055** 
(.0026) 
.0101* 
(.0058) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4766 -509.4014 .2009 .5185 .0154** .2132 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
1968Q2-2007Q4           
                   
                                      
                                   
                        
.838*** 
(.1354) 
.3641*** 
(.1228) 
-.1709*** 
(.0463) 
.5682 
(.0619) 
.039** 
(.0168) 
.6267*** 
(.0679) 
.0012 
(.0016) 
.0111*** 
(.0042) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4534 -744.5971 .1551 .3272 .0465** .2267 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
1995Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                      
                                   
                        
1.3764*** 
(.417) 
.117 
(.483) 
-.7685 
(.7616) 
.3050 
(.279) 
.0432 
(.2415) 
.3222** 
(.1544) 
.0060 
(.0052) 
.0163** 
(.0077) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.2163 -253.4087 .2234 .8046 .0417** .6232 3 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
More than half of the coefficients are insignificant. This model reports residual autocorrelation and 
multicollinearity. 
Panel B: Equation without      
Hendry’s Eq.(16)           
                   
                                     
                           
                        
0.28*** 
(0.10) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
-0.12** 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.35*** 
(0.09) 
/ -0.22*** 
(0.05) 
1968Q2-1982Q4           
                     
                                
    
                               
                        
.4367** 
(.2097) 
.6729 
(.4516) 
-.2912* 
(.1703) 
.5366*** 
(.1066) 
.0374** 
(.0160) 
.5674*** 
(.1084) 
/ .0044 
(.0182) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4600 -243.0497 .2037 .2220 .2270 .0591* 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports specification error and multicollinearity. 
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1983Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                
       
                          
                        
.9792*** 
(.2154) 
.3192** 
(.1580) 
-.13299 
(.1782) 
.5423*** 
(.0807) 
.02698** 
(.0124) 
.6325*** 
(.0861) 
/ .0109* 
(.0059) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4566 -506.5692 .1236 .5877 .0201** .1267 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
1968Q2-2007Q4           
                   
                                      
                          
                        
.8405*** 
(.1352) 
.3641*** 
(.1226) 
-.1706*** 
(.0462) 
.5729*** 
(.0615) 
.0403** 
(.0167) 
.6352*** 
(.0669) 
/ .0110** 
(.0042) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4550 -745.9825 .1619 .2576 .0301** .2277 2 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
1995Q1-2007Q4           
                   
                                      
                          
                        
1.5282*** 
(.397) 
.1133 
(.4847) 
-.6735 
(.7599) 
.2755 
(.2789) 
.0538 
(.2422) 
.2919* 
(.1527) 
/ .0175** 
(.0077) 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.2106 -253.8633 .2001 .7588 .0270** .2579 3 VIF Values > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. 
Notes: The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and Banks, while all 
the other three datasets use the mortgage rate of the Building Societies.    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality 
Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity.    denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for 
Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification. (O’Brien, 2007) suggests a variable 
reports the multicollinearity when the corresponding centred Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) > 10. The figures 
reported for the diagnostic tests are  -      , except for the VIF values. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.5 in 
Chapter 3. 
The diagnostic tests in Table 4.5 suggest none of the selected alternative equations present 
economically sensible fit. Panel A of Table 4.5 suggests, for the dataset 1968Q2-1982Q4, the 
adjusted    is 0.47, which is lower than the adjusted   , 0.67, reported for the equation (16) in 
Hendry (1984). A low adjusted    is not evidence of a poor model (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
However, the poor coefficient significance and violation of diagnostic tests would indicate a poor 
model. For the dataset 1968Q2-1982Q4, 3 out of 7 independent variables are statistically 
insignificant at the 5% significance level. Even worse, this model violates the assumptions of no 
multicollinearity and residual independence. For the remaining three datasets, the alternative 
equations report residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. The collinearity is probably due 
to the substantial values of household income   and mortgage outstanding  dominate the 
values for the ratio of borrowed to own equity           and the real income per household 
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      . For the dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4, more than half of the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant at the 5% significance level. Apart from the alternative equation for 1983Q1-
2007Q4, none of the rest of FPI is statistically significant at the 5% significance level, implying 
that the changes in FPI        cannot be statistically significant in driving the changes in house 
prices, after controlling the other economic variables. 
4.3.3 A Restricted Parameterisation 
Equation (4.4) incorporates         into the equation (17) of Hendry (1984) which is a 
restricted parameterisation model, ceteris paribus. 
                           
                                     
                                                           
                                                                                                                  4. 4 
Where,       is a restricted Almon polynomial,        
 
      
∑          
 
   . 
       provides a weighted average of     , with linearly decreasing weights. Table 4.6 shows 
the results for equation (4.4). 
Table 4.6 The Output for Equation (4.4) 
Panel A: Equation with      
                           
                                               
                                                           
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4919*** 
(.1457) 
12.322 
(10.077) 
.8048** 
(.3127) 
-.1003 
(.0935) 
.1225 
(.1160) 
-.0385 
(.0475) 
.1696 
(.1289) 
                 / / 
-.0298 
(.0316) 
.0044 
(.0222) 
-.0134 
(.0312) 
.0043* 
(.0022) 
.1983 
(.4525) 
/ / 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
.0425 
(.1116) 
24.413* 
(12.342) 
.1598 
(.4140) 
.0189 
(.0273) 
-.0239 
(.0403) 
-.0238 
(.0198) 
.5717*** 
(.1773) 
                 / / 
-.0299* 
(.0154) 
.0181 
(.0124) 
.0255 
(.0232) 
.0002 
(.0028) 
-.1220 
(.1872) 
/ / 
1968Q2-2007Q4                      
.2251*** 
(.0853) 
18.694** 
(7.523) 
.5342** 
(.2389) 
-.024*** 
(.0091) 
.0277 
(.0188) 
-.0081 
(.0144) 
.2152*** 
(.0716) 
                 / / 
-.0243*** 
(.0078) 
.0079 
(.0093) 
.0167 
(.0178) 
.0026 
(.0017) 
.1039 
(.0818) 
/ / 
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1995Q1-2007Q4                      
-.1487 
(.1546) 
47.8058 
(35.0031) 
-.6866 
(.5220) 
.4958** 
(.2002) 
-.2970* 
(.1584) 
-.2136** 
(.0867) 
.6932*** 
(.2553) 
                 / / 
.0870** 
(.0407) 
-.0440 
(.0292) 
-.0918** 
(.0371) 
.0092 
(.0067) 
-3.2622** 
(1.2410) 
/ / 
Panel B: Equation without      
                           
                                               
                                               
Hendry’s Eq.(17)                      
0.24*** 
(0.11) 
11.4*** 
(4.8) 
0.57*** 
(0.22) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.15) 
                 / / 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.027** 
(0.015) 
-3.0 
(2.3) 
/ -1.01 
(0.37) 
/ / 
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4573*** 
(.1496) 
12.896 
(10.418) 
.7201** 
(.3203) 
-.0950 
(.0966) 
.1210 
(.1199) 
-.0445 
(.0490) 
.1853 
(.1331) 
                 / / 
-.0368 
(.0324) 
.0114 
(.0226) 
-.0093 
(.0322) 
/ .1699 
(.4678) 
/ / 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
.0416 
(.1100) 
24.447** 
(12.273) 
.1637 
(.4066) 
.0191 
(.0269) 
-.024 
(.040) 
-.0239 
(.0196) 
.5741*** 
(.1716) 
                 / / 
-.0298* 
(.0153) 
.0181 
(.0123) 
.0257 
(.0228) 
/ -.1234 
(.1847) 
/ / 
1968Q2-2007Q4                      
.2086** 
(.0850) 
18.856** 
(7.559) 
.5254** 
(.240) 
-.025*** 
(.0091) 
.0294 
(.0189) 
-.0079 
(.0145) 
.2322*** 
(.0710) 
                 / / 
-.0248*** 
(.0079) 
.0089 
(.0093) 
.0201 
(.0178) 
/ .1086 
(.0821) 
/ / 
1995Q1-2007Q4                      
-.2235 
(.1467) 
54.5707 
(35.149) 
-.6537 
(.5283) 
.4107** 
(.1929) 
-.2273 
(.1521) 
-.1789** 
(.0840) 
.7442*** 
(.2558) 
                 / / 
.0903** 
(.04116) 
-.0387 
(.0293) 
-.0790** 
(.0363) 
/ -2.755** 
(1.200) 
/ / 
Notes: ***, ** and * mean statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. ‘Wrongly 
signed’ coefficients are in bold. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.6 in Chapter 3. 
From Table 4.6, either panel A or panel B, the results do not make any economic sense even 
without the diagnostic tests, given the majority of coefficients are insignificant and/or ‘wrongly 
signed’. The regression parameters for equation (4.4) change in both sign and magnitude over 
datasets. 
Following Table 4.5, Table 4.7 illustrates the better alternative equations to equation (4.4) with a 
range of diagnostic tests. Panel A of Table 4.7 suggests the alternative equation for 1983Q1-
2007Q4 violates the assumption of residual normality and independence. The alternative model 
77 
 
for 1968Q2-2007Q4 reports residual heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, specification error and 
multicollinearity. Although the alternative equations for 1968Q2-1982Q4 and 1995Q1-2007Q4 
satisfy all the diagnostic tests, the fit of these two models is poor as more than half of the 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Table 4.7 The Alternative Equations for Equation (4.4) 
Panel A: Equation with      
1968Q2-1982Q4                            
                                     
                                                                     
                     
.9355*** 
(.1931) 
23.523*** 
(8.736) 
.6127** 
(.2908) 
.0485 
(.0314) 
.0273 
(.0277) 
-.5129*** 
(.1624) 
.1169 
(.1023) 
                 / / 
-.0284 
(.0270) 
-.0152 
(.0109) 
-.0305 
(.0290) 
.0034* 
(.0020) 
-.0091 
(.0074) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.6080 -250.1831 .4744 .2944 .2530 .6182 All VIFs < 10 
Remark 
More than half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1983Q1-2007Q4                               
                                         
                                                                       
                     
.1910** 
(.0940) 
17.209 
(11.1456) 
.1107 
(.2852) 
.0088 
(.0115) 
.0871*** 
(.0263) 
-.0125 
(.0127) 
.6438*** 
(.1043) 
                 / / 
-.0078 
(.0355) 
-.0322 
(.0361) 
-.0396* 
(.0219) 
.0043 
(.0028) 
.0185 
(.0585) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3746 -488.0422 .0020*** .8186 .0145** .2257 2 VIFs > 10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation and multicollinearity. Half of the coefficients are 
insignificant. 
1968Q2-2007Q4                            
                    
                
    
          
                                                    
                  
                     
.3422*** 
(.0959) 
26.757*** 
(7.295) 
.5248** 
(.2365) 
.0232 
(.0830) 
.0132 
(.0830) 
-.0979 
(.0677) 
.0958 
(.0685) 
                 / / 
-.0102 
(.0063) 
-.0162* 
(.009) 
-.0448** 
(.0191) 
.0025 
(.0017) 
.0285 
(.0133) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3658 -707.4236 .7345 .0363** .0001*** .0259** 2 VIFs > 10 
Remark 
This model violates four diagnostic tests. More than half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1995Q1-2007Q4           
                  
                                       
                                                          
      
                    
                     
.1201 
(.1686) 
66.2298 
(51.4176) 
.0214 
(.3115) 
.0126 
(.0408) 
.0601 
(.0373) 
-.2178 
(.2426) 
.4410* 
(.2341) 
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                 / / 
-.0214 
(.0650) 
-.0258 
(.0215) 
-.0367* 
(.0189) 
.0077 
(.0079) 
.0142** 
(.0058) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3490 -216.499 .6561 .9088 .7164 .2655 All VIFs < 10 
Remark 
Majority of coefficients are insignificant. 
Panel B: Equation without      
Hendry’s Eq. (17)                            
                                     
                                                          
                     
0.24*** 
(0.11) 
11.4*** 
(4.8) 
0.57*** 
(0.22) 
0.122*** 
(0.026) 
0.53*** 
(0.10) 
-0.18*** 
(0.05) 
0.45*** 
(0.15) 
                 / / 
-0.013 
(0.021) 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-3.0 
(2.3) 
 -1.01*** 
(0.37) 
/ / 
1968Q2-1982Q4                               
                                         
                                                             
                     
.9611*** 
(.1968) 
24.0394*** 
(8.9272) 
.555* 
(.2953) 
.0579* 
(.0316) 
.0269 
(.0283) 
-.5435*** 
(.1650) 
.1321 
(.1042) 
                 / / 
-.0318 
(.0275) 
-.0145 
(.0112) 
-.0295 
(.0296) 
 -.0103 
(.0076) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.5902 -248.5856 .4320 .2791 .3555 .3873 All VIFs < 10 
Remark 
Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1983Q1-2007Q4           
                     
                  
                   
                                                                 
                     
.1850* 
(.0946) 
17.1300 
(11.2332) 
.1050 
(.2874) 
.0092 
(.0116) 
.0860*** 
(.0265) 
-.0138 
(.0127) 
.6755*** 
(.103) 
                 / / 
-.0051 
(.0357) 
-.0353 
(.0363) 
-.0448 
(.0219) 
 .013 
(.0588) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3651 -487.3959 .0024*** .8132 .0221** .1505 2 VIFs > 10 
Remark 
This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1968Q2-2007Q4                            
                    
                
    
          
                                                            
                     
.3243*** 
(.0954) 
27.002*** 
(7.3220) 
.5338** 
(.2374) 
.0178 
(.0832) 
.0201 
(.0832) 
-.0921 
(.0678) 
.1087 
(.0681) 
                 / / 
-.0106* 
(.0064) 
-.0159* 
(.009) 
-.0517*** 
(.0185) 
 .0293** 
(.0133) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3609 -707.1701 .7131 .0301** .0001*** .0233** 2 VIFs > 10 
Remark 
This model violates four basic assumptions. 
1995Q1-2007Q4           
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.1847 
(.1551) 
61.358 
(51.157) 
.0029 
(.3107) 
.0208 
(.0399) 
.0536 
(.0367) 
-.2277 
(.2423) 
.4005* 
(.2303) 
                 / / 
-.0150 
(.0646) 
-.0294 
(.0212) 
-.0368* 
(.0188) 
 .0157 
(.0056) 
/ / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF 
0.3499 -217.1956 .4782 .9651 .2774 .6555 All VIFs < 10 
Remark 
This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are insignificant. 
Notes: The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and Banks, while all 
the other three datasets use the mortgage rate of the Building Societies.    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality 
Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity.    denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for 
Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification. (O’Brien, 2007) suggests a variable 
reports the multicollinearity when the corresponding centred Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) > 10. The figures 
reported for the diagnostic tests are  -      , except for the VIF values. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.7 in 
Chapter 3. 
Equation (4.5) incorporates          to the equation (18) of Hendry (1984). 
                           
                                      
                                        ̅   
    
                         
       
       
                                                                4. 5 
Where,                      and  ̅             . 
Relative to equation (3.4), equation (3.5) removes changes in physical housing stock     ; 
replaces the real value of the mortgage stock            and ratio of house price to income 
            by ratio of borrowed to own equity            ; uses the original interest 
rates  ̅ 
  instead of natural logarithmic and takes two dummy variables into account. Table 4.8 
defines the dummy variables. 
Table 4.8 Dummy Variables for Equation (4.5) 
Dataset                 
Hendry (1984) 1967Q3; 0 otherwise 1981Q3 & 1982Q1 1982Q2; 0 otherwise 
1968Q2-1982Q4 1979Q2; 0 otherwise 1981Q4 & 1982Q1; 1982Q2; 0 otherwise 
1983Q1-2007Q4 1997Q2; 0 otherwise 2006Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
1968Q2-2007Q4 1979Q1; 0 otherwise 1997Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
1995Q1-2007Q4 1997Q2; 0 otherwise 2006Q1 & 2007Q1; 0 otherwise / 
Table 4.9 displays the results for equation (4.5). Again, a large number of coefficients are 
statistically insignificant and/or ‘wrongly signed’; and the parameters vary over time. Because 
the sets of dummy variables in this chapter are differ from Hendry (1984), and there is no prior 
theoretical assumption on the relationship between dummy variables and house prices, the signs 
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of dummy variables in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 are not necessarily consistent with Hendry (1984). 
Hendry (1984) suggests that the model shown as equation (4.5) satisfies most of the model 
selection criteria. Unfortunately, it does not fit into this chapter’s datasets, either panel A or 
panel B. 
Table 4.9 The Output for Equation (4.5) 
Panel A: Equation with      
                           
                                               
              ̅   
          
       
       
                  
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4375*** 
(.1361) 
9.3793 
(10.027) 
.5755*** 
(.2080) 
.0342 
(.0370) 
-.0188 
(.0404) 
.4600 
(.2809) 
.2628 
(.2493) 
                     / 
-.4335 
(.2649) 
-.0478 
(.3026) 
-.6287 
(2.163) 
-2.2746** 
(.878) 
.0032 
(.0021) 
-.1127 
(.1495) 
/ 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
.0126 
(.1174) 
20.982 
(12.7439) 
.2671 
(.3399) 
.0250 
(.0169) 
.0116 
(.0196) 
.8711*** 
(.3111) 
.7357*** 
(.1858) 
                     / 
-.5251*** 
(.1742) 
.1304 
(.4584) 
-.5455 
(2.3714) 
.5844 
(1.7232) 
.0022 
(.0027) 
-.1117 
(.0882) 
/ 
1968Q2-2007Q4                      
.1175 
(.0817) 
16.453** 
(7.4018) 
.5226*** 
(.1770) 
.0063 
(.0110) 
.0019 
(.0119) 
.7119*** 
(.1711) 
.4950*** 
(.1129) 
                     / 
-.5149*** 
(.1105) 
-.1263 
(.2388) 
.2769 
(2.2607) 
.2043 
(1.6027) 
.0036** 
(.0017) 
-.0080 
(.0473) 
/ 
1995Q1-2007Q4                      
-.2488 
(.1526) 
47.8419 
(36.3271) 
-.1569 
(.4946) 
.0481* 
(.0238) 
.0387 
(.0397) 
.7135 
(.5111) 
.4314 
(.3738) 
                     / 
-.5918 
(.8550) 
.4216 
(1.5116) 
-1.1305 
(2.3243) 
.9520 
(1.6083) 
.0054 
(.0070) 
-.2297** 
(.1052) 
/ 
Panel B: Equation without      
                           
                                               
              ̅   
          
       
       
         
Hendry’s Eq.(18)                      
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
14.0*** 
(4.9) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.178*** 
(0.027) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
                     / 
-0.22*** 
(0.09) 
-0.50*** 
(0.20) 
-3.5*** 
(0.4) 
-2.1*** 
(0.3) 
/ -3.0*** 
(0.05) 
/ 
1968Q2-1982Q4                      
.4282*** 
(.1381) 
8.8207 
(10.1835) 
.5451** 
(.2104) 
.0297 
(.0375) 
-.0089 
(.0405) 
.4181 
(.2842) 
.2547 
(.2534) 
                     / 
-.4946* 
(.2662) 
-.0943 
(.3060) 
-.6837 
(2.198) 
-2.5211*** 
(.8780) 
/ -.0879 
(.1510) 
/ 
1983Q1-2007Q4                      
-.0009 
(.1161) 
21.543* 
(12.709) 
.3110 
(.3353) 
.0248 
(.0169) 
.0128 
(.0191) 
.8547*** 
(.3099) 
.7501*** 
(.1847) 
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                     / 
-.52370*** 
(.1739) 
.1395 
(.4575) 
-.6022 
(2.366) 
.6086 
(1.7200) 
/ -.1119 
(.0881) 
/ 
1968Q2-2007Q4                      
.0971 
(.0822) 
16.814** 
(7.492) 
.5289*** 
(.1792) 
.0042 
(.0111) 
.0040 
(.0120) 
.6952*** 
(.1731) 
.5090*** 
(.1141) 
                     / 
-.5147*** 
(.1118) 
-.1546 
(.2414) 
.3020 
(2.2888) 
-.0188 
(1.619) 
/ .0008 
(.0477) 
/ 
1995Q1-2007Q4                      
-.2797* 
(.1464) 
53.453 
(35.452) 
-.1241 
(.4899) 
.0466* 
(.0236) 
.0479 
(.0377) 
.7814 
(.5006) 
.4604 
(.3697) 
                     / 
-.4452 
(.8288) 
.8234 
(1.4104) 
-1.0671 
(2.3095) 
.8642 
(1.595) 
/ -.2392** 
(.1039) 
/ 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
‘Wrongly signed’ coefficients are in bold. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.9 in Chapter 3. 
Table 4.10 shows the better alternative models for equation (4.5). Like any previous findings, the 
fixed parameter regression models report severely from parameter instability and a large number 
of coefficients are statistically insignificant. Panel A of Table 4.10 reveals that the alternative 
model for 1968Q2-1982Q4 satisfies all the diagnostic tests; the alternative model for 1983Q1-
2007Q4 reports residual autocorrelation; the alternative model for 1968Q2-2007Q4 reports 
residual non normality and heteroskedasticity at the 5% significance level. The alternative model 
for 1995Q1-2007Q4 reports residual non normality. Three out of four coefficients for the FPI are 
statistically insignificant over the samples. Overall, the general findings of panel A and panel B 
are consistent in terms of parameter instability and poor robustness. 
Table 4.10 The Alternative Model for Equation (4.5) 
Panel A: Equation with      
 
1968Q2-1982Q4 
                           
                                        
                       ̅   
          
       
       
                      
                        
.4643*** 
(.1231) 
5.9492 
(9.2073) 
.5043** 
(.2001) 
.0259 
(.0199) 
.0503** 
(.0228) 
.5261* 
(.2680) 
.3088 
(.2369) 
-.6052*** 
(.1977) 
                  / / / 
-.1713 
(.2706) 
-1.1541 
(2.0673) 
-2.353*** 
(.8345) 
.0035* 
(.0019) 
-.0731 
(.0642) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.6150 -267.2571 .5344 .1740 .3066 .7428 All VIF Values < 10 
Remark 
More than half of the coefficients are statistically insignificant at the 5% significance level. 
 
1983Q1-2007Q4 
                           
                                        
                       ̅   
          
       
       
                      
                        
.4256*** 
(.1287) 
8.8752 
(13.3612) 
.1076 
(.3811) 
.0106 
(.0124) 
.0820*** 
(.0222) 
.5398** 
(.2324) 
.4499*** 
(.1184) 
-.4593*** 
(.1278) 
82 
 
                  / / / 
-.7530** 
(.3694) 
-.3492 
(2.0937) 
1.9168 
(1.5832) 
.0005 
(.0025) 
-.0325 
(.0659) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.3868 -489.1495 .1035 .5149 .4510 .0383** All VIF Values < 10 
Remark 
More than half of the coefficients are statistically insignificant, and the model reports residual 
autocorrelation. 
 
1968Q2-2007Q4 
                           
                                       
                             ̅   
          
       
       
                  
     
                        
.1175 
(.0817) 
16.4531** 
(7.4018) 
.5226*** 
(.1770) 
.0063 
(.0110) 
.0019 
(.0119) 
.7119*** 
(.1711) 
.4950*** 
(.1129) 
-.5149*** 
(.1105) 
                  / / / 
-.1263 
(.2388) 
.2769 
(2.2607) 
.2043 
(1.6027) 
.0036** 
(.0017) 
-.0080 
(.0473) 
/ / / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.3741 -729.9944 .0140** .0394** .0661* .0709* All VIF Values < 10 
Remark 
Half of the coefficients are insignificant, and the model reports residual non-normality and 
heteroskedasticity at 5% level. 
 
1995Q1-2007Q4 
                         
                                             
                               ̅   
          
       
       
                 
    
                        
.4424*** 
(.1207) 
28.9437 
(37.0105) 
.1860 
(.3902) 
.0585* 
(.0325) 
.0174 
(.0391) 
1.0633* 
(.5655) 
.5160* 
(.2687) 
-.5395 
(.5958) 
                  / / / 
-1.0283 
(1.1619) 
-1.4915 
(1.8488) 
-.6400 
(1.3184) 
.0068  
(.0064) 
-.0019 
(.0120) 
/ / / 
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.3660 -229.0623 .0215** .9287 .1832 .3528 All VIF Values < 10 
Remark 
Majority of coefficients are insignificant. The residual of this model is non-normality. 
Panel B: Equation without      
Hendry’s Eq. (18)                            
                                      
                       ̅   
          
       
       
          
                        
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
14.0*** 
(4.9) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
0.178*** 
(0.027) 
0.47*** 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.12) 
0.54*** 
(0.11) 
-0.22*** 
(0.09) 
                  / / / 
-0.50*** 
(0.20) 
-3.5*** 
(0.4) 
-2.1*** 
(0.3) 
 -0.30*** 
(0.05) 
   
1968Q2-1982Q4                            
                                        
                       ̅   
          
       
       
          
                        
.4631*** 
(.1262) 
6.2378 
(9.435) 
.4731** 
(.2043) 
.0288 
(.0204) 
.0465* 
(.0233) 
.4807* 
(.2734) 
.2928 
(.2426) 
-.6195*** 
(.2024) 
                  / / / 
-.1878 
(.2772) 
-1.1966 
(2.1186) 
-
2.6213*** 
(.8411) 
 -.0800 
(.0657) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.5956 -265.2553 .6804 .3534 .4975 .3812 All VIF Values <10 
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Remark 
Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
1983Q1-2007Q4                            
                                        
                             ̅   
          
       
       
          
                        
.4314*** 
(.1239) 
8.5742 
(13.1711) 
.1195 
(.3735) 
.0109 
(.0122) 
.0829*** 
(.0215) 
.5377** 
(.2308) 
.4501*** 
(.1178) 
-.4569*** 
(.1265) 
                  / / / 
-.7438** 
(.3640) 
-.3807 
(2.0752) 
1.9497 
(1.5644) 
 -.0343 
(.0649) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.3935 -491.1132 .1002 .4303 .4032 .0318** All VIF Values <10 
Remark 
Half of the coefficients are insignificant. 
 
1968Q2-2007Q4 
                           
                                       
                             ̅   
          
       
       
           
                        
.1790** 
(.0830) 
13.2595* 
(7.3172) 
.6153** 
(.2402) 
.0653*** 
(.0180) 
.0612*** 
(.019) 
.5834*** 
(.0917) 
.4577*** 
(.0917) 
-.5364*** 
(.1027) 
                  / / / 
-.2827 
(.2376) 
.1564 
(2.2175) 
.4372 
(1.5833) 
 .0255*** 
(.0067) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.4009 -737.673 .3340 .1530 .0001 .2333 All VIF Values <10 
Remark 
This model reports residual autocorrelation. 
1995Q1-2007Q4                          
                                             
                               ̅   
          
       
       
          
                        
.4732*** 
(.1174) 
34.5078 
(36.7069) 
.3084 
(.3734) 
.0649* 
(.0320) 
.0311 
(.0369) 
1.1733** 
(.5570) 
.5665** 
(.265) 
-.4384 
(.5892) 
                  / / / 
-1.0393 
(1.1639) 
-1.1899 
(1.8302) 
-.7270 
(1.3184) 
 -.0052 
(.0116) 
   
Adj.    AIC             Centred VIF Value 
0.3636 -229.51 .0725* .9147 .2812 .5094 All VIF Values <10 
Remark 
This model is poor. Most of the coefficients are insignificant. 
Notes: The dataset 1995Q1-2007Q4 uses the composite mortgage rate of the Building Societies and Banks, while all 
the other three datasets use the mortgage rate of the Building Societies.    denotes the Skewness-Kurtosis Normality 
Test.    denotes the Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticity.    denotes Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for 
Autocorrelation.    denotes Ramsey RESET Test for Model Specification. (O’Brien, 2007) suggests a variable 
reports the multicollinearity when the corresponding centred Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) > 10. The figures 
reported for the diagnostic tests are  -      , except for the VIF values. Panel B is drawn from Table 3.10 in 
Chapter 3. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to the housing literature by assessing whether an open economy 
framework is superior to its closed economy counterpart by incorporating Foreign Portfolio 
Investment (FPI) into Hendry (1984) in terms of four recent datasets. Firstly, the results indicate 
that incorporating an exogenous variable such as FPI does not enhance the model’s robustness 
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under the fixed parameter regression framework, ceteris paribus. Secondly, this chapter suggests 
that the changes in FPI in general do not statistically significantly drive the house prices after 
controlling for the effect of other economic variables, which supports Whelan (2010) and Xu and 
Chen (2012). However, the second findings could be biased conditional on the poor model fitting. 
Technically speaking, the classical fixed parameter demand and supply equations are poor in 
terms of robustness, either in a closed economy or an open economy framework. This is because 
they all fail to model the effect of people’s expectations and/or institutional changes on housing 
market explicitly. Therefore, the thesis will study the UK house prices by using more 
sophisticated empirical models in Chapters 5 through to 7 which take account of the expectations 
and institutional changes specifically. 
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Chapter 5. Identification of House Price Bubbles using User Cost in a State 
Space Model 
5.1 Introduction 
The poor robustness of the classical demand and supply econometric equations in Chapters 3 and 
4 prompt this chapter to the application of an asset market approach. This chapter expands 
Chapters 3 and 4 by addressing two issues specifically. 
 Firstly, how much variation in house price results from bubbles? 
 Secondly, whether bounded rationality expectation hypothesis best fit into the UK 
housing market? 
A persistent and substantial divergence between market price and its fundamental value is 
evidence of a bubble. In an efficient market, where the current asset price has fully, 
instantaneously and correctly reflected all relevant information, there are no speculative bubbles. 
However, there are a number of papers in the literature (Black et al., 2006; Xiao and Randolph 
Tan, 2007) suggest the house price may contain a non-fundamental element, or bubble element. 
The quantification of bubbles in house prices will make market participants aware of the size of 
their risk exposure and can help them to detect early signals of the possibility of a financial 
market crash (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). These signals drive investors to respond rationally 
and adjust house prices toward their fair value. Furthermore, policy-makers can use information 
about the existence and size of bubbles in order to stabilize the market. 
Black et al. (2006) find that intrinsic bubbles, which depend on the Bounded Rationality 
Hypothesis, have an important role to play in determining actual house prices in terms of the UK 
housing data over the periods from 1973Q4 through 2004Q3 by using a Vector Autoregression 
(VAR) based time-varying risk present value model. The present chapter considers if their result 
is supported by using a User Cost Framework based State Space model, furthermore, whether the 
bounded rationality hypothesis fits into the UK housing market in the presence of Subprime 
Crisis in 2008. 
86 
 
This chapter contributes to the literature from two aspects. Firstly, this chapter proposes a two-
step approach of quantifying a bubble in housing by incorporating the present value of housing 
User Cost into a State Space Model (SSM). The two-step approach bases the estimation of 
fundamental value on the user cost framework which takes mortgage rates, taxes, rent prices, 
expected capital gain and people’s risk premium into account relative to a simple price-income 
ratio. Moreover, the unobservable bubble time series is estimated by taking advantages of a 
Kalman filter. Relative to Black et al. (2006)’s time varying present value approach, an absolute 
valuation approach, the User Cost in a State Space Model is a relative valuation approach. The 
present value model is extremely sensitive to the quality of inputs, such as the estimate of 
discount rate. The key advantage of the relative value method, especially when contrasted with 
the present value approach is based on the assumption that fundamental house purchase prices 
are not necessarily the summation of discounted future values. Given that a large numbers of 
investors use market arbitrage opportunities as their activity criterion, the relative valuation 
approach appears attractive (Poterba, 1984; Case and Shiller, 1989; Himmelberg et al., 2005). 
Secondly, given the bubble process does not follow an explosive path and has a statistically 
significant positive correlation with the fundamental price-rent ratio and House Rent Index, our 
results support the bounded rationality hypothesis. The empirical results indicate that UK house 
prices were undervalued from 1996Q1 to 2002Q2 and thereafter entered into a bubble by 
2011Q1. Although consistent with Black et al. (2006) in general, our results provide more recent 
empirical evidence. The bounded rationality hypothesis argues that people make expectations 
and decisions to help them satisfice rather than make theoretically optimal decisions. Therefore, 
people take steps to achieve short-run targets, as long as they assist people toward the ultimately 
desired target. 
Although many papers in the literature agree about the presence of bubbles in housing markets, 
there are controversies about the features of a bubble. Under the Rational Expectation 
Hypothesis, Diba and Grossman (1988a,b) suggest rational bubbles have explosive conditional 
expectations. Therefore, a rational bubble might either increase or decrease into the infinite 
future. Under the Bounded Rationality Expectation Hypothesis, Black et al. (2006) suggest 
intrinsic bubbles or bounded rational bubbles do not continuously diverge but periodically revert 
toward their fundamental value and are statistically correlated with fundamental variables. The 
bounded rationality bubble captures the idea that asset prices overreact to relevant information 
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on fundamentals. Under the Irrational Expectation Hypothesis, Akerlof and Shiller (2010) 
suggest bubbles reflect are independent of fundamental values. 
This chapter identifies a bubble when the following characteristics are met simultaneously. 
Firstly, there is a persistent and substantial deviation of house prices from their fundamental 
value. Secondly, such a deviation follows a non-stationary AR(1) random process while the 
changes in the bubble are stationary. The chapter proposes that the bubble results from people 
who are willing to purchase an overpriced asset now with the aim of avoiding paying an 
unreasonably higher price to buy the asset in the future (Shiller, 1990; Froot and Obstfeld, 1991; 
Wu, 1997; Himmelberg et al., 2005; Black et al., 2006; Xiao and Randolph Tan, 2007; Al-
Anaswah and Wilfling, 2011). 
In the study of speculative bubbles, there are two broad categories of literature, namely, indirect 
bubble tests and direct bubble tests. The first category of research attempts to conquer the 
econometric limitations of standard tests by implementing sophisticated cointegration and unit 
root tests to relationships such as those between price-dividend and price-income. If one rejects 
the null hypothesis of market efficiency this, indicates the presence of a bubble (Campbell and 
Shiller, 1987,1988b,a; Evans, 1991; McMillan, 2007). One essential limitation of the indirect 
bubble tests is the tests cannot generate a time series of the bubble component. By contrast, 
direct bubble tests explicitly formulate the presence of a bubble in the alternative hypothesis. 
These tests typically, identify the deviation of asset prices from the determined fundamental 
values, and use the discrepancies to generate a bubble time series (Wu, 1997; Himmelberg et al., 
2005; Black et al., 2006; Xiao and Randolph Tan, 2007). Given that fundamental value is 
typically inferred, rather than directly observed, the estimation of bubbles is somewhat 
dependent on the assumptions of the model used. This chapter follows the direct bubble tests, as 
we aim to extract a bubble time series and investigate the path of bubble. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews the literature about 
bubble quantification. Section 5.3 exhibits the methodology of the State-Space Model within 
User Cost Framework. Data descriptions are in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 reports the empirical 
results and discussion. Section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
This section investigates the evolution of bubble quantification techniques by reviewing the 
bubble literature into two categories; 5.2.1 simple housing market indicators and 5.2.2 
econometric models. 
5.2.1 Simple Housing Market Indicators 
Price Appreciation Rate 
In order to study when house prices are excessive, researchers frequently start by assessing the 
house price appreciation rate (Hendry, 1984). A bubble is recognized when the price 
appreciation rate exceeds a predetermined rate (Himmelberg et al., 2005; Finicelli, 2007). 
Generally speaking, a house provides homeowners with two distinctive benefits: shelter and an 
investment asset. From the perspective of shelter, the most essential features of housing is that 
the house be durable but also experience depreciation with the passage of time. From the 
investment perspective, the total return for a homeowner consists of two components; the rent 
saved by living in the ‘rent-free’ house or received from the purchase-to-rent, and the 
appreciation of house prices. This means a higher house price is compensation for the investor’s 
capital investment and the risk bearing on that investment. Therefore, high price appreciation 
does not necessarily mean that prices are deviating from underlying value; it may instead be 
driven by fundamentals such as the risk premium. 
House Price-Income Ratio 
A second widely used simple indicator is the house price-income ratio, which is the house price 
divided by income, see equation (5.1). Based on the hypothesis that home prices and incomes 
share some common trends in the long-term, aggregate demand for a home is proposed to be a 
stable function of the average income in any particular period. A high price-income ratio 
indicates the expense of purchasing a house entails devoting a higher percentage of income. A 
higher home price-income ratio ensures the growth of capital value and investment returns for 
those who already own a house, whereas, a higher price-income ratio means housing prices are 
more ‘overvalued’ (Himmelberg et al., 2005; Girouard et al., 2006; Finicelli, 2007). 
                   
           
      
                                                                                           5. 1 
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However, the price-income ratio does not consider the value of housing services and ignores 
mortgage rates. The per-capita income used in many countries is an average evaluation that 
covers the aggregate population, but the specific groups of sellers and buyers that determine the 
house prices may have income that is significantly different from the population mean. 
Furthermore, the price-income ratio measures the local purchasing ability relative to the local 
housing prices. It does not consider the purchasing power from outside the local statistical area 
and the availability of mortgages. With the acceleration of globalization, international capital 
flow and population migration plays a much more important role than ever in the determination 
of domestic equilibrium house prices. An equilibrium price is set through market competition 
and refers to a situation where the supply of housing equals demand. When there is huge house 
demand caused either by speculation with hot money (e.g. Japan’s housing appreciation in the 
early 1990’s) or wealth movements from abroad or the rest of country (e.g. London at the 
metropolitan level; and the UK and the US at the state level (Benson et al., 1997)), domestic 
equilibrium house prices may be above the price that local people can afford. 
House Price-Rent Ratio 
A third popular cited ratio used to examine housing prices is the house price-rent ratio, see 
equation (5.2), this is the house price divided by the house rent. The rationale is that either 
renting or owning a house provides people with shelter and when the price is high relative to rent, 
people should rent a house rather than buy one and vice versa. In theory, rational people will 
drive house prices and rents towards their long run equilibrium. A higher price-rent ratio is 
associated with high house prices and is akin to estimating the price-earnings ratio for shares. 
                 
           
    
                                                                                                5. 2 
As with the price-income ratio, price-rent ratio ignores the implicit costs such as mortgage 
interest, tax, and maintenance costs of owning a house. 
User Cost Framework 
A fourth widely used indicator is the user cost framework. Poterba (1992) and Himmelberg et al. 
(2005) suggest the main problem of the earlier simple market indicators, is that they erroneously 
view the purchase price of a home as if it were the same as the cost of owning it for a year, and 
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that the yield on the house equal to the capital gain or loss on that home. The user cost of 
ownership and the implied theoretical price-rent ratio is the most complete framework to assess 
when home prices are misaligned (Finicelli, 2007) out of those in the simple market indicator 
group. 
The user cost framework suggests that people should be indifferent between renting and 
purchasing, given the same cost and housing attributes. The user cost of holding a house, in 
percentage level, is the sum of six components, as shown in equation (5.3). 
      
                    
                                                               5. 3 
  
  is the foregone interest rate,     is the property tax rate,    is the depreciation rate of the 
property or maintenance cost,     is the risk premium for the larger uncertainty of purchasing 
relative to renting.    is the marginal tax rate for the house buyer, usually considered constant. 
As nominal mortgage payment and property tax are tax deductable in many tax regimes, they 
often provide an offsetting benefit to the home owner.        is the expected capital gain. If the 
house purchase was equity financed, the foregone interest rate   
  should be measured by long-
term risk free rate and without the benefit of marginal tax deduction (Himmelberg et al., 2005); 
if it were debt financed, the interest rate should be the nominal mortgage rate (Finicelli, 2007); if 
it were financed by a mix of debt and equity, the weighted average cost of capital appears much 
more appropriate (Hubbard and Mayer, 2009). 
In the equilibrium condition, the annual cost of owning a house should equal the average 
corresponding market rent following the assumption of non-arbitrage, see equation (5.4): 
         
                                                                                                                       5. 4 
     is actual market rent,     
 
 is the theoretical housing price or fundamental housing price. 
Equation (5.4) implies the fundamental house price-rent ratio is the inverse of user cost, say, 
    
            . Home prices are overvalued if the theoretical price calculated by the user 
cost framework is less than the market price, and vice versa. Equation (5.4) also implies that the 
user cost should be positive, as neither the theoretical house price nor the actual market rent 
should be negative. The user cost framework does not have a specific item to represent inflation, 
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although the influence of inflation can be reflected via the changes of expected capital gain and 
nominal mortgage rate. 
Although house prices and rents, and the ratio between them, are frequently indices instead of 
values, the average of the actual price-rent ratio and the theoretical price-rent ratio should be 
equal in the long run. For example, 
 
 
∑
    
    
 
    
 
 
∑
    
 
    
 
                                                                                                      5. 5 
  is the number of observation,      is the market house price,         ⁄  is the market price-
rent ratio,     
     ⁄  is the fundamental price-rent ratio. The spread between the real price-rent 
ratio and the theoretical price-rent ratio at any given time shows the extent of non-fundamentals 
factors or the size of bubble. 
5.2.2 Econometric Models 
Dividend-Ratio Model 
Campbell and Shiller (1987,1988b,a) propose a dividend-ratio model for stock prices on the 
basis of a log-linear approximation, as equation (5.6). 
                                                                                                            5. 6 
The lower case letters represent the natural log of the underlying variables.   is the required log 
gross return rate.   is a constant and is defined by                    
 
 
   .   is the 
average ratio of the stock price to the sum of the stock price and the dividend,      .       
is the mathematical expectation conditional on information available at time  .              is 
the log stock price at date  .            is the log real dividend paid at date  . In the static 
situation, the log dividend-price ratio            is a constant and              
 
 
   . 
When the stock returns and dividend growth rates are time varying, the equation (5.6) does not 
hold exactly, in which case, a first order Taylor approximation form can be used: 
         
 
 
          
 
 
                                                                               5. 7 
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If the terminal condition that        
     
 
 
         is imposed, 
       ∑  
  
                
 
   
                                                                                5. 8 
Equation (5.8) implies that the log dividend-price ratio         , can be expressed as a 
discounted value of all future returns      and dividend growth rate      , at the discount rate of 
(  
 
   
). Campbell and Shiller (1988a) suggest ‘the imposition of a condition that          
does not explode as   increases’. In order to get an economic model of the dividend-price ratio 
model, researchers can impose some restriction on the required rate of return   . 
Given that the house price-rent ratio is similar to the stock price-dividend ratio, the dividend-
ratio model has been widely used in the study of house prices. In the housing literature, the 
dividend-ratio model is also called the present value model, and the dividend-price ratio is often 
replaced by the price-rent ratio or price-income ratio (Black et al., 2006; Xiao and Randolph Tan, 
2007; Man Hui and Gu, 2009). 
In the following two subsections, this chapter will briefly review two well-known extensions to 
the original dividend ratio model in the housing market, respectively state space model and the 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. 
State Space Models 
Wu (1997) suggests the unique forward-looking, no bubble solution to equation (5.6) can be 
denoted by the fundamental price    
 
. Moreover, if imposing the transversality condition 
       
           , then 
   
  
   
   
      ∑                                                                                                   5. 9 
In order to apply equation (5.9) to house prices, the log dividend    is replaced by the log rentals 
    . All other letters have clear interpretations in work on house prices. 
As market price     may deviate from fundamental value    
 
, the general solution to equation 
(5.9) has the form: 
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                                                                                                                           5. 10 
In equation (5.10), the no-bubble solution    
 
only relies on log rents and is named the market 
fundamental solution.    is the non-fundamental element and is frequently termed the speculative 
bubble. 
As the log rents      often contain a unit root, they are approximated by an              
process (Wu, 1997; Xiao and Randolph Tan, 2007; Al-Anaswah and Wilfling, 2011). Wu (1997) 
estimates the stock price bubble by using the following state space model 
                                                                                                                  5. 11 
                                                                                                                          5. 12 
   
 
 
                                                                                                                             5. 13  
                          
 ,                            ,             , 
            ,   is an          ,              
  are all h-vectors. 
{  } is an              
   error term.    is uncorrelated with the dividend innovation,  . Wu 
(1997) applies a state space model drawn from equations (5.11) through (5.13) for stock prices. 
The unobservable bubble process    is estimated by standard Kalman filtering techniques. 
Contrarily, Xiao and Randolph Tan (2007) estimate the following state space model 
(
                                   
                 
)                                                             5. 14 
                                                                                                                              5. 15            
  ,   and    are the        error terms and are uncorrelated with each other. Unlike Wu (1997), 
Xiao and Randolph Tan (2007) treat the model specification error     , as the state variable and 
then estimate house price bubble    as the residual of the first section of equation (5.14). Both 
Wu (1997) and Xiao and Randolph Tan (2007) use the first log differenced variables in their 
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measurement equations, therefore, what they estimate are the changes in bubble rather than the 
level of bubble. 
Theoretically, any factor that is not in the pricing model will contribute specification errors of 
that model. Subsequently, a bubble is a part of the specification error. If the goal of the model is 
to estimate a price bubble, one needs to decompose the error term in two parts, namely, the 
bubble component and the specification error component. Unfortunately, from a purely statistical 
point of view, there is no way to do this. Therefore, it is necessary to make an assumption, based 
on economic intuition, about the distribution of the bubble component and non-bubble 
component. This chapter defines bubble as a non-stationary random process. In addition, the 
specification error of a well-defined linear state space model should be an        process 
(Hamilton, 1994; Kim and Nelson, 1999; Durbin and Koopman, 2001). 
Departing from Wu (1997) and Kim and Nelson (1999), Al-Anaswah and Wilfling (2011) apply 
a state-space model with Markov-switching to dividend ratio model (Campbell and Shiller, 
1987,1988b,a). Although their approach is well suited to quantifying a stock price bubble, it fails 
to generate a time series of the bubble. 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model 
Black et al. (2006) transfer the dividend-price ratio in equation (5.8) into the following house 
price-income ratio: 
    
 
   
∑                ∑  
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    is the log price-income ratio,    is the log real disposable income,           . If 
{  }      then {    }     , and {  }     . As    is the required log gross return rate or real 
discount rate,         . 
Once the coefficients of their specific 3-variable VAR model are estimated, Black et al. (2006) 
can estimate the fundamental price-income ratio    
 
. The log of house price is expressed as: 
       
            
               (
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To sum up, among the simple market indicators, the user cost framework is superior as it takes 
the mortgage rates, risk premium, taxes and expected capital gain into account; and therefore 
provides a complete asset valuation framework. It seems state space model may outperforms 
other sophisticated econometric models by estimating the unobservable bubble by taking the 
advantage of a Kalman filter. 
5.3 Empirical Methodology 
Departing from equation (5.17), this chapter proposes an approach to quantify the bubble by a 
combination of existing econometric models and indicators, namely, the User Cost Framework in 
a State Space Model. As the first step, this chapter uses the enhanced user cost framework to 
estimate the fundamental house price-rent ratio. In the second, it uses a linear state space model 
to estimate the unobservable bubble time series. Relative to Black et al. (2006)’s time varying 
present value approach, a typical absolute valuation approach, the User Cost Framework in a 
State Space Model is a relative valuation approach. 
The present value model is extremely sensitive to the quality of inputs, such as the estimate of 
discount rate. Moreover, the factors, such as supply restrictions, regulations and contractual 
practices that affect the relationship between house prices and rents are hard to incorporate into 
the simple asset pricing models. The key advantage of the relative value method, especially when 
contrasted with the present value approach is based on the assumption that fundamental house 
purchase prices are not necessarily the summation of discounted future values. Given that large 
numbers of investors use the market arbitrage opportunity as their activity criterion, the relative 
valuation approach appears attractive (Poterba, 1984; Case and Shiller, 1989; Himmelberg et al., 
2005). 
5.3.1 The Enhanced User Cost Step 
The main equations for the user cost framework are equation (5.3) and equation (5.4). In 
literature, Himmelberg et al. (2005) assume marginal tax rate       , maintenance cost 
        , property tax     and risk premium       . Finicelli (2007) sets          
and               . Quigley and Raphael (2004) suppose       ,       ; 
          . Girouard et al. (2006) employ a varied of parameters for the OECD countries. 
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This chapter sets the marginal tax rate     5 , and the property tax rate and maintenance 
cost           . Given the real marginal tax rate is very hard to estimate at the 
macroeconomic level, this chapter also uses       for the sake of comparison. 
In the literature, risk premium is often set as a constant, for example, 2%. The expected capital 
gain is often proxied by the past n-period moving average of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
and/or forward looking long term CPI. However, people’s risk premium is time-varying; and the 
calculation of CPI does not consider house prices due to the house being regarded as investment 
goods rather than consumption goods. In fact, the biased estimation of risk premium and 
expected capital gain are often blamed as the main culprit to the biased user cost (Finicelli, 2007). 
Unlike the literature, this chapter uses the ex post realized annual house price return to proxy the 
expected annual capital gain,      . 
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The rational is when the individual market participant has a perfect forecast (no forecast error) at 
time t, the unbiased annual expected capital gain at any point is the price appreciation over the 
next year. 
Furthermore, the risk premium of owning a house relative to renting    , is calculated as the ex 
post annual house price return minus ex post annual rental changes. 
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Given this chapter uses the quarterly time series data, the annual capital gain at any point is 
calculated as the price appreciation over the next four quarters. In finance, risk premium refers to 
the amount by which an asset’s expected rate of return exceeds the return on a risk free asset. In 
practice, risk premium is calculated as the difference between the historical mean of risky asset 
return and the risk free return. When people adjust their annual risk premium on a quarterly basis, 
equation (5.19) appears appropriate. Here, the market rentals are regarded as ‘risk free’ relative 
to house prices. However, this method is redundant when estimating the perfect capital gain and 
risk premium beyond the end period of the sample data, as it assumes investors are ex post 
rational. 
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The enhanced user cost time series is calculated by applying equation (5.3) and then the implied 
fundamental house price-rent ratio is the inverse of user cost,     
            . Instead of 
quantifying the bubble by using equation (5.5), this chapter incorporates the user cost based 
fundamental house price-rent ratio into the state space model. 
The so-called enhanced user cost model is based on some simplified assumptions, such as 
markets have high liquidity and individual investors are rational all of the time, resulting in 
misspecification errors. 
5.3.2 The State Space Model Step 
Before introducing the state space model step, this section briefly illustrates the general state 
space model and the Kalman filter. State space models were initiated by control engineers 
(Kalman, 1960), and are effective tools for expressing dynamic systems that involve unobserved 
state variables. A state space model consists of two equations: a measurement equation (or signal 
equation) and a state equation (or transition equation). The measurement equation illustrates the 
relation between observed variables and unobserved state variables. The state equation illustrates 
the dynamics of the unobserved state variables, normally in the form of an AR(p) in the state 
vector. 
Once a model has been expressed in a state space form, some important algorithms can be 
applied the Kalman filter being central. The Kalman filter is a recursive procedure for estimating 
the optimal estimator of the state vector at time t, based on the information available at time t. 
The Kalman filter assures the estimation of the state vector to be continually updated as new 
information becomes available. When the disturbance and the initial state vector follow a normal 
distribution, the likelihood function can be accurately calculated via what is known as the 
‘prediction error decomposition’ (Harvey, 1990; Hamilton, 1994; Kim and Nelson, 1999; Durbin 
and Koopman, 2001). 
Based on the existing literature, in particular equation (5.13) and equation (5.17), this chapter 
defines the following state space model. 
Measurement equation: 
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    is the log house price,    
 
 is the log fundamental price-rent ratio which is calculated as 
          ,      is the log rent, and    is level of bubble in log scale. 
State equation: 
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Where, 
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    ,        
     and        
                                                                         5. 24 
   and    are the error terms. To guarantee nonnegative variance estimates, variances are defined 
as exponential functions of the coefficients    and   . More specifically,             , 
             .       and       are the variance for    and   .   
  is the initial state vector. 
When       , it would indicate the bubble has an explosive path. 
There are no constants in equation (5.20) and equation (5.21), given that house price is a sum of 
fundamental value and bubble. The rationale for the AR(1) process in equation (5.21) is based on 
the assumption that people will naively extrapolate the most recent price deviation level into the 
next period. Relative to equation (5.17), equation (5.20) replaces the log fundamental price-
income ratio and log income with the log fundamental price-rent ratio and log rent, respectively. 
The rationale for the state space model step is three fold. Firstly, based on equation (5.17), 
equation (5.25) can be derived. 
       (
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Secondly, the price-rent ratio outperforms price-income ratio in economics theory and practice, 
to an extent, particularly the fundamental price-rent ratio which is calculated by an enhanced 
user cost framework. Thirdly, it simplified the model building process relative to Wu (1997) and 
Black et al. (2006) while maintaining the advantages of a state space model. Unlike regular time 
series regressions, the stationarity of a time series is not required in a state space model (Harvey, 
1990; Commandeur and Koopman, 2007). 
The two-step state space model has five unknown parameters,                   
 .  are 
termed as hyperparameters and are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with 
Marquardt algorithm, in this chapter. Marquardt algorithm is a modification of the Gauss-
Newton algorithm (Commandeur and Koopman, 2007). The initial values for the 
hyperparameters are those specified in the coefficient vector, which are estimated by EVIEWS 7. 
Overall, the proposed state space model within user cost framework typically uses of two steps. 
Firstly, to calculate the enhanced user cost and the implied fundamental house price-rent ratio 
and secondly, to put the fundamental price-rent ratio into the linear state space model; and treat 
the bubble as an unobservable state variable which is estimated by taking the advantages of the 
Kalman filter. 
The two-step user cost framework in a state space model suffers from some fragile assumptions. 
Firstly, the chapter assumes the bubble follows a linear Gaussian process, which may not be the 
truth in reality. If the bubble is a nonlinear, non-Gaussian process, the particle filter instead of 
the Kalman filter appears more suitable (Arulampalam et al., 2002). Secondly, the inputs of the 
user cost framework could be more realistic such as the time varying tax rates and maintenance 
costs. 
5.4 Data Description 
The data included in this study are Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
House Price Index (HPI), a House Rent Index (HRI) which is proxied by the CPI component of 
actual rents for housing, and the composite mortgage rate of banks and building societies from 
the Bank of England. The quarterly UK time series data are all collected from DataStream with a 
time span from 1996Q1 to 2011Q1. The start and end dates are chosen by the availability of data 
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from the House Rent Index and composite mortgage rate, respectively. This chapter sets 
            in 2002Q1. Table 5.1 presents the preliminary statistics about the HPI, HRI 
and fundamental price-rent ratios. 
In Table 5.1, the Jarque-Bera test indicates that the HPI, HRI and fundamental price-rent ratios 
are normally distributed at the 5% significance level, an ADF unit root test shows that the four 
variables are nonstationary in levels, and the Johansen Trace test shows that HPI, HRI and the 
fundamental price-rent ratio (MT=0) are cointegrated at the 5% significance level. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
 House Price Index 
    
House Rent Index 
     
F. Price/Rent Ratio 
   
 
 (MT=25%) 
F. Price/Rent Ratio 
   
 
 (MT=0%) 
No. of Observations 60 60 60 60 
Mean 4.7385 4.6379 2.8896 2.5684 
Median 4.8593 4.6357 2.8896 2.5533 
Maximum 5.2128 4.8235 3.3647 3.0079 
Minimum 4.0236 4.4123 2.6390 2.3169 
Standard Deviation 0.3979 0.1204 0.1509 0.1425 
Jarque-Bera Test 5.9981 3.4463 10.992 11.604 
ADF Unit Root Test 0.2062 0.5371 0.7410 0.5765 
Johansen Trace Test 33.273** 
(29.797) 
 
Notes: F.Price/Rent Ratio    
 
is the fundamental price-rent ratio. MT=25% and MT=0% stand for the fundamental 
price-rent ratios are estimated based on marginal tax rate        and      , respectively. The null 
hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test is that the variable is from a normal distribution. For ADF tests, the values are p-
values. Johansen trace test tests the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration against the alternative that there is 
at most one cointegrating vector. The figure in parenthesis under the trace statistic is the 95% critical value. The 
Johansen trace test applies to the House Price Index    , House Rent Index      and fundamental price-rent ratio 
   
 
(MT=0). ** stands for statistical significance at the 5% significance level. The lower case letters represent the 
natural log of the underlying variables. 
DCLG HPI employs the mix-adjusted method, which is based on weighted averages, using 
mortgage completion data from a few large lenders. Black et al. (2006) use the Nationwide HPI 
which uses hedonic regression, also known as the characteristics based method, using datasets 
from Nationwide’s mortgage lending. Black et al. (2006) deflate all the nominal variables by the 
Retail Price Index (all items), thus providing prices in real terms. In this chapter, however, all the 
variables are in nominal terms for two reasons. Firstly, ‘there is a great deal of confusion about 
the role of inflation expectations in the demand for housing’ (Schwab, 1982,1983). Some argue 
that inflation is a major determinant of the demand for housing (Poterba, 1984). Others suggest 
inflation expectations are independent on the demand for housing; and that only deflated 
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variables are relevant (Arcelus and Meltzer, 1973). Schwab (1982,1983) suggest that the truth 
lies somewhere between these two extremes. Therefore, it is interesting to study whether the 
linkages between house prices and its determinants can be replicated in nominal terms. Secondly, 
bulk of people tend to arbitrage between owning and renting by comparing the cost of holding a 
home and renting a home per year in nominal terms instead of real terms. Akerlof and Shiller 
(2010) suggest people often fail to exclude the effect of inflation on their house investments in 
reality. 
5.5 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Figure 5.1 plots the fundamental price-rent ratio     
      , which is the inverse of the 
enhanced user cost time series. In the case of Marginal Tax rate      , the fundamental 
house price-rent ratio ranges from 14 to 28.9 with a mean of 18.2 and standard deviation of 2.95. 
Driven by the low interest rates and high expected capital gain, the ratio rebounded sharply from 
the local bottom of 15 in 2002Q2 to a peak of 28.9 at 2010Q3. This means the implied 
fundamental price for investors to buy a house on average is approximately 18.2 times the 
market rent between 1996Q1 and 2009Q3, ceteris paribus. In the case of Marginal Tax rate 
    , the fundamental price-rent ratio ranges from 10.14 to 20.24 with the mean of 13.18 and 
standard deviation of 2.14. Given the effect of marginal tax rate on user cost is        
  
     and   
  is not a constant, so the spread between the two fundamental price-rent ratios varies 
with the mortgage rate. Considering the real marginal tax rate is an unknown weighted average 
of      and        in the UK
1
, the real fundamental price-rent ratio will be bounded 
by the ratios shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 The chapter assumes that the tax rates imposed on high earners will not have a significant effect on the aggregate tax rate. 
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Figure 5.1 Fundamental Price-Rent Ratio     
 
    ⁄  (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
 
Notes:    
     ⁄      ⁄      
                    
             ⁄ .    
     ⁄ denotes for 
the fundamental Price-Rent Ratio.    is the User Cost of holding a house per year.   
  is the composite mortgage 
rate from Bank of England. Property Tax rate       , Maintenance Cost      , Risk Premium for the 
larger uncertainty of purchasing relative to renting     is the difference between the house price appreciation and 
rent appreciation over next four quarters.    is the Marginal Tax rate for the house buyer. Fundamental P/R MT25% 
and MT0 stand for the fundamental price-rent ratio     
     ⁄  are estimated based on marginal tax rate    
    and     , respectively. Expected Capital Gain       is proxied by the real capital gain over next four 
quarters. 
Table 5.2 displays the empirical results of the state space model, equations (5.20) and (5.21). 
Except for the coefficient of fundamental price-rent ratio    and the residual of the measurement 
equation   , the remainder of the hyperparameters are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Given the chapter uses index data instead of actual data to proxy house price and rent, it is not 
surprising to see the figure of House Rent Index is very close to, if not higher than, the figure of 
House Price Index, even when the house price is significantly overvalued. For example, both 
HPI and HRI are 100 in 2002Q1. Therefore, it is quite possible and reasonable for the 
hyperparameter      and     . However, it must be kept in mind that such a condition is 
only sensible for index data. Given    is slightly above 1 in both cases, so,          which 
would indicate rejection of hypothesis that the bubble follows an explosive path. This means the 
process    is not a typical rational bubble process (Diba and Grossman, 1988a,b; Black et al., 
2006). Furthermore, Table 5.2 suggests the level of marginal tax rate does not substantially affect 
the fitting of the two-step state space model, given that hyperparameters and/or Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Log Likelihood ratios are very close to each other. 
5
10
15
20
25
30
Q
1
 1
9
9
6
Q
3
 1
9
9
6
Q
1
 1
9
9
7
Q
3
 1
9
9
7
Q
1
 1
9
9
8
Q
3
 1
9
9
8
Q
1
 1
9
9
9
Q
3
 1
9
9
9
Q
1
 2
0
0
0
Q
3
 2
0
0
0
Q
1
 2
0
0
1
Q
3
 2
0
0
1
Q
1
 2
0
0
2
Q
3
 2
0
0
2
Q
1
 2
0
0
3
Q
3
 2
0
0
3
Q
1
 2
0
0
4
Q
3
 2
0
0
4
Q
1
 2
0
0
5
Q
3
 2
0
0
5
Q
1
 2
0
0
6
Q
3
 2
0
0
6
Q
1
 2
0
0
7
Q
3
 2
0
0
7
Q
1
 2
0
0
8
Q
3
 2
0
0
8
Q
1
 2
0
0
9
Q
3
 2
0
0
9
Q
1
 2
0
1
0
Q
3
 2
0
1
0
Fundamental Price/Rent Ratio 
Fundamental P/R MT25% Fundamental P/R MT0
103 
 
Table 5.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Hyperparameters (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
         
 
                                                                                                            Equation (5.20) 
   
 
  
                                                                                                                                 Equation (5.21) 
𝚿                AIC Log Likelihood 
MT=25% -0.0398 
(0.045) 
1.0611*** 
(0.1544) 
-29.3038 
(18835056) 
1.0025*** 
(0.0127) 
-7.197*** 
(0.2139) 
-4.1039 128.1180 
MT=0 -0.0840 
(0.0529) 
1.0832*** 
(0.1612) 
-26.5544 
(36050335) 
1.0024*** 
(0.0129) 
-7.225*** 
(0.2451) 
-4.1309 128.9283 
Notes:     is the house price.   ,    and    ⁄  are the coefficients on fundamental price-rent ratio    
 
, House Rent 
Index      and deviation from fundamental value   , respectively.    and    are the error terms for the measurement 
equation and state equation, respectively. See Figure 5.1 for the calculation of fundamental price-rent ratio at the 
raw data level. AIC refers to the Akaike Information Criterion. MT25% and MT0 stand for the fundamental price-
rent ratio     
     ⁄  are estimated based on marginal tax rate         and     , respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** stands for statistical significant at the 1% significance level. The lower case letters 
represent the natural log of the underlying variables. This chapter uses the Marquardt algorithm to optimize the 
likelihood function. The initial values for the hyperparameters are those specified in the coefficient vector, which are 
estimated by EVIEWS 7.              ,              .       and       are the variances for    and   . The 
 -       for    are 0 in both cases. 
In order to identify whether the time series    generated by the state space model satisfy the main 
characteristics of the bubble process, Figure 5.2 plots the deviation from fundamental value   . 
When the price-deviation is above 0 this, indicates the price is above its fundamental value and 
vice versa. 
Figure 5.2 Deviation from Fundamental Value    (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
 
Notes: See Table 5.2 for the estimation of deviation from fundamental value   . Deviation/Price Ratio MT25% 
stands for the estimation of    is based on the marginal tax rate       . Deviation/Price Ratio MT25% and 
MT0 stand for the estimation of    are based on the marginal tax rate        and     , respectively.  
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From Figure 5.2, the two cases of deviation from fundamental values are quite close to each 
other, even though that which has a 25% Marginal Tax rate is slightly higher. So, the level of tax 
rates is not of great importance in explaining the deviations from fundamental value. There is a 
long term increasing trend of deviation from 1996Q1 at -0.54% to 2007Q3, peaking at 27.4%; hit 
by the Subprime Crisis, the deviation sharply decrease to below 10% by 2009Q2; it stands at 18% 
by 2010Q4. Additionally, the impressive increase in the deviation seems to result from people’s 
speculative activities and the slowdown of supply, especially from 2000 to 2003. According to 
the data of the Office of National Statistics (ONS), the quarterly housing completions remain 
about 36,000 units between 2001 and 2003 which is lower than the historical average. Given the 
lengthy lag in supply, the resulting effect may cause an increase of price deviation to follow. 
Figure 5.3 illuminates the quarterly changes in deviations from fundamental values      against 
the changes in house prices. The two cases of changes in deviations from fundamental values 
     overlap significantly. Generally, the changes in deviations from fundamental values      
show significant ups-and-downs with value ranges from -6% to 7%. When marginal tax rate is 
25%, for example, the correlations between house price and deviation are 0.9934 and 0.9399 in 
log level scale and log difference scale, respectively. In order to investigate whether the 
deviations from fundamental values   are statistical different from 0, Figure 5.3 plots the 
 -           for    over the sample. The chapter does not plot the confidence bands for the    
primarily because the standard errors for    are very tiny and thereby make the confidence bands 
too tight to understand. Given the absolute values of  -           for    are substantially above 
2.33 over the sample, deviations from fundamental values    are statistical different from 0 at the 
1% significance level. 
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Figure 5.3 T-statistics for the Deviation from Fundamental Value    (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis for the  -     is the deviation from fundamental value    equals 0.  -                    . 
        is the smoothed standard error for   .  -               or  -          -      indicates the null hypothesis is 
rejected at the 1% significance level. MT25% and MT0 stand for the estimation of    are based on the marginal tax 
rate        and     , respectively. 
In Table 5.3, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests 
indicate the deviations from fundamental value    are non-stationary random processes which 
indicate    are unpredictable, and its mean and variance are time varying. However, the changes 
in deviation from fundamental value      are stationary that means the      will never goes too 
far from its mean. 
Given that the price deviation from fundamental value    simultaneously meets the 
characteristics of a bubble, the chapter can safely conclude the deviation from fundamental value 
   illustrates the level of biased expectation bubble in log scale. Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.4 reflect 
the bubble to price ratio and the changes in bubble to price ratio, respectively. 
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Figure 5.4 Changes in House Price Index       against Changes in Price Deviation from 
Fundamental Value      (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
 
Notes:    stands for first difference.       stands for the first natural log difference of House Price Index.      
stands for the changes in deviations from fundamental values. See Table 5.2 for the estimation of deviation from 
fundamental value   .             .      MT25% and MT0 stand for the estimation of    are based on the 
marginal tax rate        and     , respectively. 
Table 5.3 Unit Root Tests for Price Deviation from Fundamental Value    (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
Time Series    Unit Root Tests Marginal Tax (MT) rate = 25% Marginal Tax (MT) rate = 0 
ADF PP ADF PP 
Log level 
With Intercept 0.1839 0.4467 0.1887 0.4968 
With Intercept and Trend 0.9788 0.9870 0.9782 0.9842 
Without Intercept and Trend 0.0126 0.0426 0.0123 0.0509 
Log Difference 
With Intercept 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
With Intercept and Trend 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
Without Intercept and Trend 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
Notes: The optimal lag length for the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test is determined by the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC). The figures presented in this table are p-values. PP stands for the Phillips-Perron test. 
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) and Black et al. (2006) suggest the deviations of prices from 
fundamental values can be interpreted by the non-linear deterministic functions of the 
fundamentals of asset value alone. When this is true, then, the deviations of prices from 
fundamental values are intrinsic bubbles. Intrinsic bubbles depend on bounded rationality 
hypothesis and self-fulfilling expectations. Intrinsic bubbles do not continuously diverge but 
periodically revert toward their fundamental value, which is consistent with Table 5.2 and Figure 
5.2. The non-linear relation between bubbles and the fundamentals themselves indicate that asset 
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prices overreact to news on fundamentals (Chen and Sauer, 1997; Dissanaike, 1997; Black et al., 
2006). When the biased speculative bubbles are not significantly correlated with any 
fundamental variables, then, the bubbles support the pure irrational expectation hypothesis. 
Following Black et al. (2006), Table 5.4 illustrates the correlation matrix between the bubble, 
fundamental price-rent ratio, HRI and HPI in log scale. We find that all the correlations are 
significantly different from zero depicting a positive relationship, which supports the bounded 
rationality hypothesis and consistent with Black et al. (2006). However, the correlation between 
bubble and house price is higher than that for bubble and fundamental price-rent ratio and House 
Rent Index which is contrast to Black et al. (2006). While Table 5.4 indicates that bubbles are 
not driven by purely irrational activities, it does not quantify about the extent to which bubbles 
are rational, partially due to fundamentals; or irrational, due to pure non-economic behaviour. 
Table 5.4 Correlation Matrix (1996Q1-2011Q1) 
 Bubble    F.Price/Rent Ratio    
 
 HPI     HRI      
Bubble    1    
F.Price/Rent Ratio    
 
 0.4834*** 
(4.2058) 
1   
HPI     0.9934*** 
(65.9941) 
0.4792*** 
(4.1579) 
1  
HRI      0.9337*** 
(19.8663) 
0.5185*** 
(4.6184) 
0.9676*** 
(29.1727) 
1 
Notes: F.Price/Rent Ratio    
 
is the fundamental price-rent ratio. HPI     is the House Price Index. HRI      is the 
House Rent Index. The values above the parentheses are the corresponding correlations. The values in the 
parentheses are the  -          .  -                √      √        .      is the correlation coefficient 
and       is the squared correlation coefficient. The bubble   and the fundamental price-rent ratio    
 
are estimated 
based on the Marginal Tax rate MT=0. *** stands for the correlation is statistical significance at 1% level. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies how much variation in house prices results from non-fundamental factors by 
quantifying the size of housing bubbles. The chapter contributes to the literature both 
methodologically and empirically. Using the user cost framework in a state space model has 
clear methodological advantages. In the first step, the fundamental house price-rent ratio is 
calculated using the enhanced user cost framework which has the benefit compared to many 
prior papers of incorporating all relevant variables. In the second step, the method can 
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advantageously estimate the level of any bubble by incorporating the fundamental price-rent 
ratio into a state space model by taking advantage of a Kalman filter. 
Our empirical results indicate that UK house prices were undervalued from 1996Q1 to 2002Q4; 
and thereafter overvalued. As a proportion, the bubble ranges from -52% to 27.4% in log scale, 
which is indeed a quite substantial range. The magnitude of this range indicates that any 
modelling of house prices without the consideration of a bubble element, or the non-fundamental 
components, will be somewhat problematic. 
From a theoretical viewpoint our results favour the bounded rationality hypothesis rather than the 
rational expectation hypothesis and the pure irrational expectation hypothesis. The bounded 
rationality hypothesis suggest that people’s expectations and economic behaviours might be 
biased due to cognitive and psychology limitations which, in turn, indicates the market might be 
inefficient at least temporarily. However, people learn from their mistakes and attempt to 
satisfice by acting as rationally as possible. 
From a practical perspective, the quantification of bubbles in house prices can make market 
participants aware of the size of their risk exposure and can help them to detect early signals of 
the possibility of a financial market crash (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). For financial institutions, 
periodically assessing the state of the housing market, rational diversification and timely 
rebalancing of portfolios may help them prevent similar losses to those experienced in the 
Subprime Crisis. Signals regarding a bubble may drive investors to respond rationally and adjust 
house prices toward their fair value. Furthermore, policy-makers can use information about the 
existence and size of bubbles in order set policies to stabilize the market. 
There are several avenues for future research in this area. The method can be applied to other 
markets and time periods and compared to other approaches. Detailed consideration of the 
various components of the user cost can also give a guide to the relative influences of different 
factors on house prices and the size of any bubble component. This understanding is potentially 
very useful for policy formation. 
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Chapter 6. Investigation of Institutional Changes in the UK Housing Market 
by Structural Break Tests and Time Varying Parameter Models 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter considers whether the effects of institutional changes within the UK housing market 
are empirically supported, furthermore, whether these institutional changes are short term (less 
than 1 year) or long term (more than 1 year). If the changes are short term, the best course of 
action might be to do nothing. However, if the institutional changes are long term, one has to 
review and adjust his/her investment strategies. 
This chapter contributes to the literature from two aspects. Firstly, the dates of structural breaks 
or fast-moving institutional changes appear to match the unexpected market shocks rather than 
political events, which provides more recent empirical evidence to support Lucas (1976), Roland 
(2004) and Culpepper (2005). Culpepper (2005) suggests the sufficient condition for institutional 
change is the change in ideas, with the process by which people apply triggering events such as 
the financial crises to coordinate their future anticipations around the new rules of the economy. 
Secondly, this chapter expands on the literature by using three novel Kalman filtering based 
Time Varying Parameter (TVP) models to quantify the slow-moving institutional changes in the 
UK housing market. The three TVP models are the Time Varying Parameter with Principal 
Component Analysis (TVP-PCA), Time Varying Parameter with Principal Component Analysis 
and Bubbles (TVP-PCA-Bubble), and Time Varying Parameter with Error Correction Model 
(TVP-ECM). Literature often uses TVP-PCA and TVP-ECM in dynamic forecasting (Li et al., 
2006; Stock and Watson, 2006). However, the chapter does not find any literature studies 
institutional changes using the three aforementioned TVP models, especially TVP-PCA-Bubble. 
Empirically speaking, statistical significant structural breaks will indicate fast-moving 
institutional changes. Even though some sophisticated structural break tests may detect all 
structural break points, they are however, naturally unsuitable to investigate the slow-moving 
institutional changes. For many purposes, a more natural model is that parameters gradually 
change over time with small, Gaussian shifts, rather than rare but large ‘structural break’ shifts. 
The slow-moving institutional changes are identified to occur if the coefficients in a regression 
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are time varying (Brown et al., 1997; Hansen, 2001; Pesaran and Timmermann, 2002; Gérard, 
2004; Baddeley, 2005; Culpepper, 2005; Guirguis et al., 2005). There are three reasons for using 
the time varying parameter models in economic modelling (Engle and Watson, 1987; Brown et 
al., 1997; Guirguis et al., 2005). Initially, the Lucas (1976) critique proposes a behavioural 
motivation for parameter variation. Lucas (1976) suggests people adjust not only their behaviour 
in response to new policies, but also their expectations of the economic model believed relevant 
to existing policies. Secondly, changes in the unobservable components of economic variables 
such as expectations will drive institutional changes in the data generating process. Thirdly, 
model mis-specification is another source of time varying parameters given it is generally 
impossible to build a perfect specification of an economic data generating process. The TVP 
models usually take the state space form and are estimated by the Kalman filter algorithm 
(Kalman, 1960; Brown et al., 1997; Kim and Nelson, 1999; Guirguis et al., 2005; Li et al., 2006; 
Zivot and Wang, 2006). Chow et al. (2011) suggest the constant coefficient models such as the 
classical Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are only plausible for stationary time series. Having 
constant coefficients is necessary but an insufficient condition for stationary, as some non-
stationary processes may have constant coefficients. 
The Principal Component Analysis (PCA) investigates the dynamic links among observed, 
correlated economic variables by using a potentially lower number of unobservable common 
factors. Relative to the TVP-PCA, the TVP-PCA-Bubble incorporates the housing bubbles as an 
additional independent variable which controls for people’s biased expectations. One of the 
advantages of the Error Correction Model (ECM) lies in its ability to capture the short-run 
dynamic self-correcting process of the housing market toward its long-run equilibrium 
relationship (Li et al., 2006). Moreover, ECM and PCA can eliminate the occurrence of spurious 
regression and multicollinearity problems, which may otherwise compromise the reliability and 
accuracy of the applied investigation. 
The three TVP models suggest that the effects of fundamental variables such as real household 
disposable income on housing returns have declined over previous decades. With the effect of 
people’s biased expectations, housing price bubbles are playing a more important role than ever. 
The empirical findings are generally consistent with Chapters 3 and 4 and literature (Brown et al., 
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1997; Gérard, 2004; Culpepper, 2005; Guirguis et al., 2005). Additionally, TVP-PCA-Bubble 
outperforms TVP-PCA and TVP-ECM in terms of model explanation and model fitting. 
The empirical findings suggest that the fast-moving (or formal) institutional changes such as 
significant political reform is often a necessary but insufficient condition for institutional change, 
given people’s shared beliefs can persist even after changing the formal laws. However, the 
changes in policies would impact the housing market through the slow-moving institutional 
changes, in particular those relating to people’s preferences, technology and expectations over 
time. Slow-moving institutions must change continuously so that they produce inconsistencies 
within fast-moving institutions which, in turn, create pressure for changes. Overall, reforms (fast-
moving institutions) in a given economy must in part build on their local conditions (slow-
moving institutions). 
In the remainder of the chapter, Section 6.2 exhibits data description. Section 6.3 displays the 
Bai and Perron (1998) structural break tests. Section 6.4 presents the three TVP models and the 
diagnostics tests. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Data Description 
The data included in this study are the Department for Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG) House Price Index (HPI), Retail Price Index (RPI), House Rent Index (HRI), mortgage 
rates of Building Societies, composite mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks (1995Q1-
2007Q4 only), aggregate mortgage outstanding, real aggregate household disposable income, 
house completions, foreign exchange reserves (foreign currency deposits and bonds held by UK 
monetary authorities only), net exports of good/services and net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflow from the United Kingdom. Except for the composite mortgage rate of Building Societies 
and Banks, all the quarterly time series data were collected from DataStream covering the period 
from 1968Q2 to 2007Q4. The starting dates are chosen by the availability of data for the HPI and 
the end dates are chosen by the availability of data for the house completions. The chapter sets 
the House Price Index (HPI), House Rent Index (HRI) and the Retail Price Index (RPI) equal to 
100 at 2002Q1. Following Martin and Morrison (2008), the chapter calculates the Foreign 
Portfolio Investment (FPI) by the identity: FPI Inflow = Change in Foreign Exchange Reserves – 
Net Exports – Net FDI Inflow. Unless specifically mentioned, all the variables are in nominal 
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terms. Throughout this chapter, lower case letters for time-dependent variables represent the 
natural logarithm of their capital counterparts.    denotes for the first difference. 
In Appendices, Tables A and B illustrate the source and definition of data. Table C exhibits a 
basic data summary. Table D exhibits the results of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root 
tests on the level and the first natural log difference for each variable where the appropriate 
number of lagged difference is identified by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). Table D 
suggests all the applied variables are nonstationary in log level but stationary after first log 
difference. 
6.3 The Bai and Perron (1998) Structural Break Tests for Fast-moving Institutional 
Changes 
To empirically assess whether the political reforms caused structural breaks immediately after 
the 1970s, Table 6.1 presents two forms of the Bai and Perron (1998) structural break tests. The 
univariate test applies to the changes in house prices       only, for the purpose of detecting the 
structural breaks in housing prices. The multivariate test applies to house price       against 
mortgage outstanding     , mortgage rate of Building Societies     , house completion     , 
real aggregate household disposable income     , foreign portfolio investment        and 
general index of retail price      at the first natural log difference scale. The rationale for the 
multivariate test is detecting the structural breaks in the housing market which contains a group 
of economic variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Table 6.1 Bai and Perron (1998) Structural Break Tests 
Bai and Perron (1998) structural break test for       
                                                    |   
6.149 25.010*** 19.309*** 14.644*** 12.203*** 34.300*** 
       |          |          |               / 
1.887 3.139 2.019 25.010*** 32.064*** / 
Number of breaks selected Identified break dates 
Sequential Procedure LWZ BIC / 85
th
 Observation 112
th
 Observation 
0 0 2 / 1989Q3 1996Q2 
Bai and Perron (1998) structural break test for       against    ,     ,     ,     ,        and      
                                                    |   
1202.66*** 547.291*** 192781.922 *** 6084796.474*** 5267225.103*** 62.386*** 
       |          |          |               / 
58.586*** 62.386*** 9.641 6084796.474*** 8061287.479*** / 
Number of breaks selected Identified break dates 
Sequential Procedure LWZ BIC 22
th
 Observation 78
th
 Observation 116
th
 Observation 
2 0 0 1973Q4 1987Q4 1997Q2 
Notes:    denotes the first difference.     is house price,   means mortgage outstanding,    means mortgage rate 
of Building Societies,    means house completion,    means real aggregate household disposable income,      
means foreign portfolio investment, and    means the general index of retail price. Throughout the thesis, lower case 
letters for time-dependent variables represent the natural logarithm of their capital counterparts. In the Bai and 
Perron (1998) tests, the chapter sets the maximum number of break points    , minimum length of distance 
equals 23, trimming equals 0.10. The sample size ranges from 1968Q2 to 2007Q4. *** denotes statistical 
significance at the 1% significance level. The null hypothesis for          test is there are  statistical structural 
breaks, where,      . The null hypothesis for          |   test is there are    statistical significant 
structural breaks conditional on   structural breaks. The null hypothesis for the       test and the      test 
are there is no structural break. BIC is Bayesian Information Criteria and LWZ is a modified Schwartz’s Criteria. 
Sequential Procedure, LWZ and BIC test for the number of breaks selected, respectively. 
From Table 6.1, the       test and the      test consistently reject the null hypotheses 
that there are no structural breaks. However, there are controversies on the dates of the breaks. In 
the univariate tests, the          test, Sequential Procedure test and LWZ test fail to reject the 
null hypothesis and suggest that there is no structural break. The tests          through 
         are statistically significant and suggests that there are 2 to 5 structural breaks, 
respectively. The BIC test suggests there are two structural breaks or fast-moving institutional 
changes at 1989Q3 and 1996Q2. In the multivariate tests, the tests          through          
suggest there are 5 structural breaks. The tests        |   through        |   suggest there 
are 4 statistical significant structural breaks. The Sequential Procedure test suggests there are 2 
statistical significant structural breaks. However, the LWZ and BIC tests suggest there is no 
statistical significant structural break. For the sake of prudence, this chapter identifies three 
statistical significant structural breaks at 1973Q4, 1987Q4 and 1997Q2. The first structural break 
1973Q4 roughly follows the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1971, the 1973 oil 
crisis, and the Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973-1975. The second structural break, 1987Q4 or 
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1989Q3, follows the UK Building Societies Act 1986, the Lawson boom from 1986 to 1988, the 
‘Big Bang’ in 1986, the general election in June 1987, and the Black Monday on 19th October 
1987. Finally, 1996Q2 or 1997Q2 follows the UK recession in 1992, the US savings and loan 
crisis in the early 1990s, the 1994 economic crisis in Mexico, the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
and/or the UK general election in May 1997. The dates of the structural breaks appear to match 
the unexpected market shocks rather than political events. However, some of the political events 
would be the real drivers of the market shocks. It seems the unexpected shocks in particular 
financial crises often drive people to coordinate their future anticipations around the new rules of 
the economy, and thereby leads to structural break. Table 6.1 empirically supports that the 
political and/or legal reform is often a necessary but insufficient condition for fast-moving 
institutional changes, given people’s shared beliefs can persist even after changing the formal 
laws (Gérard, 2004; Culpepper, 2005). 
Building on a sample from 1971Q4 to 1989Q2, Brown et al. (1997) uses the Chow (1960) 
structural break test to find that 1983Q2 is a statistically significant structural break in the UK 
which seems to differ slightly from Table 6.1. Given 1983Q2 is in the middle of the recession of 
the early 1980s in the UK, the implications of Table 6.1 indeed remain consistent with Brown et 
al. (1997). Guirguis et al. (2005) empirically support the coefficient instability of the US housing 
market by using three statistical tests including, the rolling OLS, the Chow (1960) structural 
break test and the RESET test. Unfortunately, Guirguis et al. (2005) fail to detect the numbers 
and the possible dates of the structural breaks. 
The Chow (1960) test is a linear regression based known break point model, which is essentially 
a test of parameter constancy or homogeneity. In practice, one has two options: to pick an 
arbitrary potential break point; or to pick a break point based on some known characteristic of 
the time series. In the earlier case, the real break point can be missed. In the latter case, the tests 
can be misleading due to the candidate break points being endogenous. Moreover, people can 
easily obtain distinctly different results, given the selection of candidate break points are far 
more art than science. By contrast, the Bai and Perron (1998) test is an unknown break point test. 
One of the key points of the Bai and Perron (1998) test is how to estimate ‘confident intervals’ 
for the break point. The Bai and Perron (1998) break test can extend to more than one break 
point given the maximum number of possible breakpoints are known. For the Chow (1960) test, 
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one has to split the sample at the estimated break point and test for further breaks on the two 
subsamples by repeating the Chow (1960) test until there are no further breaks. In recent 
econometric practice, the unknown break test such as the Bai and Perron (1998) test has replaced 
the more well-known break tests, in particular the Chow (1960) test, see (Hansen, 2001). 
6.4 The Time Varying Parameter Models for Slow-moving Institutional Changes 
6.4.1 Time Varying Parameter with Principal Component Analysis (TVP-PCA) 
In the first step, the chapter extracts principal components from a number of macroeconomic and 
fundamental factor variables which are related to the changes in house prices,      . In the 
second step, the chapter runs the changes in house prices       against a few of the selected 
principal components, by using the TVP in the form of a state space model which is in the spirit 
of Principal Component Regression. 
Measurement Equation: 
                                                                                                                          6. 1 
State Equation with Random Walk Specification: 
                                                                                                                                  6. 2 
       
   ((
 
 
)  (
   
  
))                                                                                                    6. 3 
      is the time varying coefficient for the  -   independent variable, principal component       
at time  .    is the constant.    and    are the temporary and permanent disturbance terms, 
respectively.    and    are Gaussian disturbances, which are serially independent and 
independent of each other over the sample. Once the TVP models are specified as equations (6.1) 
through (6.3), the unknown parameters for the disturbance terms and the time varying parameters 
can be estimated by using maximum likelihood estimation. This chapter uses a Gauss-Newton 
algorithm, Marquardt, for optimizing the log likelihood function. Here, the log likelihood 
function refers to the ‘prediction error decomposition’ in Harvey (1990). 
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In the housing literature, one of the main challenges is the ‘curse of dimensionality’. For serially 
correlated variables, the number of parameters of a model often increases significantly when the 
order of the model is increased. Multiple variables present similar patterns, implying the 
existence of common factors among these variables. As a statistical factor model, the aim of a 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is to identify and extract, from a number of possibly 
related stationary variables, a few uncorrelated stationary factors, named principal components 
which can attribute to most of the variations in the covariance or correlation matrix of the 
variables. The first principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as 
possible, the second greatest variability on the second principal components, and so on. See 
(Jackson, 1993; Zivot and Wang, 2006; Alexander, 2008; Tsay, 2010). 
Building on the demand and supply equations in Hendry (1984) and the open economy 
framework of Mankiw (2011), this chapter runs robust PCA (Verardi and Croux, 2008) to house 
completion     , Retail Price Index (RPI)     , real household disposable income     , real 
income per household         , house price      , average value of housing per unit income 
             , mortgage total outstanding     , mortgage rate from Building Societies 
    , ratio of borrowed to own equity            , real mortgage value         , real 
value of the mortgage stock           , ratio of house price to incomes             
and foreign portfolio investment        at the first log difference scale. Relative to the standard 
PCA application, Verardi and Croux (2008)’s robust PCA eliminates the outlier effects. 
By applying the correlation matrix approach, Table 6.2 shows the results of the robust PCA. 
Because of collinearity, STATA automatically drops the changes in physical house 
completion     , RPI     , real income per household         , ratio of borrowed to own 
equity            , real mortgage value          and ratio of house price to incomes 
           . Therefore, the robust PCA actually applies to the real household disposable 
income     , house price      , average value of housing per unit income              , 
mortgage total outstanding     , mortgage rate from Building Societies     , real value of the 
mortgage stock           , and foreign portfolio investment        at the first log 
difference scale. 
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Table 6.2 Results of Robust PCA 
Panel A: 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 2.17894 .661348 0.3113 0.3113 
Comp2 1.5176 .360288 0.2168 0.5281 
Comp3 1.15731 .122031 0.1653 0.6934 
Comp4 1.03528 .274499 0.1479 0.8413 
Comp5 .760777 .415837 0.1087 0.9500 
Comp6 .34494 .339779 0.0493 0.9993 
Comp7 .005161 / 0.0007 1.0000 
Panel B: Principal components (Eigenvectors) 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 Comp6 Comp7 Unexplained 
     -0.0426 -0.0290 0.1497 0.9153 0.3650 0.0201 0.0595 0 
      0.2514 0.6570 0.1982 0.0722 -0.1195 -0.6492 -0.1578 0 
              0.6611 -0.0717 -0.0245 -0.0891 0.1907 -0.0428 0.7149 0 
     0.2047 0.0246 0.8030 0.0155 -0.3600 0.4260 -0.0359 0 
     0.1948 0.4566 -0.5157 0.2664 -0.4281 0.4826 0.0243 0 
           -0.6263 0.1962 0.1158 0.0318 -0.2885 -0.1166 0.6768 0 
       -0.1606 0.5611 0.1164 -0.2772 0.6481 0.3851 0.0244 0 
In Table 6.2, panel A shows the figures for the eigenvalues, and the (cumulative) percentage of 
explained variance. The eigenvalue for a given component measures the variance in all the 
variables which is accounted for by that component. The sum of all eigenvalues equals the total 
number of variables. The difference shows the spread between one eigenvalue and the next. The 
proportion indicates the relative weight of each component in the total variance. The cumulative 
shows the amount of variance explained by the sum of the first   components. Following 
Jackson (1993), the chapter identifies the numbers of principal components when the cumulative 
proportion of variance is above 90%. Therefore, the chapter selects the first five principal 
components that implies     in equation (6.1). The chapter does not rotate the principal 
components, primarily as the components rotation does not enhance the interpretation in Table 
6.2. The rotated results are available upon request. Given the chapter targets quantifying the 
dynamic relationships between the changes in house prices against the five principal components 
or common factors in the UK housing market, instead of identifying the specific characteristics 
of each component, the chapter names the principal components according to the values of the 
factor loadings. 
In Table 6.2, panel B reports the factor loadings which are the correlation coefficients between 
the variables (rows) and components (columns). As the first component has a factor loading of 
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0.66 on the average value of housing per unit income              , -0.62 on real value 
of the mortgage stock           , and quite low loadings on the rest of variables. The first 
component is named the house value and leverage factor. In the same way, the second principal 
component is named the house price appreciation factor. The third principal component is the 
credit availability factor. The fourth and fifth principal component is the personal disposal 
income factor and the foreign capital factor, respectively. Considering the factors might have 
substantial factor loadings on some other variables, it is somewhat problematic to assume a 
specific component has the same characteristics as the underlying variables. For instance, the 
performance of the fourth principal component might differ significantly from the real household 
disposable income     , simply because the component also has very high loadings on the 
mortgage rate      (0.27), and these variables have quite different or even opposite 
characteristics. 
Then, the chapter runs changes in house price       against the five unrotated principal 
components by using the equations (6.1) and (6.2). Figure 6.1 shows the time varying 
coefficients       for the five principal components over the sample 1975Q1-2007Q4. This is 
because there are spikes in the diagrams which correspond to having an exact fit to the data or at 
most 1 degree of freedom over the sample 1968Q2-1974Q4, given the TVPs are estimated by 
recursive process. With the increasing in degrees of freedom, the time varying coefficients tend 
to be sensible. Throughout the chapter, the notation       means the time varying coefficients for 
the  -   independent variable at time  . Throughout the chapter, the time varying coefficients 
indicates that one unit changes in independent variable could cause about       unit changes in 
house prices at time  , ceteris paribus. 
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Figure 6.1 TVP-PCA (1975Q1-2007Q4) 
    
    
 
Figure 6.1 suggests all the coefficients are declining between 1975Q1 and 2007Q4 albeit they 
experience various levels of short-term recoveries. It implies that the five principal components, 
or common factors in general, play a declining role in driving the changes in house prices over 
the sample 1975Q1-2007Q4. Apart from the coefficients of the fifth principal component      , 
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the remainder of the four TVPs remain positive over the sample. The general turning points for 
these time varying parameters appears in 1980-1983, 1987-1990 and 1996-1998 which are 
consistent with Table 6.1 and Brown et al. (1997). 
6.4.2 Time Varying Parameter with Principal Component Analysis and Bubble (TVP-PCA-
Bubble) 
To control the effect of people’s biased expectations on the changes in housing prices, equation 
(6.4) incorporates the changes in housing price bubble      to equation (6.1). 
Measurement Equation: 
                                                                                                              6. 4 
The remainder of the model specification is same as equations (6.2) and (6.3). As    , the time 
varying coefficients for the changes in bubble     is labelled as      The estimation of changes 
in bubble      is available in Section 7.2.1, in Chapter 7. Figure 6.2 plots the time varying 
coefficients of the TVP-PCA-Bubble over the sample 1996Q2- 2007Q4 because the starting data 
for the changes in house price bubble     are available at 1996Q2. 
Figure 6.2 TVP-PCA-Bubble (1996Q2-2007Q4) 
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In Figure 6.2, the coefficients for the five principal components change signs over time which is 
a contrast to Figure 6.1. However, the decline of coefficients     through     over time and the 
dramatic volatility between 1996 and 1998 are consistent with Figure 6.1. After controlling for 
the effect of changes in bubble    , the coefficients for the five principal commons are smaller 
than 0.2 in absolute value. The coefficient for the changes in bubble     increases from 0.05 in 
1996 to 0.8 in 1998, and thereafter, it remains stable and approaches 1.0 by 2007Q4. Given 
bubble is a component of house price, one unit changes in bubble approximately drives one unit 
changes in house price, after controlling for the effect of the fundamental variables. The small 
value of     prior to 1998 is probably due to lack of degree of freedom. When compared to 
Figure 6.1, Figure 6.2 implies that the effects of common factors on housing prices are 
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substantially dependent on the changes in bubble, or people’s biased expectations. It is the build-
up of the bubble which is driving the changes in house prices. 
Brown et al. (1997) study the time varying coefficients for the nominal user cost and the 
expected capital gains on housing separately. However, this chapter treats expected capital gains 
as a key driver of the nominal user cost which, in turn, is a main variable in the estimation of 
bubble, or people’s biased expectations. Furthermore, Brown et al. (1997) formulate the 
expected capital gains by using the backward-looking adaptive expectations, while this chapter 
uses the forward-looking unbiased expectations. 
Brown et al. (1997) suggest the coefficient for the expected capital gains is likely to increase 
when the house prices are booming and fall when house prices are in recession periods over the 
sample 1968Q2-1992Q2. Given the sample 1996Q2-2007Q4 is a typical booming period in the 
UK housing market, the increase of coefficient for the changes in bubble     in Figure 6.2 
support Brown et al. (1997). 
6.4.3 Time Varying Parameter with Error Correction Model (TVP-ECM) 
Following Li et al. (2006), this chapter investigates a two-step TVP-ECM. TVP-ECM 
accommodates an adjustment process that prevents housing variables from moving too far away 
from their long-run equilibrium. 
Building on the equation (14) of Hendry (1984) and the open economy theory of Mankiw (2011), 
the first step applies the Johansen cointegration test for house price    , mortgage outstanding  
  , mortgage rate   , house completion   , real household disposable income   , foreign 
portfolio investment      and general index of retail price    at the natural log scale. 
From Table 6.3, both the trace test and the maximum eigenvalue test indicate there are four 
cointegrations among the seven applied variables at the 5% significance level. It implies there 
are four linear combinations of these variables which are stationary in level. 
 
 
123 
 
Table 6.3 Johansen Cointegration Test 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Johansen cointegration test for house price    , mortgage outstanding   , mortgage rate   , house 
completion   , real household disposable income   , foreign portfolio investment      and general index 
of retail price   . *** and ** denote for statistical significant at the 1% and 5% significance level, 
respectively. 
The second step runs the changes in house price       against the cointegration terms and the 
mortgage outstanding     , mortgage rate     , house completion     , real household 
disposable income     , foreign portfolio investment       , general index of retail price      
at the first natural log difference scale as equation (6.5). 
Measurement Equation: 
                                                                    
                                                                                
                                                                                                                             6. 5 
           is the  -   cointegration term or error correction mechanism. The state equation and 
the rest of model specifications are same to equations (6.2) and (6.3). Like Figure 6.1, Figure 6.3 
shows the time varying coefficients for the TVP-ECM over the sample 1975Q1-2007Q4. 
 
 
 
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
No. of Cointegration(s) Eigenvalue Trace Statistic p-value 
None  0.4554  266.7334  0.0000*** 
At most 1  0.3755  171.3211  0.0001*** 
At most 2  0.2505  97.4002  0.0001*** 
At most 3  0.1789  52.1197  0.0188** 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
No. of Cointegration(s) Eigenvalue Max-Eigen  Statistic p-value 
None  0.4554  95.4122  0.0000*** 
At most 1  0.3755  73.9209  0.0000*** 
At most 2  0.2505  45.2806  0.0015*** 
At most 3  0.1789  30.9458  0.0178** 
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Figure 6.3 TVP-ECM (1975Q1-2007Q4) 
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In Figure 6.3, the coefficient for the changes in mortgage outstanding    , declines between 
1975 and 1982; remains stable between 1983 and 1989; declines from 1990 to 1997, and then 
recoveries slightly. The coefficients for changes in mortgage rate from Building Societies    , 
house completion     and real household disposable income     show W-shape volatiles. The 
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coefficient for changes in foreign portfolio investment     and the lagged changes in house price 
    increases from 1975 to 1978; declines between 1979 and 1980. Thereafter,     remains quite 
stable.     exhibits a slight recovery from 1989 to 1990 and then remains stable. The coefficient 
for changes in RPI     declines from 1975Q1 at 1.1 to 0.7 at 1996Q1, recoveries of 0.9 at 
1993Q1, and then experience long term decline with modest short term recoveries by 2007Q4. 
The coefficients for the cointegration terms,      and      are negative but     and     are 
positive with slightly higher values between 1975Q1 and 1982Q2 which implies the 
cointegration terms in general drive the housing market far away from their equilibrium. From 
1982Q3 to 2007Q4, the coefficients     and      remain negative,     converges to 0,      
turns to positive; and the overall effect of these four cointegration terms turns to negative which 
drives the UK housing market to converge on its long run equilibrium. Figure 6.3 suggests the 
turning points appear in 1980-1982, 1989-1991 and 1995-1998 which are consistent with Table 
6.1 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
The general declining values of    ,     and     over the sample indicate that the changes in the 
mortgage outstanding from Building Societies, real household disposable income and RPI are 
playing a less important role than they were. The values of    ,     and     are less than 0.05 in 
absolute values, suggesting that if one unit changes in each of the mortgage rates from the 
Building Societies, house completion and foreign portfolio investment cannot substantially drive 
the movement of house prices, ceteris paribus. 
Table 6.4 exhibits the hypothesis testing for statistical significance of the TVPs throughout the 
chapter. The chapter does not display the confidence intervals for the TVPs primarily because 
the standard errors for the TVPs are generally very small, and thereby make the confidence 
intervals and the TVPs too tight to distinguish. Except for few exceptional, the majority of TVPs 
are statistical significant at the 10% significance level. The statistical insignificant TVPs 
including the coefficient for the fourth principal component in the TVP-PCA-Bubble model; the 
coefficients for the changes in mortgage rate from Building Societies    , the changes in housing 
completion    , the changes in foreign portfolio investment     and the second ECM in the 
TVP-ECM model. The next two paragraphs present a battery of evidences to support these 
empirical findings. 
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Table 6.4 Statistical Significance for the Time Varying Parameters 
 Final State Root MSE  -            -       
TVP-PCA: 
                                                                                                                                     Equation (6.1) 
                                                                                                                                               Equation (6.2) 
      0.147830 0.018092 8.171039 0.0000 
      0.236976 0.020796 11.39542 0.0000 
      0.502223 0.036696 13.68589 0.0000 
      0.319816 0.103073 3.102803 0.0019 
      -0.118968 0.049496 -2.403569 0.0162 
TVP-PCA-Bubble:  
                                                                                                                          Equation (6.4) 
                                                                                                                                                Equation (6.2) 
      -0.068433 0.014462 -4.731877 0.0000 
      -0.041734 0.021256 -1.963376 0.0496 
      -0.171932 0.040672 -4.227262 0.0000 
      0.049494 0.082698 0.598487 0.5495 
      0.074855 0.038897 1.924443 0.0543 
      0.969045 0.053804 18.01080 0.0000 
TVP-ECM:  
                                                                                 
                                                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                                Equation (6.5)     
                                                                                                                                               Equation (6.2) 
      0.619478 0.117573 5.268883 0.0000 
      -0.019398 0.019762 -0.981590 0.3263 
      -0.021493 0.019095 -1.125550 0.2604 
      0.394486 0.113480 3.476249 0.0005 
      -0.001048 0.002083 -0.503042 0.6149 
      0.359820 0.078414 4.588731 0.0000 
      0.853063 0.153488 5.557853 0.0000 
      -0.028909 0.011434 -2.528233 0.0115 
      0.000653 0.014477 0.045105 0.9640 
       -0.032686 0.010400 -3.142964 0.0017 
       0.066366 0.022491 2.950734 0.0032 
Notes:       is the changes in house price.       is the time varying coefficient for the  -   independent variable, at 
time  .       denotes for principal component.    is the constant.    and    are the temporary and permanent 
disturbance terms, respectively.            is the  -   cointegration term or error correction mechanism. Root MSE 
stands for Root Mean Square Error. 
Firstly, Shiwakoti et al. (2008) suggest that about 80% of the total assets of Building Societies 
eventually transfer to the banking sector, since the enactment of the UK Building Societies Act 
1986. O’Connor (2010) suggests the proportion of total mortgage outstanding provided by 
Building Societies dramatically declines from more than 60% in mid-1980s to 14% by 2010. 
Therefore, the mortgage outstanding and the mortgage rates from the Building Societies play a 
declining role in driving the UK housing prices. However, the estimation of housing price 
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bubbles in Chapter 5 suggests that the composite mortgage rate of Building Societies and Banks 
plays an increasing role over previous decades. Secondly, the real disposable income is an 
average evaluation that covers the aggregate population, but the specific groups of sellers and 
buyers that determine the house prices may have income that is significantly different from the 
population mean, which is particularly true in the UK housing market. Thirdly, when people 
purchase a home, they make their decision based not only on available information such as the 
lagged changes in RPI, but also their expectations about the future. Fourthly, the house 
completion is very small in relation to the existing housing stock (Hendry, 1984); and the 
domestic regulations which could effectively eliminate the impact of foreign portfolio 
investments (Whelan, 2010; Xu and Chen, 2012). Fifth, the spread of ‘short-termism’ in the UK 
since the 1960s is associated with financial innovations and deregulations that drive people to 
treat housing as a gambling chip, becoming increasingly impatient for a quick return on their 
investments. Consequently, people’s expectations, in particular the expected capital gains on the 
housing market rather than the traditional economic factors, are playing a far more important role 
in driving the UK housing prices. 
6.4.4 Diagnostic Tests 
To assess whether the three two-step TVP models are valid, Table 6.5 tests the residuals of the 
three TVP models in terms of independence, homoscedasticity and normality, which are listed in 
a decreasing order of importance according to Commandeur and Koopman (2007). As the 
measure of the relative quality of a statistical model, Table 6.5 also presents the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). 
Table 6.5 Diagnostic Tests for the TVP Models 
 Independence 
(L-B Test) 
Homoscedasticity 
(McLeod-Li Test) 
Normality 
(J-B Test) 
AIC BIC Remark 
TVP-PCA 1.4920 No ARCH effect 138744.8*** -4.035 -3.996 Alright. 
TVP-PCA-Bubble 20.189 No ARCH effect 2.19841 -4.284 -4.205 Good Model. 
TVP-ECM 23.246 No ARCH effect 627.963*** -3.454 -3.415 Alright. 
Notes: The null hypothesis for the Ljung-Box (L-B) independence test is the residuals are independent at Q(24). The 
null hypothesis for the Jarque-Bera (J-B) normality test is the residuals follow a normal distribution. *** represents 
statistical significant at the 1% significance level. 
In Table 6.5, the Ljung-Box (L-B) test fails to reject the residual independence and the McLeod-
Li test does not reject the residual homoscedasticity for the TVP-PCA, the TVP-PCA-Bubble 
129 
 
and the TVP-ECM; the Jarque-Bera (J-B) test significantly rejects the normality of residuals for 
the TVP-PCA and the TVP-ECM. The TVP-PCA-Bubble reports the smallest AIC and BIC, 
while the TVP-ECM exhibits the largest AIC and BIC. Table 6.5 indicates the TVP-PCA-Bubble 
model satisfies the three assumptions concerning the residuals of the analysis. The TVP-PCA 
and the TVP-ECM are somewhat problematic but still provide sensible outputs, given the 
residual normality is the least important assumption. The model fitting of TVP-PCA-Bubble 
outperforms TVP-PCA which, in turn, is superior to the TVP-ECM. Overall, the findings of the 
three applied TVP models are valid. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the institutional changes in the UK housing market from 1968Q2 to 
2007Q4 using two categories of quantitative models. The Bai and Perron (1998) break tests for 
the fast-moving (or formal) institutional changes, and the Time Varying Parameter (TVP) 
models for the slow-moving (or informal) institutional changes. 
The chapter contributes to the housing literature from two aspects. Firstly, this chapter provides 
more recent empirical evidence to justify that the fast-moving institutional changes, such as 
political reforms do not cause statistically significant structural breaks immediately which 
supports Lucas (1976), Roland (2004) and Culpepper (2005). Political reform is often a 
necessary but insufficient condition for institutional change, given people’s shared beliefs can 
persist even after changing the formal laws. It seems the unexpected shocks in particular 
financial crises often drive people to coordinate their future anticipations around the new rules of 
the economy, and thereby leads to structural break. 
Secondly, the chapter investigates three two-step TVP models, namely, TVP-PCA, TVP-PCA-
Bubble and TVP-ECM. Although it is getting popular to use TVP-ECM and TVP-PCA in 
dynamic forecasting, the chapter does not find any one uses these models to quantify the slow-
moving institutional changes, let alone the TVP-PCA-Bubble model. The TVP models suggest 
the changes in policies would impact the housing market through the slow-moving institutional 
changes in particular those relating to people’s preferences, technology and expectations over 
time. The findings of TVP models support the Lucas (1976), Gérard (2004) and Culpepper 
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(2005). Therefore, rapidly political and legal interventions may not stabilize the housing market 
immediately and may risk driving the housing market into further uncertainty in the long run. 
From an investment perspective, this chapter finds that the linkages between house prices and 
fundamental variables are decaying over time. On the contrary, people’s biased expectations of 
housing price bubbles are playing much more of an important role in driving the UK house 
prices over the booming period 1996Q2-2007Q4, which supports Brown et al. (1997). Whether 
the coefficient for the biased expectations will fall in recession periods needs more recent 
empirical evidence. Any housing policies and investment strategies would be wise if they take 
account of people’s biased expectations. 
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Chapter 7. Understanding the Causal Relationship between the Changes in 
House Prices and Bubbles: Evidence from the UK Regional Panel Data 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to test that the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 are robust over time, even in terms 
of panel data analysis. This chapter considers two issues. 
 Firstly, whether the bounded rationality expectation hypothesis best fit into the UK 
housing market in terms of panel data analysis? 
 Secondly, whether the feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) is supported in the UK 
housing market? 
The bounded rationality hypothesis argues that people make expectations and decisions to help 
them satisfice rather than make theoretically optimal decisions. The bounded rationality 
expectation captures the idea that asset prices overreact to relevant information on fundamentals, 
due to cognitive and psychological limitations. However, people learn from their mistakes and 
attempt to satisfice by acting as rationally as possible. 
The feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) suggests that when house prices as a whole appreciate 
significantly, this generates many investor success stories. These stories entice potential 
investors, who naively extrapolate that they will achieve the same success if they invest too, and 
vice versa. The repeating of this process drives prices higher and higher and vice versa, for a 
while. The feedback theory implies that there is a positive feedback causal relationship between 
people’s expectations and subsequent house prices, and vice versa. The feedback theory appears 
as a type of adaptive expectation hypothesis which means that people usually form their 
expectations of an economic variable by taking a weighted mean of past values and an ‘error 
adjustment’ term. Mayer (2007) suggests Shiller (2007) overstates the case by ignoring the role 
of interest rates and using an outdated dataset. 
This chapter contributes to the literature from two aspects. Firstly, the chapter empirically 
indicates that the changes in people’s expectations best fit the bounded rationality hypothesis in 
the context of the panel data analysis. Relative to Shiller (2007), the chapter estimates the 
regional fundamental value and takes account of mortgage rates, people’s risk aversions, taxes 
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and the most recent UK datasets. Relative to Mayer (2007) and Hubbard and Mayer (2009), the 
study incorporates people’s unbiased expected capital gain and the quarterly adjusted risk 
premium into the estimation of a fundamental house price. 
Secondly, the chapter provides the first empirical evidence to justify the statistically significant 
feedback causality between the changes in bubble and the contemporaneous changes in house 
prices by using the Fixed Effects Model (FEM). The feedback causality is robust even when 
taking the mortgage rate and the more recent datasets into account. Therefore, we contribute to 
the literature on how regional heterogeneity may affect a region’s housing market. When some 
regional heterogeneity is unobservable, a fixed effects model helps to capture the effect of the 
unobservable variables, and therefore alleviates the endogeneity problem resulting from the 
omitted variable bias. Additionally, a fixed effects model is unique in that it captures the time 
series variation (Chi, 2005). In line with earlier chapters, this chapter regards bubbles as the 
house prices deviation from fundamental values which result from people’s biased expectations. 
Our findings indicate that as a region increases its house price, people observe a subsequent 
increase in its bubble, ceteris paribus. However, an increase in bubble could cause a subsequent 
decrease in house price which does not support the feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007), ceteris 
paribus. The causality effects are asymmetrical, being more significant from bubble to house 
price than that from house price to bubble in the presence of the observable and unobservable 
regional characteristics. Furthermore, there is modest parameter instability over the subsamples. 
This chapter supports the findings in Chapters 3 through to 6. 
There are two broad categories of literature study of house prices using the panel data analysis. 
The first category focuses on the linkages between some fundamental factors and housing prices. 
For instance, Holly et al. (2010) investigate the determination of real house prices by using a 
spatio-temporal model in a panel of 49 US states over a period of 29 years. Holly et al. (2011) 
propose a novel way to model the spatial-temporal dispersion of shocks in non-stationary 
systems in a panel of 11 UK regions. Holly et al. (2011) suggest that the effects of a shock decay 
more slowly along the geographical dimension when compared to the decay along the time 
dimension. The second category places emphasis on whether the house prices are supported by 
fundamentals. For example, Cameron et al. (2006) examine the bubbles hypothesis using a 
dynamic panel data model in a panel of the UK regional property prices from 1972 to 2003, but 
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fails to find a bubble. Recent studies (Mikhed and Zemčík, 2009; Clark and Coggin, 2011) 
suggest there is a house price bubble in the US, according to the univariate and panel unit root 
and cointegration tests. Unfortunately, it is rare for the literature to quantify the level of housing 
price bubbles by using the panel data analysis, let alone modelling the direction of causality 
between the changes in house price and the changes in bubble. This chapter quantifies the 
regional changes in bubbles using a time series approach, namely, the user cost framework in a 
state space model. 
Relative to the pure aggregate time-series analysis, the panel data analysis using the UK regional 
data possesses several advantages: (1), panel data normally provides a large number of data 
points, raising the degrees of freedom and eliminating the multicollinearity among independent 
variables; (2), controlling for individual heterogeneity; (3), micro panel data collected on 
individual regions may be more precisely measured than similar variables measured at the macro 
level; (4) better ability to investigate the dynamics of economic states; (5) panel allows 
researchers to investigate causality (Hsiao, 2003; Frees, 2004; Wooldridge, 2010). 
In the remainder of the chapter Section 7.2 presents the methodology. Section 7.3 is data 
description. Section 7.4 reports the empirical results and discussion. Section 7.5 is the conclusion. 
7.2 Methodology 
Section 7.2.1 presents how to estimate the regional changes in bubble using the user cost 
framework in a state space model, which is a typical two-step time series approach. Section 7.2.2 
exhibits the causality tests in the context of the fixed effects model. Throughout this chapter, 
lower case letters for time-dependent variables represent the natural logarithm of their capital 
counterparts.    denotes for first difference. 
7.2.1 Estimation of Changes in Bubble 
Given that asset price is a combination of fundamental, non-fundamental or bubble and model 
misspecification error (Wu, 1997), we can write the changes in house price as 
           
                                                                                                              7. 1 
134 
 
Where,       is the changes in house price,      
 
 is the changes in fundamental house price, 
and      is the changes in bubble,    is error term. Because    (    
 )     (    
      )  
         , we can rewrite equation (7.1) as 
           
               
                                                                 7. 2 
     
       (    
      ) is the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.        
            is the changes in house rent index. In equation (7.2), the changes in fundamental 
house price-rent ratio      
 
 and the changes in bubble      are not directly observable and need 
some algebra estimations. 
In the first step, the chapter estimates the fundamental house price-rent ratio    
 
 by using the 
user cost framework. The user cost framework suggests that at the equilibrium house price     
 
, 
the cost of holding a house per year         
 
 equals the cost of renting the house      for 
that period, namely, 
             
 
                                                                                                                  7. 3  
    is the user cost of holding a house per year at the percentage level. Then, the fundamental 
house price-rent ratio    
 
 is the inverse of the user cost    . 
   
  
    
 
    
 
 
   
                                                                                                                      7. 4 
At the percentage level: 
      
                    
                                                               7. 5 
Where,   
  is the foregone mortgage rate,     is the property tax rate,    is the maintenance 
cost,     is the risk premium for the larger uncertainty of purchasing relative to renting,    is 
the marginal tax rate for the house buyer.       is the expected capital gain over the next year. 
Equation (7.4) implies that the user cost should be positive, as neither the theoretical house price 
nor the actual market rent should be negative. This chapter estimates the risk premium     and 
expected capital gain       as 
135 
 
          
           
    
                                                                                                        7. 6 
      
      
    
   
           
    
                                                                                             7. 7 
Equation (7.6) calculates the risk premium as the difference between the house price appreciation 
and the rent appreciation over the next year. Equation (7.7) calculates the expected capital gain 
as the realized capital gain over the next year. Then, 
          
           
    
 
           
    
 
           
    
                                                           7. 8 
Equation (7.8) implies the net effect of risk premium and expected capital gain equals the 
changes in rent over the next year. Because the chapter uses the quarterly data, the annual 
changes in rent are the changes in rent over the next four quarters. Following Chapter 5, this 
chapter sets the property tax rate     = maintenance cost rate      , and the marginal tax 
rate     . Furthermore, the chapter uses the composite mortgage rates from Building 
Societies and Banks over the sample 1996Q2-2007Q4 to proxy the   
 . Additionally, the chapter 
assumes the changes in regional rents are identical to the changes in national rents, given the 
regional rents are not available. Because the quarterly changes in regional house prices are quite 
huge, a few of the user costs are negative. In such case, the negative user costs are replaced by 
the previous positive figures. 
In the second step, the chapter estimates the changes in bubble      by using a state space 
modelling. 
Measurement equation: 
             
                                                                                                        7. 9 
State equation: 
     
 
  
                                                                                                                                      7. 10  
                                                                                                                                    7. 11 
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                                                                                                                                                    7. 12 
       
    ,        
     and        
                                                                                    7. 13 
   and    are the error terms.   
  is the initial state vector. The five unknown parameters 
                
  are hyperparameters and are estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) with Marquardt algorithm. The initial values for the hyperparameters are those specified 
in the coefficient vector, which are estimated by EVIEWS 7. 
7.2.2 Panel Data Causality Tests 
From the perspective of econometrics, there are four possible causal relationships between the 
changes in bubble and the changes in house price. (1), changes in bubble drive subsequent 
changes in house price; (2), changes in house price drive subsequent changes in bubble; (3), 
feedback effect, the changes in house price affects the changes in bubble, or causality runs both 
ways; (4), changes in bubble and changes in house price are not directly related, but are 
spuriously associated through other variables, either observable or unobservable. Technically 
speaking, situation (3) and situation (4) refer to the endogeneity, which is one of the most 
significant challenges in applied econometrics. Endogeneity normally arises from three sources: 
measurement error; simultaneity, as in situation (3); and omitted variable biases, as in situation 
(4). 
The fixed effects model includes all unobserved effects and then provides a good control for 
endogeneity (Chi, 2005; Schroeder, 2010; Wooldridge, 2010). The key motivation of using a 
fixed effect model is to alleviate the omitted variable bias, not that the unobservable regional 
heterogeneity is fixed over time. Alternatively, one could try the instrument variable regression. 
However, exogenous and strong instruments may be unavailable. 
In the spirit of the Granger causality test (Chi, 2005), the chapter sets the following fixed effects 
models: 
                     ∑            
 
                                                                     7. 14 
                     ∑            
 
                                                                    7. 15 
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Where,         is the changes in house price index for region   at time  .        is the changes in 
bubble for region   at time  .    and    are constants.   denotes different regions,   denotes time, 
and   the number of Control Variables. For instance,        is the  -   control variable for region 
  at time  .   and   are the coefficients on the underlying independent variables.    and    are the 
fixed effects, indicating the effects of any and all time-invariant covariates on each variable, 
along with time-specific error terms   and  . The fixed effects model controls for the 
endogeneity by extracting the unobservable regional heterogeneities    and    from the error 
terms   and  , respectively. It is possible to estimate equations (7.14) and (7.15) simultaneously 
as in the typical panel data Granger causality tests (Hoffmann et al., 2005; Schroeder, 2010). 
However, estimating equations (7.14) and (7.15) separately allows for more flexibility in 
specifying the model. 
There are three criteria for inferring causality (Frees, 2004; Chi, 2005). (1), there is a statistically 
significant relationship. (2), the causal variable must precede the other variable in time. (3), the 
association between two variables must not be result from another, omitted, variable. Given 
equations (7.14) and (7.15) control for these observable and unobservable regional heterogeneity 
(criterion 2 and criterion 3), one can infer the causality effect primarily depends on the 
significance of the relevant coefficients. More specifically, the statistical significance of   would 
indicate changes in bubble cause subsequent changes in house price, ceteris paribus. The 
statistical significance of   indicates changes in house price would cause the changes in bubble, 
ceteris paribus. When   and   are simultaneously statistically significant, then there are 
feedback relationships between changes in bubble and changes in house price, ceteris paribus. 
When   and   are simultaneously statistically insignificant, there are no statistically causal 
relationships between changes in bubble and changes in house price, ceteris paribus. 
The Random Effects Model (REM) is another popular panel data model. REM assumes the 
omitted time-invariant variables are irrelevant with the involved time-varying covariates. REM is 
often estimated by the Generalized Least Square (GLS) estimator, while FEM is often estimated 
within the OLS estimator. REM outperforms FEM for its greater efficiency leading to statistical 
power to detect effects and smaller standard errors. Given that there is almost always some 
omitted variables bias, FEM appears more suitable than REM from a causal inference 
perspective. 
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Both random and fixed effects models have implicit restrictions that are infrequently examined 
but that if incorrect, could bias the estimated results. For example, both models assume the 
unexplained variance remains the same over time. Moreover, the autoregressive relations with 
lagged dependent variables are assumed to be nil. When the lagged dependent variables are 
included in the Arellano Bond dynamic model, the dataset has to be a large number of regions (N) 
and short time period (T) (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Bond, 2002). Although the Hausman test is 
widely used to distinguish between REM and FEM, the choice is never straightforward, and 
tends to be harder still when the number of observations is small (Hsiao, 2003; Bollen and Brand, 
2008,2010). 
7.3 Data Description 
The dataset in this study covers the twelve regions of the UK regional Halifax seasonal adjusted 
House Price Indices (HPI), the UK aggregate House Rent Index (HRI) is proxied by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) component of actual rents for housing, and the composite mortgage 
rate of Building Societies and Banks from the Bank of England. Black et al. (2006) suggest the 
Halifax house price index tracks price changes of a representative house rather than average 
prices by using the hedonic regression. The price of the representative house is then estimated for 
each period using the implicit prices of each attribute as extracted from the hedonic regression. 
All the quarterly UK time series data are collected from DataStream with a time span from 
1996Q1 to 2011Q1. The starting dates are chosen by the availability of data for the House Rent 
Index. The end dates are chosen by the availability of data for the composite mortgage rate of 
Building Societies and Banks. All the indices are set to 100 in 2005Q2. The twelve regions of the 
UK are; Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales and the nine regions of England, namely, East Anglia, 
East Midlands, Greater London, North, North West, South East, South West, West Midlands, 
and Yorkshire and the Humber. The full dataset has long time periods (    ) with small 
individuals (    ) at the first log difference scale. All the variables in this chapter are not 
adjusted for inflation. Given that ‘there is a great deal of confusion about the role of inflation 
expectations in the demand for housing’ (Schwab, 1982,1983), it is interesting to study the 
linkages between house prices and its determinants in nominal terms. 
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A preliminary statistics and correlation matrix about the changes in HPI, changes in HRI, 
changes in fundamental price-rent ratios and changes in bubble are available in Appendix Table 
E and Table F, respectively. 
7.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
7.4.1 Findings from the Full Sample 
Table 7.1 displays the results of panel data unit root tests for changes in house price index 
       , changes in fundamental house price-rent ratio        
 
, changes in house rent index 
         and changes in bubble       . The applied unit root tests are Harris–Tzavalis (HT) test, 
Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) test and Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test. The dataset includes all twelve UK 
regions over 1996Q1 to 2011Q1. As expected, all these variables are stationary at a 1% 
significance level. 
Table 7.1 Panel Data Unit Root Tests 
                
 
                 
Harris–Tzavalis (HT) Test .000 .000 .000 .000 
Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC) Test .000 .000 .000 .0053 
Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) Test .000 .000 .000 .0002 
Notes:         denotes for changes in house price index,        
 
 denotes for changes in fundamental house price-rent 
ratio,          is changes in house rent index and        denotes for changes in bubble. The figures presented in 
Table 7.1 are  -      . 
Figure 7.1 displays the changes in regional bubbles against the changes in regional house prices. 
In Figure 7.1, the quarterly changes in bubbles report significant regional heterogeneities with 
values ranging from -8% to 10% which indicate the bubbles do not follow the explosive paths. 
Therefore, the chapter rejects the rational expectation hypothesis. Apart from few exceptions 
such as Northern Ireland, the difference between changes in bubble and changes in house price is 
minute for a given region. The bubbles increases across the UK from 1996 to 2007, given the 
changes in bubbles        are positive during most of that time. During the Subprime Crisis, the 
bubbles decrease significantly thereafter and demonstrate varied recovery after 2009. 
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Figure 7.1 Changes in Regional House Price Bubble (dlbubble) vs. Regional House Price 
Index (dlhpi) 
 
Table 7.2 shows the impact of changes in bubble on changes in housing price in terms of Fixed 
Effects Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM). Model 1 of each approach regresses 
the changes in house prices         against two control variables, namely, the changes in 
fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
 and the changes in rent         . The coefficients on changes 
in fundamental price-rent ratios        
 
 are statistically significant with a value of -0.031 in both 
FEM and REM. So, one unit increases in the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio will 
significantly cause housing return decreases by 0.031 units and vice versa, ceteris paribus. The 
coefficient on changes in rent          is -0.167 but insignificant in both of FEM and REM. 
In Table 7.2, Model 2 of each approach regresses the changes in house prices         against the 
changes in fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
, the changes in rent          and the changes in 
bubble       . Model 2 suggests after controlling for the changes in the fundamental price-rent 
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
-.
2
-.
1
0
.1
.2
1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q11995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q11995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q11995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
East Anglia East Midlands Greater London North
North West Northern Ireland Scotland South East
South West Wales West Midlands York and Humber
dlbubble dlhpi
Time
Graphs by Region
141 
 
ratio        
 
 and the changes in rent         , the coefficients on changes in bubbles        are 
statistically significant with values of 1.209 and 1.124 in the FEM and REM, respectively. Given 
bubble is a component of house price, one unit changes in bubble approximately drives one unit 
changes in house price, after controlling for the effect of the fundamental variables. In contrast to 
Model 1, the coefficients on the changes in rents          turn positive but still statistically 
insignificant. 
Relative to Model 2, Model 3 includes the lagged changes in bubble          as another 
independent variable. The coefficients on the changes in bubbles        remain significant but 
more positive in both FEM and REM. The coefficients on the lagged changes in bubbles          
are significantly negative with values of -0.434 and -0.484 respectively, which indicates the 
previous increases in bubbles tend to reduce the subsequent increases in house prices and vice 
versa, ceteris paribus. The significant but negative coefficients on the lagged changes in bubbles 
         do not support the feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007). Given the bubbles reflect 
people’s biased expectations and market anomalies, the negative coefficients on lagged changes 
in bubbles          suggest people learn from their past mistakes and try to adjust the current 
house prices to converge to their fundamental values which, in turn, justify the arguments of 
bounded rationality expectation hypothesis. The net effect of changes in bubble        and lagged 
changes in bubble         is approximately one unit, ceteris paribus. Additionally, the 
coefficients on the changes in rents          become more positive and statistically significant. 
In Models 4 and 5, the chapter adds two interactive variables,               
 
 and        
        , to control for the interaction effects.               
 
 is the interaction of changes in 
bubble and changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.                 is the interaction of changes 
in bubble and changes in rent. Throughout the chapter, all the interactive variables are scaled 
down by multiplying 100. This is because the first log differenced variables, such as          and 
       
 
, represent the continuous compounded returns on the underlying variables. However, the 
interaction variables represent the multiplying effect of return on return. The scaling only affects 
the coefficients of scaled variables but does not influence the coefficients of other variables and 
the fit of the model. The interaction effect of changes in bubble and changes in fundamental 
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price-rent ratio               
 
 are significantly positive with coefficient of 0.2% in FEM and 0.1% 
in REM, which indicates the effect of changes in bubble on the changes in house price is 
positively dependent on the changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio. On the contrary, the 
coefficient on the interaction effect of changes in bubble and changes in rent                 is 
significantly negative with a value of -0.104 in FEM and -0.154 in REM, which implies 
increasing bubbles combined with declining rents making it more attractive to buy than rent 
because of higher capital gain on ownership, ceteris paribus. The coefficients on changes in 
bubble        and lagged changes in bubble          remain significant and on their signs, after 
controlling for the interaction effects. 
In general, Table 7.2 shows a series of interesting findings. Firstly, the significantly negative 
coefficients on changes in fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
 and the significantly positive 
coefficients on changes in rent          jointly indicates that with the changes in house price, the 
changes in the fundamental house price are less than the changes in rent, ceteris paribus. On one 
hand, Britain has probably the most liberalised private renting market in the European Union 
(EU) since 1989. Less security of tenure and the long-term taxation imbalance between the rental 
and the owned makes it more attractive to rent rather than own than ever before. On the other 
hand, the structure of the privately rented market has been changed over the past two decades. 
The typical landlord has treated the buy-to-let as the mainstream for personal investment, and the 
tenants are now composited by far more immigrations and younger people. Consequently, 
although changes in rent may be less than the changes in market house price, they can easily 
exceed the changes in the fundamental house price in the UK, at least in the nominal term. 
Secondly, the causality tests reject the null hypothesis of changes in bubbles and lagged changes 
in bubbles and are jointly insignificant,                       . Therefore, the changes in 
bubble        and the lagged changes in bubbles          jointly cause the contemporaneous 
changes in house prices        , ceteris paribus. 
Thirdly, throughout the chapter, the FEMs use regional fixed effects which assume the potential 
omitted variable bias from variables that vary across regions but are constant over time. The 
chapter does not exhibit the results of the fixed time effects, primarily because the results of time 
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fixed effects are highly consistent with the results of FEM with regional fixed effects. 
Furthermore, the chapter does not present the fixed regional and time effect model, given the 
chapter’s dataset is not large enough to end up as a reasonable model fit. 
Fourthly, the explanatory power of fundamental factors, in particular the changes in fundamental 
price-rent ratio        
 
 and the changes in rent         , on the changes in house price        , is 
quite low as the    is just 0.16 in Model 1. After incorporating the changes in bubbles       , the 
   dramatically increases to above 0.81 in Model 2 which indicates the changes in bubble can 
significantly explain the changes in house prices. The marginal effect of lagged changes in 
bubbles          and interaction effects on changes in house price is quite low as the marginal 
increase in    is less than 0.05 in Models 2 through to 5. 
Finally, the F-tests for the fixed effects are statistically significant in Models 2 through to 5, 
which indicate the FEMs are superior to the Pooled OLS in these four models. The Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) random effects test fails to reject the null hypothesis of variances across 
individuals as zero in Models 1 through to 5. Therefore, the Pooled OLS outperforms REM in all 
five models. The Hausman test suggests REM outperforms FEM in Model 1, as the Hausman 
test fails to reject the null hypothesis of REM is preferred. However, the Hausman tests break 
down in the remaining four models, given the     . This is because the model fitted on these 
data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions of the Hausman Test. Consequently, Pooled OLS 
works best in Model 1. FEMs are superior to Pooled OLS and REM in Models 2 through to 5. 
For the five FEMs, the LM independence tests indicate the residuals are serially correlated. The 
Pasaran Cross-Sectional (CD) tests suggest the residuals are correlated across individuals, expect 
for Model 3. The heteroskedasticity tests reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. Because 
the diagnostics tests suggest the FEMs violate two or three model assumptions, the findings of 
FEMs in Table 7.2 might be biased more or less. 
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Table 7.2 Changes in Bubbles cause Changes in HPIs: Fixed Effects Models vs. Random Effects Models (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Dependent Variable 
         
Fixed Effects Models 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Random Effects Models 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  -.031*** 
(.003) 
-.020*** 
(.001) 
-.022*** 
(.001) 
-.026*** 
(.001) 
-.026*** 
(.001) 
-.031*** 
(.003) 
-.021*** 
(.001) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.026*** 
(.002) 
-.026*** 
(.002) 
          -.167 
(.201) 
.136 
(.094) 
.232** 
(.095) 
.232** 
(.093) 
.349*** 
(.102) 
-.167 
(.200) 
.115 
(.107) 
.224** 
(.108) 
.224** 
(.107) 
.397*** 
(.116) 
         
1.209*** 
(.024) 
1.538*** 
(.034) 
1.479*** 
(.035) 
1.557*** 
(.044) 
 
 
1.124*** 
(.026) 
1.500*** 
(.038) 
1.455*** 
(.040) 
1.571*** 
(.051) 
            
-.434*** 
(.034) 
-.395*** 
(.034) 
-.414*** 
(.035) 
 
 
 
 
-.484*** 
(.039) 
-.456*** 
(.039) 
-.483*** 
(.040) 
              
 
     
.002*** 
(.0004) 
.002*** 
(.0004) 
   
.001*** 
(.0004) 
.001*** 
(.0004) 
                     
-.104*** 
(.037) 
    
-.154*** 
(.042) 
Constant .017*** 
(.002) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
Causality Test    .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No      
No. Observation 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 
Within    .160 .818 .853 .858 .860 .160 .817 .851 .857 .858 
F-test for Fixed Effect .997 .000 .000 .000 .000      
LM Random Effect Test      1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Hausman Test .999                         .999                         
LM Independence Test  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Pasaran CD Test .000 .000 .374 .028 .004      
Heteroskedasticity Test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Notes:    means first difference.         denotes the changes in house price index.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.          denotes 
the changes in house rent index.        denotes the changes in bubble. The interaction variables,               
 
 and                , are scaled down by 
multiplying 100.      means the Hausman test fails as model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptotic assumptions. The values presented for the 
diagnostics tests are  -      . The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                       . The null hypothesis of LM Independence Test is that residuals 
across regions are not correlated. The null hypothesis of Pasaran Cross-sectional Dependence (CD) Test is the residuals are not correlated across regions. The 
null hypothesis of Heteroskedasticity test is homoskedasticity. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. *** and ** stand for statistical significance at 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
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As a robust check, Table 7.3 displays the findings of the Panel-Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) 
with AR(1), and the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) with heteroskedasticity. Both 
approaches correct the panel residuals for groupwise heteroskedasticity, contemporaneous 
correlation, and serial correlation. PCSE is an alternative to FGLS. When AR(1) is not specified, 
PCSE produces OLS estimates of the coefficients, while the standard errors are estimated 
differently. When AR(1) is specified, PCSE estimates the coefficients by the Prais-Winsten 
regression which is conditional on the estimates of the autocorrelation coefficients. The FGLS 
estimation is conditional on the estimation of the residual covariance matrix and is conditional on 
any autocorrelation coefficients that are estimated. Either PCSE or FGLS estimator is consistent 
when the conditional mean is properly specified. FGLS is more efficient than PCSE, as long as 
the assumed covariance is correctly structured. However, the full FGLS variance-covariance 
estimates might be biased when the applied dataset consists of 10-20 regions with 10-40 time 
periods. The datasets, especially the subsamples, used in this chapter roughly falls into this 
category. PCSEs are helpful in precisely assessing the variance across regions, as they purport to 
create higher standard errors in an effort to generate more conservative results. 
PCSE with AR(1) and FGLS with heteroskedasticity may provide a better statistical estimation, 
especially for the standard errors. However, they are unsuitable to control the omitted variable 
bias as FEM does. In general, the findings of Table 7.3 are highly consistent with Table 7.2. One 
interesting finding is the standard errors for PCSE with AR(1) are 50%-100% higher than those 
for the FGLS with the heteroskedasticity model (Beck and Katz, 1995). 
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Table 7.3 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI: PCSE with AR(1) vs. FGLS with (Heteroskedasticity) (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Dependent Variable 
         
PCSE (AR1) 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
FGLS (Heteroskedasticity) 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  -.031*** 
(.002) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.027*** 
(.002) 
-.027*** 
(.002) 
-.029*** 
(.002) 
-.023*** 
(.001) 
-.026*** 
(.001) 
-.028*** 
(.001) 
-.028*** 
(.001) 
          -.012 
(.244) 
.133 
(.119) 
.214* 
(.112) 
.218* 
(.115) 
.375*** 
(.132) 
-.198 
(.183) 
.068 
(.081) 
.111 
(.079) 
.101 
(.079) 
.291*** 
(.089) 
         1.159*** 
(.037) 
1.477*** 
(.042) 
1.409*** 
(.046) 
1.515*** 
(.056) 
 
 
1.081*** 
(.020) 
1.560*** 
(.031) 
1.550*** 
(.033) 
1.657*** 
(.040) 
            
 
-.463*** 
(.042) 
-.418*** 
(.044) 
-.442*** 
(.044) 
 
 
 
 
-.516*** 
(.031) 
-.513*** 
(.033) 
-.541*** 
(.032) 
              
 
     .002*** 
(.0004) 
.002*** 
(.0004) 
   .001*** 
(.0003) 
.001** 
(.0003) 
                     -.142*** 
(.046) 
    -.138*** 
(.032) 
Constant .015*** 
(.005) 
.003** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.017*** 
(.002) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
No. Observation 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 720 
    .328 .737 .791 .793 .797      
         .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.         denotes the changes in house price index.         
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.        denotes the changes in house price bubble. The interaction variables,               
 
 and                , are scaled down 
by multiplying 100. The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                       .       
  tests for whether all the coefficients in the model are joint 
significant. Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7.4 studies whether the changes in house prices        cause changes in bubble  
       in terms of fixed effects model with robust standard error (White, 1980), and PCSE with 
AR(1). In Table 7.4, Model 1 regresses changes in bubble        against changes in the 
fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
 and changes in rent         . The coefficient on changes in 
the fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
 is significantly negative with a value of -0.008 in FEM 
and -0.006 in PCSE with AR(1), respectively. The coefficient on changes in rent          is 
significantly negative with a value of -0.251 in FEM; but statistically insignificant in PCSE with 
AR(1). 
After controlling for changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio        
 
 and changes in rent 
        , Model 2 suggests the coefficient on changes in house price         is significantly 
positive with a value of 0.648 in FEM and 0.488 in PCSE with AR(1). Therefore, Model 2 of 
FEM suggests that one unit changes in house price only drive 0.65 unit changes in bubble. This 
is because bubbles are primarily driven by people’s biased expectations alongside the available 
information, ceteris paribus. Moreover, the coefficient on changes in the fundamental price-rent 
ratio        
 
 becomes significantly positive, implying the changes in bubble reflect people’s 
biased reaction to the changes in the fundamental. Overall, the results for Model 2 support the 
bounded rationality hypothesis. 
Model 3 adds the lagged changes in house price           as another independent variable. The 
coefficient on changes in house price         is still significant and positive, ceteris paribus. The 
coefficients on lagged changes in house price           are significantly positive with a value of 
approximately 0.2, which indicates the one unit changes in house price will cause about 20% 
subsequent changes in bubble, ceteris paribus. Model 4 and Model 5 include interaction 
variables, changes in house price and changes in the fundamental price-rent ratio               
 
, 
and changes in house price and changes in rent                . The interaction variables, 
               
  and                 , are scaled down by multiplying 100. After controlling for 
the interaction variables, the coefficient on changes in house price remains significantly positive. 
The coefficients on               
 
 are insignificant. The coefficients on                 are 
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significant and negative, while the figures of coefficients are quite small in both FEM and PCSE 
with AR(1). 
In Table 7.4, the causality test indicates the changes in house price         and lagged changes in 
house price           are joint significant in driving the changes in bubble       . The LM 
independence tests indicate the fixed effects models are subject to serial correlations. Pasaran CD 
tests report cross sectional dependence in Model 1 and Model 2. The robust standard deviations 
(White, 1980) fail to control for the standard error heteroskedasticities in Models 1 through to 5. 
Overall, the findings of FEM are highly consistent with PCSE with AR(1), except for a few 
exceptions. 
Tables 7.2 through to 7.4 suggest there are statistically significant feedback effects between the 
changes in bubble and the changes in contemporaneous house price between 1996Q2 and 
2011Q1. However, the effect is asymmetric. After controlling for the fundamental variables, one 
unit changes in contemporaneous bubble drives approximately one unit changes in house prices, 
given bubble is a component of house price. One unit changes in house price only cause about 60% 
units changes in contemporaneous bubble, even controlling for some fundamental variables. 
149 
 
Table 7.4 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble: Fixed Effects Models vs. PCSE (AR1) (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Dependent Variable 
        
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
PCSE (AR1) 
(1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  
-.008*** 
(.003) 
.011*** 
(.003) 
.009*** 
(.002) 
.009*** 
(.002) 
.012*** 
(.002) 
-.006*** 
(.001) 
.009*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.001) 
.011*** 
(.001) 
          -.251** 
(.099) 
-.143 
(.108) 
-.141 
(.104) 
-.140 
(.124) 
-.130 
(.117) 
-.123 
(.126) 
-.134 
(.109) 
-.120** 
(.058) 
-.129** 
(.063) 
-.136** 
(.063) 
          .648*** 
(.074) 
.555*** 
(.064) 
.555*** 
(.056) 
.580*** 
(.057) 
 
 
.488*** 
(.021) 
.507*** 
(.014) 
.504*** 
(.017) 
.531*** 
(.018) 
             
 
.237*** 
(.013) 
.237*** 
(.013) 
.228*** 
(.014) 
 
 
 
 
.194*** 
(.012) 
.194*** 
(.012) 
.187*** 
(.012) 
               
 
  
   -.001 
(.024) 
-.005 
(.021) 
   .005 
(.018) 
.004 
(.018) 
                      -.001*** 
(.0002) 
    -.001*** 
(.0001) 
Constant .012*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
.009* 
(.005) 
.003** 
(.002) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
-.0003 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes      
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No      
No. Observation 720 720 708 708 708 720 720 708 708 708 
Within    .029 .790 .889 .889 .893 .072 .615 .723 .725 .731 
LM Independence Test  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
Pasaran CD Test .000 .000 .377 .378 .194      
Heteroskedasticity .000 .000 .000 .000 .000      
              .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.        denotes the changes in house price bubble.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.         denotes the changes in house price index. The Robust St. Dev. stands for robust standard deviation (White, 1980) which 
controls for heteroskedasticity. The interaction variables,                
 
 and                 , are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the 
diagnostics tests are  -      . The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                         . The null hypothesis of LM Independence test is that 
residuals across regions are not correlated. The null hypothesis of Pasaran Cross-sectional Dependence (CD) test is the residuals are not correlated across regions. 
The null hypothesis of heteroskedasticity test is homoskedasticity.         tests for whether all the coefficients in the model are jointly significant. 
Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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7.4.2 Robustness Tests 
Following the modelling procedure in Table 7.2, Table 7.5 investigates whether the changes in 
bubbles cause the changes in house prices in terms of FEM with robust standard errors (White, 
1980) for the subsamples 1996Q2-2000Q4, 2001Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2011Q1. The three 
subsamples roughly match the recovery, boom and recession of the UK housing market, 
respectively. 
The findings of Table 7.5 are highly consistent with Table 7.2. Broadly speaking, Table 7.2, 
Table 7.3 and Table 7.5 altogether exhibit parameter instability, which means the coefficient on 
any given variable changes from model to model and over time. For example, in the subsample 
1996Q2-2000Q4, the coefficient on the changes in bubble        ranges from 0.94 to 1.2 in 
models 2 through to 5, which is much lower than that for the rest of samples for a given model. 
But the coefficient on the lagged changes in bubble          ranges from -0.33 to -0.25, which is 
higher than that of the rest of the samples. Moreover, the coefficients on the changes in rent and 
the interaction variables experience more changes than that for the rest of the variables, in terms 
of magnitude and sign. 
From an economics perspective, the time varying coefficients reflect the dynamics of the 
underlying economy and people’s economic behaviour, which supports the findings in Chapters 
3 through to 6. Given the sample size is relatively small, the changes in coefficient over time is 
quite modest, even in the presence of the Subprime Crisis between 2007 and 2009. 
Following Table 7.4, Table 7.6 studies whether the changes in house price cause the changes in 
bubble by using FEM with robust standard errors (White, 1980) for the subsamples 1996Q2-
2000Q4, 2001Q1-2006Q4 and 2007Q1-2011Q1. The general findings in Table 7.6 are highly 
consistent with Table 7.4, except for the modest parameter instability. 
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Table 7.5 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI (Panel A): Fixed Effects Models (1996Q2-2000Q4 vs. 2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Dependent Variable 
         
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (1996Q2-2000Q4) 
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  
-.041*** 
(.003) 
-.031*** 
(.005) 
-.033*** 
(.005) 
-.036*** 
(.005) 
-.037*** 
(.005) 
-.018*** 
(.002) 
-.014*** 
 (.003) 
-.018*** 
(.005) 
-.015** 
(.006) 
-.015** 
(.006) 
          .070 
(.077) 
.194* 
(.105) 
.266* 
(.143) 
.230 
(.136) 
.353 
(.212) 
-.629*** 
(.169) 
.189 
(.128) 
.159 
(.170) 
.152 
(.170) 
.623*** 
(.174) 
         .941*** 
(.082) 
1.087*** 
(.117) 
1.063*** 
(.125) 
1.203*** 
(.131) 
 
 
1.263*** 
(.116) 
1.592*** 
(.261) 
1.610*** 
(.263) 
1.742*** 
(.269) 
            
 
-.325*** 
(.079) 
-.254** 
(.087) 
-.274*** 
(.080) 
 
 
 
 
-.490** 
(.218) 
-.504** 
(.220) 
-.519** 
(.219) 
              
 
  
   .004*** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.002) 
   -.0006 
(.001) 
-.001 
(.001) 
                     -.162 
(.146) 
    -.202*** 
(.058) 
Constant .015*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.007*** 
(.001) 
.006*** 
(.002) 
.038*** 
(.001) 
.001 
(.003) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.005** 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No 
No. Observation 228 228 216 216 216 288 288 276 276 276 
Within    .539 .794 .824 .834 .836 .107 .759 .806 .806 .814 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.         denotes the changes in house price index.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.        denotes the changes in house price bubble. The robust standard deviation (White, 1980) controls for heteroskedasticity. 
The interaction variables,               
 
 and                , are scaled down by multiplying 100. The values presented for the diagnostics tests are  -      . 
The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                       . Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 7.5 Changes in Bubble cause Changes in HPI (Panel B): Fixed Effects Models (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Dependent Variable 
          
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  
-.046*** 
(.007) 
-.027*** 
(.007) 
 -.027*** 
(.007) 
-.024*** 
(.006) 
-.024*** 
(.006) 
          -.635* 
(.312) 
-.152 
(.295) 
.347 
(.269) 
.313 
(.249) 
.359 
(.347) 
         1.146*** 
(.105) 
1.459*** 
(.264) 
1.429*** 
(.259) 
1.406*** 
(.278) 
            
 
-.469** 
(.207) 
-.434* 
(.199) 
-.432** 
(.200) 
              
 
  
   .004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
                     .031 
(.118) 
Constant -.007*** 
(.002) 
.003 
(.002) 
-.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
No. Observation 204 204 192 192 192 
Within    .346 .784 .821 .831 .832 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.         denotes the changes in house price index.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.        denotes the changes in house price bubble. The robust standard deviation (White, 1980) controls for heteroskedasticity. 
The interaction variables,                
 
 and                 , are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are  -      . 
The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                       . Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 7.6 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble (Panel A): Fixed Effects Models (1996Q2-2000Q4 vs. 2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Dependent Variable 
         
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (1996Q2-2000Q4) 
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (2001Q1-2006Q4) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  
-.010** 
(.004) 
.014*** 
(.003) 
.014*** 
(.002) 
.015*** 
(.002) 
.018*** 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.007** 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.014*** 
(.003) 
          -.132 
(.113) 
-.173 
(.110) 
-.135 
(.109) 
.007 
(.124) 
-.059 
(.136) 
-.648*** 
(.115) 
-.284*** 
(.082) 
-.212** 
(.091) 
-.324* 
(.169) 
-.290 
(.173) 
          .586*** 
(.080) 
.623*** 
(.073) 
.713*** 
(.068) 
.698*** 
(.066) 
 
 
.578*** 
(.083) 
.533*** 
(.059) 
.512*** 
(.060) 
.539*** 
(.060) 
             
 
.203*** 
(.031) 
.193*** 
(.031) 
.196*** 
(.022) 
 
 
 
 
.230*** 
(.010) 
.231*** 
(.010) 
.220*** 
(.010) 
               
 
  
   -.105** 
(.041) 
-.059 
(.039) 
   .035 
(.041) 
.022 
(.042) 
                      -.001*** 
(.0004) 
    -.001*** 
(.0003) 
Constant .010*** 
(.001) 
.002** 
(.001) 
-.003*** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
.029*** 
(.001) 
.007** 
(.003) 
.001 
(.002) 
.002 
(.002) 
.0008 
(.002) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No No No 
No. Observation 228 228 216 216 216 288 288 276 276 276 
Within    .112 .602 .734 .751 .777 .044 .742 .857 .858 .865 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000   .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.        denotes the changes in house price bubble.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.         denotes the changes in house price index. The robust standard deviation (White, 1980) controls for heteroskedasticity. 
The interaction variables,                
 
 and                 , are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are  -      . 
The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                         . Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 7.6 Changes in HPI cause Changes in Bubble (Panel B): Fixed Effects Models (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Dependent Variable 
         
Fixed Effects Models (Robust St. Dev.) 
UK (2007Q1-2011Q1) 
Independent Variables Model 1. Model 2. Model 3. Model 4. Model 5. 
       
 
  
-.017*** 
(.004) 
.010*** 
(.004) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
          -.422 
(.332) 
-.050 
(.228) 
-.181 
(.184) 
-.186 
(.198) 
-.155 
(.182) 
          .585*** 
(.083) 
.528*** 
(.081) 
.530*** 
(.078) 
.542*** 
(.079) 
             
 
.223*** 
(.012) 
.223*** 
(.013) 
.216*** 
(.013) 
               
 
  
   -.003 
(.031) 
-.0001 
(.033) 
                      
 
-.0007** 
(.0003) 
Constant -.009*** 
(.002) 
-.005** 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.004*** 
(.001) 
Regional Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects No No No No No 
No. Obs 204 204 192 192 192 
Within    .126 .712 .824 .824 .829 
Causality Test   .000 .000 .000 
Notes:    means first difference.        denotes the changes in house price bubble.        
 
 denotes the changes in fundamental price-rent ratio.           denotes 
the changes in house rent index.         denotes the changes in house price index. The robust standard deviation (White, 1980) controls for heteroskedasticity. 
The interaction variables,                
 
 and                 , are scaled down by multiplying 100. Values presented for the diagnostics tests are  -      . 
The null hypothesis of Causality Test is                         . Coefficient standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter supports the bounded rationality hypothesis best fit into the UK housing market. 
However, the chapter does not support the feedback theory (Shiller, 1990,2007) because an 
increase in bubble could cause a subsequent decrease in house price, ceteris paribus. This 
chapter demonstrates that the findings in Chapters 5 and 6 are robust over time, even in panel 
data analysis. 
The statistically significant and positive feedback causal relationship between the changes in 
house price and the contemporaneous changes in bubble are asymmetrical. One unit changes in 
bubble could approximately drive one unit changes in house price, after controlling for the 
fundamental variables. Therefore, it is the build-up of bubbles which is driving the changes in 
house prices over time. By contrast, one unit changes in house price only causes about 60% unit 
changes in bubble, after controlling for the contemporaneous fundamental variables and the 
lagged changes in house price. 
As the bubbles do not follow an explosive path, the bubbles are not rational bubbles which reject 
the rational expectation hypothesis. The lagged changes in bubble could significantly cause the 
subsequent changes in house price in reverse direction, which suggests people learn from their 
past mistakes and try to adjust the house prices to converge to their fundamental value. However, 
the adjustment effect is not powerful enough to offset the negative effects of biased expectations 
at the current period, ceteris paribus. The changes in fundamental variables could significantly 
drive the changes in bubble implying that the bubbles are not dominated by people’s purely 
irrational behaviour, so rejecting the irrational expectation hypothesis. These evidences jointly 
support the bounded rationality hypothesis and best fit the UK housing market. 
Thirdly, the modest time varying coefficients for a given variable indicate there are institutional 
changes which, in turn, suggest people adjust their behaviours according to the dynamics of the 
underlying economy. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to literature by investigating the underlying valuation drivers of the UK 
housing prices both methodologically and empirically. 
Chapter 2 proposes a three-step theoretical framework for studying the primary drivers of 
housing prices. The rationale is that people make investment decisions by studying the 
underlying costs and benefits. Additionally, people respond to expectations under the given 
behaviour rules, which refer to the institutions in place. Following the three-step framework, 
Chapter 2 reviews literature from three interrelated aspects: 
 Common factors that are specific to the UK housing price in a closed economy and an 
open economy. 
 The implications of four typical expectation hypotheses, namely, Irrational Expectation 
Hypothesis, Adaptive Expectation Hypothesis, Rational Expectation Hypothesis, and 
Bounded Rationality Expectation Hypothesis. 
 The institutions and the effect of institutional changes on the UK housing prices. 
Chapters 3 and 4 suggest the classical fixed parameter models are poor in terms of robustness, 
especially the regression coefficients changes in both magnitude and sign over samples. Brown 
et al. (1997) suggest that the time varying coefficients indicate the possibility of institutional 
changes and the changes in the unobservable components of economic variables such as 
expectations. Some naïve modifications will improve the fit of the underlying equation. However, 
it is unclear why people should make such a modification. 
Chapter 5 proposes a user cost framework in a state space model. The empirical results indicate 
that UK house prices were undervalued from 1996Q1 to 2002Q4 and thereafter overvalued. As a 
proportion, the bubble ranges from -52% to 27.4% in log scale, which is indeed quite a 
substantial range. The chapter supports the bounded rationality hypothesis implying the UK 
housing bubbles reflect people’s biased expectations. 
Chapter 6 empirically suggests that the fast-moving institutional changes are likely to occur at 
the domestic financial crises by using the structural break tests. This chapter expands literature 
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by using three novel Time Varying Parameter (TVP) models to quantify the slow-moving 
institutional changes. The TVP models empirically suggest that people’s biased expectations are 
playing a much more important role in driving the UK house prices than ever. However, the 
effects of fundamental variables on housing prices are decaying over time. 
Chapter 7 indicates that the bounded rationality hypothesis best fit into the UK housing market in 
the context of the panel data analysis. However, the chapter does not support the feedback theory 
(Shiller, 1990,2007) because an increase in bubble could cause a subsequent decrease in house 
price, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, the chapter provides the first empirical evidence to justify 
the statistically significant feedback causality between the changes in bubble and the 
contemporaneous changes in house prices by using the Fixed Effects Model (FEM). Finally, the 
regression coefficients changes modestly over time indicate there are institutional changes. 
Overall, the findings in Chapters 3 through to 7 empirically support the three-step framework. 
Housing prices are not only determined by fundamental economic variables but also people’s 
expectations, under the given institutions in place. Through a series of institutional changes, 
people’s biased expectations are playing a far more important role in driving the UK house 
prices than the fundamentals. 
The bounded rationality hypothesis suggest that people’s expectations and economic behaviours 
might be biased due to cognitive and psychological limitations which, in turn, indicates the 
market might be inefficient, at least temporarily. However, people learn from their mistakes and 
attempt to satisfice by acting as rationally as possible. For policymakers, interest rate is not the 
only source of housing dynamics. Public policy, e.g. manipulating money supply and interest 
rates, may fix housing recessions in the short run but run the risk of re-inflating housing bubbles 
in the future. Furthermore, people’s expected capital gain, or people’s biased expectations, 
should be given much more emphasis when stabilizing housing markets. In order to enhance 
market stability, policymakers may implement counter-cyclical policies, given human nature is 
inherently pro-cyclical. For markets already in a bubble, releasing the bubble modestly may save 
more than busting the bubble immediately. For financial institutions, periodically studying the 
housing market, rational diversification and timely rebalancing portfolios may help them prevent 
similar losses by those experienced during the Subprime Crisis. A reasonably volatile price not 
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only drives the market price to regress to equilibrium, but also provides informed investors with 
profit opportunities and vice versa. 
It would be appreciated if any future studies can fill the gaps of this thesis from the following 
aspects. 
 Firstly, whether the housing price bubbles exists under the assumption that bubbles 
follow a non-linear non-normal distribution? 
 Secondly, whether the bounded rationality hypothesis fit into the other housing markets? 
 Thirdly, whether the three-step theoretical analysis framework is supported in the other 
housing markets and/or stock markets? 
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Appendices 
Table A. Variable Sources 
Variable Definition Source and Time Period 
      Net FDI Inflow: Gross Earnings Office for National Statistics 
     Foreign Currency Reserves International Financial Statistics (IMF) 
    Number of owner occupied houses 
using data on completions of private sector 
Office for National Statistics 
    Total Mortgage Outstanding Bank of England 
    Retail Price Index Office for National Statistics 
      DCLG house price index Department of Communities and Local 
Government 
        Interest Rate on New Mortgages to Owners Building Societies 
         Basic Rate Mortgages: Composite Banks 
and Building Societies 
Office for National Statistics 
    Net Export Good/Services Office for National Statistics 
    Real Household Disposable Income  Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Source: DataStream 
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Table B. Variable Definitions and Expressions 
Variable Economic meaning 
       
 
      
∑           
 
     
       is a restricted Almon polynomial. 
         
 
 
                         
 
 
      
 
 
        
 
 
          
   Rate of completion of new units. 
   and    Historical means of the feedback. 
  
  
  
   
     is Dummy variable. 
   Excess demand. 
                        
                                                      
          Physical housing stock. 
          House demand and House supply, respectively. 
              House rent index. 
           Mortgage total outstanding (£ Million). 
        Real mortgage value. 
         
 
   
  Real value of the mortgage stock. 
          Real mortgage value per unit income. 
          
 
    
  Ratio of borrowed to own equity. 
    Number of families. 
            RPI: General Index of retail price. 
    Overall house prices. 
                         is the House Price Index (HPI). 
         Real house prices. 
              Average value of housing per unit income. 
          
  
  
  Ratio of house price to incomes. 
   
 
  Fundamental price-rent ratio. 
            Price-income ratio. 
   
 
  Fundamental price-income ratio. 
     
           After-tax mortgage rate,    is the Marginal Tax Rate. 
        
   Mortgage rate. 
  
  
  
   
   
 ̅   
  
 
 
              
 ̅  
 
 
            
          Real household disposable income (£ Million). 
        Real income per household. 
         
    The cubic effect of changes in lagged house price. 
Notes: Lower case letters for time-dependent variables represent the natural logarithm of their capital counterparts. 
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Table C. Basic Data Summary 
Sample 1968Q2-1982Q4 
                  
        
              
No. Obs. 59 59 59 59 59 59 / 59 
Mean 2.21848 2.99641 3.84312 9.91000 3.66056 9.10487 / 7.8129 
St. Dev. .610414 .538873 .104704 .673727 .198315 2.44502 / 1.34234 
Minimum 1.28093 2.25143 3.65686 8.85037 3.27336 5.25 / 0 
Maximum 3.10906 3.85942 3.99903 11.1257 4.06389 14.25 / 8.86841 
Sample 1983Q1-2007Q4 
                  
        
              
No. Obs. 100 100 100 100 100 100 52 100 
Mean 4.184753 4.396824 4.383296 12.659 3.675868 7.265625 5.242067 8.957995 
St. Dev. .5591631 .261959 .2184159 .6522185 .1163814 2.402262 .7186375 .8345972 
Minimum 3.13983 3.8645 3.9741 11.1779 3.48738 4.125 3.9825 6.405229 
Maximum 5.21276 4.79316 4.69691 13.5911 3.95508 12.75 6.6525 10.43494 
Sample 1968Q2-2007Q4 
                  
        
              
No. Obs. 159 159 159 159 159 159 52 159 
Mean 3.455129 3.877173 4.182854 11.63893 3.670186 7.948113 5.242067 8.533085 
St. Dev. 1.113863 .7811407 .3200674 1.485917 .1515883 2.569997 .7186375 1.185683 
Minimum 1.28093 2.25143 3.65686 8.85037 3.27336 4.125 3.9825 0 
Maximum 5.21276 4.79316 4.69691 13.5911 4.06389 14.25 6.6525 10.43494 
Sample 19995Q1-2007Q4 
                  
        
              
No. Obs. 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
Mean 4.588464 4.605609 4.561869 13.15858 3.659145 5.516827 5.242067 9.363086 
St. Dev. .4022786 .097905 .103983 .2716969 .1071827 .8154749 .7186375 .8286384 
Minimum 4.00369 4.43593 4.37243 12.7553 3.48738 4.125 3.9825 6.405229 
Maximum 5.21276 4.79316 4.69691 13.5911 3.89386 7.125 6.6525 10.43494 
Notes:         means mortgage rate from Building Societies.  
         means the composite mortgage rate from 
Building Societies and Banks. 
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Table D. ADF Unit Root Test 
ADF Unit Root Test for the Sample 1968Q2- 2007Q4 
                   
           
Log Level  0.3521 0.9080 0.0507* 0.0143** 0.0645* 0.4371 0.6081 
1
st
 Log  Difference 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.4746 0.1016* 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0001 
Notes:     is the house price index,    represents the real household disposable income,   is the mortgage 
outstanding,    is the general index of retail price.    is the physical housing stock.   
       is the mortgage rate 
from Building Societies. The composite mortgage rate from Building Societies and Banks for the sample 1995Q1- 
2007Q4 are stationary at first natural log difference. The figures shown in the table are  -      . The appropriate 
number of lagged difference for the ADF unit root test is identified by the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
 
Table E. Preliminary Statistics (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. of Obs. 
         .016 .037 -.172 .157 60 
          .007 .006 -.002 .029 60 
       
 
  
.004 .488 -2.647 2.011 60 
        .010 .026 -.099 .114 60 
Notes:         is the changes in house price index.          is the changes in house rent index.        
 
 is the changes 
in fundamental price-rent ratio.        is the changes in bubble. 
 
Table F. Correlation Matrix (1996Q2-2011Q1) 
                         
 
                           
         1.000      
          -.024 1.000     
       
 
  
-.397 -.027 1.000    
        .831 -.058 -.155 1.000   
           .362 -.009 -.048 .596 1.000  
          .544 .017 -.189 .784 .835 1.000 
Notes:         is the changes in house price index.          is the changes in house rent index.        
 
 is the changes 
in fundamental price-rent ratio.        is the changes in bubble. 
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